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ABSTRACT 
 
 This thesis aims to explore how some young Australian children construct their 
racialised ideas of difference and social relations. It adopts a qualitative method of 
inquiry and is based on face-to face, semi-structured interviews with a small sample 
of twelve Western Australian children aged three, five and seven years.  
 
  The study adopts a relatively recent perspective on children, within which 
they are viewed as having an active role in their own learning process and as 
possessing a certain level of competence (Lloyd-Smith & Tarr, 2000; James & 
James, 2004) that allows them to “comprehend, process and articulate their needs 
and experiences” (Connolly, 1996, p.172). The study also adopts a perspective of the 
multiplicity of the forms of racism (Hall, 1986; Miles, 1989, 1993) and their 
dynamic, contingent nature, specific to different political and social contexts. Within 
this understanding children are viewed not just as passive recipients of racist 
discourses, but as active agents who, in order to make sense of their social world, 
strive to deal with the often contradictory nature of information received in relation 
to the racial Other (Rizvi, 1993a; Connolly, 1996).  
 
  Bronfenbrenner’s ecological perspective on human development adopted by 
this study, allows us to position the development of children’s racialised thinking 
within the specific contexts of immediate environments (Microsystem), where 
children experience and create reality (Bronfenbrenner, 1979). At the same time, 
however, it helps us to see how the experiences within the child’s environments are 
influenced, if not determined, by the broader social processes and institutions 
(Exosystem), which in many aspects reflect the ideologies (Macrosystem) of racism 
within Australian society (Jayasuriya, 1999). 
  
The study argues that young Australian children’s racialised construction of 
difference needs to be addressed, possibly through the development of curricula and 
programs with an anti-racist rather than multicultural focus. Such curricula have a 
potential to provide children with opportunities to look critically at the dangers of 
racisms and to challenge everyday racist assumptions. Further qualitative research is 
needed to unearth the complexities of young Australian children’s racialised thought.    iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 Page
Abstract ii
Table of contents  iii
Acknowledgements ix
Key to transcripts  x
   
Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION  1
Background to the study and research aims  2
The significance of the study  6
Understanding the concept of ‘race’, racialisation and racism  7
The nature of my study  15
 
Chapter 2 THE NOTION OF RACE AND RACISM  21
Introduction 22
The ambiguity of the concept of ‘race’  23
The emergence of the racialised discourse  25
The modern discourse of ‘race’  29
‘Race’ as a means of rationalising class differences   30
 The ‘scientific’ theory of ‘race’  32
       ‘Race’ and colonialism – the issue of colour difference in the       
        representation of the colonised Other 
35
The horrors of Nazi Germany and the transformation of the ‘race’ discourse  37
       The changing boundaries of the concept of ‘race’  39
       Changes in the Australian racialised discourse  40
       The persistence of the concept of ‘race’   42
‘Race’ as a social construct  42
Conceptualising racism  46
       The imprecise meaning of racism  47
       The emergence of the concept of racism  49
       Racism: an ideology or social practice?  50
       The changing face of racism: from biology to culture  52
       What is new in ‘new racism?  55  v
       We are all the same: the colour-blind approach  60
       Consequences of colour-blind racism  61
       Unfortunately not dead: the social utility of ‘race’ and racism  62
       Conclusion  64
   
Chapter 3 DEVELOPMENT OF CHILDREN’S RACIALISED        
                  THOUGHT 
67
Introduction 68
The ‘common sense’ ideology of racism  68
Racialised representation and children  70
       Developmental antecedents for prejudice?  72
       Personality factors and children’s racialised thinking  75
       Social Reflection Theory and prejudice  78
       Social-cognitive theories and ‘racial’ attitudes  80
       Adopting  an alternative framework  86
Bio-ecological approach to development of racialised thinking  88
The Microsystem and children’s perception of social difference and social 
relations 
89
       The quality of proximal processes and racialised thinking   90
       Understanding of social roles  92
       Understanding identity as an inclusive concept  93
The Mesosystem and its role in children’s perception of social difference and 
social relations 
98
       Respect for each other – does it matter?  99
The Exo- and Macrosystem’s role in the development of children’s racialised 
thinking 
102
Macrosystem ideologies and their impact on other systems  103
       Australian Macrosystem and lessons in racist tradition  105
       The beginning of pluralism?  109
       Still ‘them’ and ‘us’ – the ‘new’ era of assimilation?  111
       Multiculturalism as diversity and education  112
       How harmonious is our ‘family of the nation’ – the new modalities of       
       racism 
113  vi
Conclusion 115
 
Chapter 4 METHODOLOGY  117
Introduction and research questions  118
Methodological approaches  121
Towards naturalistic inquiry  123
Phenomenological influences  125
Methodological implications: developing shared meanings through inductive 
inquiry and human-as-instrument approach 
126
       Learning from empathy  128
       Maintaining empathic neutrality  131
‘Extensive’ versus ‘intensive’ research  132
Before and after: reflections on my data collection  134
Study sample  138
Collecting the data  139
Developing photographs  140
Designing interviews  142
Conducting interviews  145
Ethical issues  148
Data analysis  150
   
Chapter 5 DATA ANALYSIS: CHILDREN’S CONSTRUCTION OF 
DIFFERENCE 
159
Introduction 160
What criteria do children use in constructing their understanding of 
difference?  
162
       Cassie  165
       Patrick  167
       Dane  169
       Ella  170
       George  173
       Chris  174
       Cleo  174  vii
       Adam  177
       Simone  181
       Scot  183
       Natalie  186
Do children readily talk about physical differences commonly associated with 
‘race’? 
188
        Natalie  188
How do children draw lines in their racialisation of difference?  193
       Cassie and Ella  193
       Chris   194
       George  195
       Lisa  196
       Scot  201
       Adam  202
Conclusion 205
       The important cues in children’s construction of difference  205
       Children’s perception of social desirability of discussing ‘racial’  
       differences 
208
       How do children draw lines in their racialisation of difference   209
Final notes  211
   
Chapter 6 DATA ANALYSIS: CHILDREN’S PLAYMATE 
PREFERENCES 
212
Introduction 213
Children’s potential playmate choices  215
       Ella  215
       Dane  220
       Patrick  221
       Cassie  222
       George  223
       Chris  225
       Scot  226
       Adam  229  viii
Is it acceptable to discuss ‘racial’ preferences in relation to potential 
playmates? 
235
       Cleo  235
       Natalie  239
       Lisa  242
       Simone  248
Conclusion 253
Is there a link between children’s categorisation based on characteristics 
commonly associated with ‘race’ and their verbally stated playmate 
preferences? 
253
Children’s construction of the rejected potential playmates  256
       “Brown people do not like playing with whitish people”  256
       “He might not be nice to us”  256
       “He looks too smart for me”  258
Do children wish to discuss their ‘race’ related playmate preferences with 
adults? 
259
Final thought  260
   
Chapter 7 DATA ANALYSIS: ASCRIBING VALUE TO RACIALISED 
IDEAS OF DIFFERENCE 
261
Introduction 262
Ascribing value to physical differences commonly associated with ‘race’  265
       Adam  267
       Lisa  274
       Cleo  281
Conclusion 287
   
Chapter 8 CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS  289
Introduction 290
What have I found?  291
What do my findings mean?  295
Implications of my study  304
       Reflections on the research process  304  ix
       Pedagogical implications of my findings  308
       Suggestions for further research  311
 
APPENDIX A: Guide to interviews 1 & 2  312
APPENDIX B: Consent forms  316
REFERENCES 321
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   x
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
I would like to acknowledge my supervisor Nado Aveling for her inspiration, advice 
and encouragement during the process of conducting my research and preparing this 
thesis. I would also like to thank my Edith Cowan University colleagues, Margaret 
Sims, Teresa Hutchins and Sherry Saggers for offering ideas and informal feedback 
and for providing me with understanding and invaluable support, especially during 
challenging times. 
 
Moreover, I would like to offer a special word of appreciation to all the children who 
participated in my study, and also to acknowledge the support of the families, school 
and childcare services who gave me permission to conduct my research.  
 
Lastly I would like to mention my husband Michal and my two daughters Ewa and 
Kasia whose patience, support and understanding helped me to complete this thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   xi
  KEY TO TRANSCRIPTS 
 
Conventions used in the presentation of excerpts from interview transcripts are as 
follows: 
 
I      Interviewer 
 
(other text)  Text in parenthesis has been added to describe 
body language of  interview participants 
 
(…)  Hesitation or silence during the interview 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   2
Chapter 1 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
 
Background to the study and research aims 
 
When my daughter was five years of age, she started learning music. The 
music classes included not only children, but also their parents who participated in 
various activities. During one of the lessons we played a game that required working 
with a partner. My daughter was paired up with one of the mothers whom she had 
seen before, but did not know well, as she and her child only recently joined our 
classes. In order to play the game the partners had to hold hands. I was standing next 
to my daughter at the time and noticed that she put her hands behind her back 
refusing to cooperate with her partner. I was quite puzzled at her reaction, but 
thought it was due to her unfamiliarity with this woman. When the lesson finished, I 
asked her about it and she provided me with the following explanation: “Mum, don’t 
you know that black people are very mean?” The mother, with whom my daughter 
did not want to hold hands, had quite dark brown skin. My first reaction was that of 
anger, followed by frustration that it was my daughter who demonstrated such 
prejudice. I started asking her questions only to find out that in her class at school 
there was a girl with dark brown skin who seemed not to have very good social skills 
and therefore did not get on with other children. Another class member told my 
daughter that “this girl is mean because she is black”. My five-year-old daughter 
generalised this information to other people with dark skin. 
    3
I started thinking about our home environment and realised that even though 
my husband and I are not prejudiced, we obviously do not do enough to counteract 
racist ideas to which our child may have been exposed in her everyday activities in 
other environments, such as school, her peer group, the neighbourhood or through 
books, television and other means of mass communication. I decided to be more 
proactive at home to challenge her emerging prejudice, but at the same time I went to 
see my daughter’s teacher to share my concerns. To my astonishment, the teacher 
was aware of the problem, but did not think this issue needed to be addressed as “it 
would make things even worse”. When I asked what strategies were used in the 
classroom to help children positively value differences, the teacher told me that it is 
better not to talk about them, as drawing children’s attention to such differences 
makes them prejudiced. 
 
My experience with my daughter’s teacher illustrated quite a common belief 
that the best way of dealing with racialised ideas of difference is by ignoring it. This 
belief echoes the concept of a ‘colour blind myth’, which assumes that physical 
characteristics commonly associated with ‘race’ are best not to be spoken about, as 
we as humans are more similar than we are different. It further assumes that 
acknowledging such differences can be an obstacle to creating harmonious multi-
racial societies (see Halstead, 1988). In an ideal world such a view may have some 
validity. However in our current societies, it fails to take into account the contingent 
facts of social inequalities where many minority groups experience differential 
treatment on the very basis of belonging to the socially constructed racialised 
categories. The strategy of colour blindness does not lead to providing people with 
equality in opportunities and treatment.    4
An extension of the colour blind myth is the belief that children do not notice 
differences in physical characteristics, such as skin colour. In other words, it is 
believed “that the young child is inherently colour blind” (Downey, 1998, p.2). 
However, research indicates that children respond to ‘racial’ cues from an early age. 
Downey (1998) refers to evidence showing that even six months-old babies respond 
to skin colour differences. The empirical findings from North-American and 
Canadian studies indicate that children group people in racialised categories at 
around 4-5 years of age (Kircher & Furby, 1971; Katz, 1982; Milner, 1983; 
Sigelman et al., 1986). Furthermore, research by George & Hoppe (1979), Jarret 
(1981), Ramsey (1991) and Rizvi (1993) show that children develop negative 
racialised images in relation to the members of groups with whom they might not 
have direct social relations. For example, Ramsey (1991) found that children who 
grew up in an all-White community, despite the lack of direct cross-racial contacts, 
used ‘race’ as a dominating factor in categorising and rejecting unknown peers. This 
evidence seems to suggest that children are not colour blind. They notice 
differentiating physical characteristics, such as skin colour, and quite early in their 
life may start attaching value to them. 
 
Therefore, it seems that to challenge children’s emerging stereotypes linked 
to racialised differences, they need to be discussed and actively confronted. 
However, instead of doing that, many people employ a strategy of not seeing colour 
or other characteristics commonly associated with ‘race’. Paley (1989, cited in 
Goldstein, 2001) retells a story of a black American mother who was told by her 
child’s teacher that there was no colour difference in her classroom and that all her 
pupils looked alike to her. The mother responded in the following way:   5
What rot. My children are black. They do not look like your children. 
They know they’re black and we want it recognized. It’s a positive 
difference, an interesting difference. At least it could be, if you teachers 
learned to value difference more. What you value, you talk about. (p.12) 
 
This mother expressed a view of many who experience ‘racial’ prejudice. 
Differences should not be treated as something ‘unspeakable’ (Downey, 1998). If 
they are treated like that by teachers, parents and other important adults in children’s 
lives, children may start feeling confused and uncomfortable about them. It seems 
that children experience contradictory messages in relation to difference. This is 
especially true in multicultural societies. For example, Australian children are told, 
on the one hand, that we are all the same and should be all living as a ‘happy family’. 
This is a legacy of the colour blind myth within the rhetoric of multiculturalism. 
However, on the other hand, these multicultural sentiments are often contradicted by 
the negative images of minority groups constructed as a threat or as objects of 
paternalistic concerns (Rizvi, 1993a) through the media and other contexts in which 
children directly participate, such as the family, peer group, neighbourhood, and 
school or children services.  
 
My experience and my subsequent interest in children and ‘race’ gave rise to 
my study, which is concerned with how children make sense of the different 
racialised discourses to which they are exposed and how they construct their 
racialised ideas of difference. My study is guided by the following research 
questions: 
 
  Do some young Australian children use ‘race’ as a dominating category in 
structuring their perceptions of self and others? 
  Is there a link between the study participants’ racialised categorization and 
their verbally stated playmate preferences?    6
 
  How do some young Australian children ascribe value to their racialised 
ideas of difference? 
 
  Do the study participants’ racialised ideas of difference reflect discourses, to 
which they are exposed?  
 
The significance of the study 
 
Children and ‘race’ have been of interest to researchers for a considerable 
number of years. However, the majority of research procedures to study this topic 
have been developed and used overseas, mainly in the U.S.A., Canada and Europe.  
For that reason their generalisability to other contexts is difficult to assess. In 
Australia this topic remains relatively unexplored. Studies by Palmer (1990), Rizvi 
(1993), Black-Gutman & Hickson (1996) and MacNaughton & Davis (2001) are 
some examples of the few attempts undertaken in the last twenty years to understand 
and document young children’s racialised thinking in an Australian context. 
Although there are some other research studies conducted by teachers interested in 
this topic, their results are often unpublished and therefore difficult to access (e.g. 
Barnes, 1991, cited in MacNaughton & Davis, 2001).  
 
As Australia is a ‘multi-racial’ society, with a declared policy of harmony 
and tolerance, an awareness of how children construct their ideas of ‘racial’ 
differences and how they ascribe value to such differences is important. My research 
aims to contribute to this knowledge. It also aims to contribute to a better 
understanding of the racialised discourses and practices that impact on the 
development of children’s images of the Other. Such improved understanding may 
influence the development of curricula and programs for young Australian children   7
with stronger anti-racist rather than a multicultural focus. Anti-racist curricula have a 
potential to provide children with opportunities to look critically at the dangers of 
racisms, whether intentional or unintentional, biological or cultural (Cole, 1998), and 
challenge racist thinking that rationalises the disadvantaged position of minority 
groups. Education with an anti-racist focus seems very much needed in Australia, 
where racisms, in various forms and shapes, still persist (Pettman, 1992; Jayasuriya, 
1999). One could argue that it is unrealistic to expect curricula to have the power of 
directly changing the existing racialised discourses and structures in society. 
However, such curricula can provide opportunities to develop a culture within 
schools or children services where society’s racist terms of reference (Naidoo, 1992) 
can be questioned and challenged by children now and possibly carried into their 
future roles in the broader society.  
 
Understanding the concept of ‘race’, racialisation and racism 
  
Before I discuss the nature of my study in more detail, I would like to define 
the notion of ‘race’, racialisation and racism, as well as to explain how these terms 
are going to be used in this dissertation. Such understanding is important in the 
context of researching children and ‘race’, as it impacts on the design of the study as 
well as its data collection and interpretation.  
 
The concept of ‘race’ is characterized by the lack of coherence and by 
continuous change. The validity of the term has been the subject of arguments in 
academia and in society generally both in the past and in the present. I would like to 
argue after Miles (1989; 1993) that the notion of ‘race’ is constructed in the process   8
of signification in the representation of the Other in social discourse. Through the 
process of signifying certain biological human characteristics, the world population 
started being sorted into distinct groups, which from the eighteenth century were 
represented in social discourse as ‘races’, whose social relations were understood to 
be shaped by their allegedly inherent characteristics (Miles, 1989). Miles 
conceptualizes this process as racialisation and defines it as one which attributes 
meanings “to particular biological features of human beings, as a result of which 
individuals may be assigned to, [or categorized into], a general collectivity of 
persons reproducing itself biologically” (1989, p.76). The concept of racialisation 
can be understood as referring to “the historical emergence of the idea of ‘race’ and 
to its subsequent reproduction and application” (Miles, 1989, p.76). The particular 
content of the process of racialisation as well as its social consequences relate to 
specific historical and political contexts.  
 
The concept of racialisation is closely linked to that of racism. Understood as 
an ideology, racism presupposes a process of racialisation as it signifies certain 
phenotypical and/or genetic characteristics of human beings and uses them as the 
criteria by which a collectivity, the Other, that is represented as having natural 
unchanging origins and status, may be identified. However, what differentiates racist 
ideology from racialisation is that people sorted into such categories are further 
attributed with additional (negatively evaluated) characteristics, either biological or 
cultural. In racist discourses the supposedly inherent negative characteristics of the 
different Other contrast with the positive characteristics of the Self (Miles, 1989). 
The Other in such discourses is defined as a problem and is often represented as a 
threat to the Self. Although the idea of ‘races’ is scientifically no longer valid, it   9
persists as a social construct and is continuously used, if only implicitly, in current 
racist discourses.  
The scientific advances revealing major “commonality of human DNA” have 
discredited the notion of ‘races’ as fixed, natural systems of genetic differences 
(Gillborn, 1995, p.3). However, our socially constructed world remains unchanged. 
The process of racialisation continues. People still routinely categorise themselves 
and others according to ‘racial’ criteria. Further, many legal, economic, employment 
and educational institutions operate today in racialised ways, providing inequitable 
opportunities and treatment for different individuals based on their belonging to 
‘racial’ categories primarily defined in terms of common physical characteristics 
(phenotypes) or geographical origins, and more recently in terms of their cultural 
heritage. ‘Race’ has no genetic credibility; nevertheless, it exists as a social 
construct. The term is still commonly used to refer to groups of people who are 
socially defined as sharing common characteristics. As Gillborn maintains “such 
groupings are […] not a biological fact, but are defined into existence” (1990, p.4). 
Therefore, “ ‘race’ operates as a system of socially constructed and enforced criteria, 
constantly recreated and modified through human interactions” (Gillborn, 1995, p.3). 
Such an understanding of ‘race’, sometimes known as ‘social race’ underpins most 
use of this term in contemporary social discourse and it is in this sense that I use it in 
this dissertation. I understand ‘race’ as having no objective meaning and as a social 
construct, and for that reason I enclose this term in the inverted commas to 
emphasize its problematic nature.  
 
As I stated earlier, I claim after Miles (1989) that the existence of ‘race’ is 
related to the process of signification in the representation of Others in a social   10
discourse. Representation is understood here as a process of depicting the social 
world in such a way that it creates “a sense of how things really are” (p.70). How 
human kind is divided depends on how people choose to represent other people. The 
fact that only certain physical characteristics, such as skin colour, are “signified to 
define ‘races’ … indicates that we are investigating not a given, natural division of 
the world population, but the application of historically and culturally specific 
meanings to the totality of human physiological variation” (Miles, 1989, p.71). Miles 
rightly warns us about the dangers of using the notion of ‘race’ in a social discourse, 
as the manner of the use of this term commonly implies an acceptance of differences 
between human beings, which “express the existence of distinct, self-reproducing 
groups” (1993, p.2). However, I believe that ‘race’ is a useful analytical tool in the 
study of racism, which allows us to reflect on and explore how despite the lack of its 
objective meaning, the concept of ‘race’ is socially formed, erased and resuscitated 
in racist ideology and subsequent policies and practices, which justify and perpetuate 
existing social inequalities. 
 
According to Miles (1989), the emergence of the representation of the Other 
has to be viewed in the historical context of human migration, during which different 
individuals and groups interacted with each other. During these interactions, 
different images and beliefs about the individuals and groups were created in order 
to explain the appearance and behaviour of those with whom this contact has been 
established. In this process, the ‘representations’ of the Other have been produced, 
which consisted of the images categorizing people in terms of real or attributed 
differences when compared with Self. This representation is based therefore on 
dialectic between Self and Other, “in which the attributed characteristics of Other   11
refract contrasting characteristics of Self, and vice versa” (Miles, 1989, p.11). The 
process of representation in the social discourse is dynamic in its nature as the 
images and beliefs about the Other are challenged, transformed and sometimes 
eradicated or resuscitated to suit the existing political order and economic structures.  
 
The Western representation of the Other developed in the colonial racist 
discourse, for example, was framed in the language of doctrines of biological 
inequality and social Darwinism and reflected the need for the political and 
economic security of the coloniser (Jayasuriya, 1999). The colonial forms of cultural 
and economic exploitation and oppression resulting from the European expansion 
during the past 400 years (MacNaughton & Davis, 2001) were justified by the 
ideology of racism, in which people were constructed in racialised terms, as 
belonging to distinct, self reproducing groups, classified on the basis of their 
biological, genetic and physical characteristics. These characteristics were ascribed 
with meaning, which explained the behaviour and cultural characteristics of the 
Other as well as Self. Racialised representation showed different groups in 
dichotomous terms. For example, the representation of Africans as ‘black’ and 
‘savage’ Others, implied the representation of Self (Europeans) as ‘white’ and 
‘civilised’. This dialectic process of signification in the colonial discourse 
contributed to the racialisation of human beings (Gandhi, 1998) and the social 
relationships between them were thought to be hierarchical and determined by their 
assumed inherent characteristics (Miles, 1989). The ‘savages’ were perceived as 
constituting an inferior ‘race’, while the ‘civilised’, by definition, formed the 
superior ‘race’. Although the notion of the hierarchy of inferior and superior races is 
no longer present in the official social discourse, it is still commonly assumed that   12
races exist as distinct, biologically defined collectivities and the Other, remains to be 
negatively represented in current forms of racist ideology. 
 
This can be seen in the relatively recent phenomenon, conceptualized by 
Barker (1981) as ‘new racism’. According to Hopkins, Reicher and Levine (1997) 
one of the central assumptions of new racism is the ‘natural’ affinity of the members 
of the same ‘race’. Although new racism rejects the notion of superiority of one 
racialised group over another and it does not even use the notion of ‘race’ explicitly 
anymore, it still presents people in terms of racialised social categories, defined in 
relatively fixed biological or cultural characteristics, which are either negative or 
bring negative consequences for others. Furthermore, as Barker maintains, the new 
racism’s construction of difference means that “you do not [even] need to dislike or 
blame those who are different from you – in order to say that the presence of aliens 
constitutes a threat to your way of life” (1981, p.18). Although in the discourse of 
new racism, the term ‘race’ is replaced with ‘culture’ and ‘tradition’, it exaggerates 
differences between ‘cultural’ or ‘ethnic’ groups and assumes antagonism between 
them, which is viewed as normal and ‘natural’ and therefore inevitable (Jayasuriya, 
1999). The new racism therefore does not seem to be different from the old racism. 
Although superficially ‘deracialised’, it is still a representational form, which by 
designating discrete human collectivities, functions as an ideology of inclusion and 
exclusion, in which the negative characteristics of the Other mirror the positive 
characteristics of the Self. The new racism, like the old one, still maintains the same 
strong divisions between ‘them’ and ‘us’, it only justifies them differently. Rather 
than using the theory of supremacy of certain ‘races’¸ new racism explains these 
divisions by the natural tendency of people ‘liking their own kind’ and the necessity   13
to maintain (or defend) the cultural tradition, unity and identity of the nation. For that 
reason, instead of looking at Aboriginal-Australians or Asian-Australians as inferior 
we can ‘naturally’ see them and their culture as being different and therefore dislike 
them, because “to be prejudiced is, simply, to be human” (Honeyford, 1986, p.52) 
and because ‘they’ are never going to be like ‘us’.  
  
It is quite convenient to look at the process of forming racialised categories 
as a result of the natural capacities of the human mind. Such a perspective justifies 
prejudiced views as being natural. I would like to argue, however, that the human 
beings and their social relations continue to be racialised in a social discourse as a 
means of maintaining the natural perpetuation of the existing social order and the 
hierarchy of power in our world. The images of the collective ‘racial’ Other being a 
threat to the social cohesion of the nation and the economic well-being of the 
majority group are present in a relatively recent Australian political discourse. They 
can be found in the negative views on Asian immigration expressed by Geoffrey 
Blainey (1984) or John Howard (1988, cited in Ricklefs, 1997), or Pauline Hanson’s 
(1996) maiden speech, which placed anti-Asian and anti-Aboriginal issues as one of 
the key elements of her political platform (Jayasuriya, 1999). Such voices influence 
Australian public opinion and become recreated in the everyday common discourse 
encouraged by the radio, television and newspapers. The racialisation of human 
beings in a social discourse is closely linked to the “racialisation of the processes in 
which they participate and the structures and institutions that result” from them 
(Miles, 1989, p.76). In Australia, this is evident, for example, in the past anti-
Aboriginal legislation or the past and present anti-Asian immigration policies 
(Jayasuriya, 1999).    14
 
According to Miles (1989, 1993), the concept of racism should be used 
exclusively in relation to ideology. Although such conceptualization might be useful 
for analytical purposes, I would like to use this term in a broader sense. I argue that 
“racism as an ideology constructs differences which impinge on the way everyday 
experience is perceived, embodied and reflected in the range of social institutions” 
(Jayasuriya, 1999, p.5) and processes. For that reason it is difficult to separate racist 
thought from racist social structures and practices as the former finds its expression 
in the latter.  
 
In addition, I agree with Hall (1980) that racist ideology should not be 
viewed as a single, static set of images and beliefs. Rather, it should be understood as 
“flexible and plastic, one which appears in different forms in disparate historical 
conjunctures, and which has various populations as its objects” (Miles, 1993, p.85). 
Therefore, instead of thinking of racism in general, we should be looking for racisms 
in their different modalities (Miles, 1993), which are formed in actual cultural 
practices (Hall, 1986) of representation that sustain particular racist constructions of 
social differences and social relations. While acknowledging different types and 
modalities of racism, however, we need to be mindful of the fact they all, in a 
structural sense, involve practices of marginalization and exclusion.  
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The nature of my study 
  
My study aims to explore how young children relate to different modalities 
of racism present in Australia and how they construct their images of difference and 
social relations. Research on children’s racialised thinking traditionally employed a 
number of theoretical and interpretive frameworks that aimed to explain the 
formation of ‘racial’ attitudes. Some of these frameworks linked children’s racist 
views to personality problems and explained the emergence of prejudiced attitudes in 
the context of inflexible cognition attributed to an authoritarian parenting style 
(Adorno, 1950).  In contrast, social psychological theories looked at children’s 
racialised ideas and prejudices from the perspective of their immature cognition and 
the natural tendency to categorise and develop their social identity (see Aboud, 
1988). These two frameworks focused purely on the cognitive and affective 
development of children and ignored the role structural factors in the society play in 
the process of children’s racialised thinking. On the other hand, the social reflection 
theory emphasised structural determinants of children’s racialised thinking, but 
failed to acknowledge the active role children play in their own learning. By utilising 
the concept of social learning, the social reflection theory looked at young children 
“as passive and indiscriminate recipients of racist ideology that circulates within 
sociocultural norms and mores” (Troyna & Hatcher, 1993, p.111).  
 
Studies conducted within the developmental and socialisation frameworks 
(Milner, 1975; Davey, 1983; Katz, 1982; Ramsey, 1987, 1991; Black-Gutman & 
Hickson, 1996) provided opportunities to describe children’s development of 
racialised conceptions of themselves and others. However, their contribution to our 
understanding of this phenomenon and their implications for practice can be   16
questioned for a number of reasons. Firstly, studies based on the perspective that 
children’s negative racialised ideas of difference are a natural phenomenon, either 
consciously or unconsciously, contribute to legitimising it. Accepting such a 
viewpoint gives us a peace of mind that there is no need to intervene. Such research 
on racism can be accused of being racist. Secondly, explaining children’s negative 
racialised representation of the Other in terms of individual’s emotional problems 
and her or his inability to reason correctly redirects efforts from social action against 
racism to individual therapy and shifts emphasis from broader social structures to the 
family unit. Thirdly, locating the development of racism in children’s ignorance and 
irrationality assumes that it can be dealt with by promoting a more sympathetic 
understanding of cultural differences (Rizvi, 1993). This, however, seems to lead to 
the reinforcing of their understanding of the world and social relations along the very 
same racialised lines that we are trying to avoid. Lastly, assuming that children 
simply absorb attitudes of those around them underestimates their social competence 
and active agency in processing and making sense of the contradictory racist 
discourses to which they are exposed. In addition, traditional studies based on the 
developmental and socialisation models contribute to the discourse which 
presupposes that racism and children’s racialised identities are ‘fixed’ and therefore 
a racially prejudiced child is assumed to “act upon these prejudices regardless of 
context” (Connolly, 1996, p.174). The majority of these studies, which have been 
conducted within the quantitative paradigm, tried to simply ‘measure’ children’s 
prejudice and their racialised identity.  
 
There are a number of more recent studies (Troyna & Hatcher, 1992; Wright, 
1992; Rizvi, 1993a) that contribute to our better understanding of the complexity of   17
the processes that underpin children’s racialised construction of themselves and their 
social world. These studies, however, with a few exceptions (Connolly, 1996, 1998b; 
MacNaughton & Davis, 2001; van Ausdale & Feagin, 2001) focus on older children. 
My study aims to contribute to this understanding in relation to young children. I 
adopt the perspective of some recent research on children and ‘race’ and claim that 
children play an active role in their own learning and develop their knowledge 
through interactions in their social world. I also view children as possessing a certain 
level of competence that allows them to “comprehend, process and articulate their 
needs and experiences” (Connolly, 1996, p.172). Furthermore, I adopt the earlier 
discussed perspective on the contingent and context specific nature of racism. Within 
this understanding children are viewed not just as passive recipients of racist 
discourses, but as active agents who strive to deal with the contradictory nature of 
information they receive in relation to the racial Other in order to make sense of their 
social world. I agree with Rizvi that children develop their racialised ideas of 
difference and social relations within the specific contexts of their “everyday 
experiences and that these experiences are socially organised, determined by social 
processes that extend beyond the scope of everyday experience” (1993a, p.126).  
  
For the purpose of my study, children’s construction of racialised ideas of 
difference and the way they attribute value to such differences will be explored 
within the broad framework of Bronfenbrenner’s ecological perspective on human 
development. I find this theory a useful one as it emphasises the importance of the 
context or the environment in which any of the processes of human development are 
situated. It permits to see the interconnectedness between the processes of human 
development, the environments in which this development occurs, and the reciprocal   18
relationships between the elements of the environment as well as the environments 
themselves within which any person develops (Bronfenbrenner & Ceci, 1994). 
Bronfenbrenner conceptualised the different levels of the social environment in 
systems terms, representing them as a set of concentric “structures, each inside the 
next as a set of Russian dolls” (1979, p. 3). Each of these systems, according to 
Bronfenbrenner, offers individuals different levels of developmental opportunities 
and risks. The most immediate system, called Microsystem, consists of settings in 
which children directly participate such as the family, neighbourhood, school or 
childcare. Within these settings children experience and create their reality. This 
happens through ‘proximal processes’ which unfold during children’s direct 
interactions with people, objects and symbols. According to Bronfenbrenner and 
Ceci (1994), proximal processes are dynamic in nature,  
 
as their form, power and direction vary systematically as a joint function 
of the characteristics of the developing person, of the environment – both 
immediate and more remote – in which the process is taking place, and of 
the nature of the developmental outcomes under consideration. (p.572) 
 
The second level of the environment, called Mesosystem, consists of the 
links between the Microsystems. The role the Mesosytem plays in the development 
of the child depends on the number and quality of those links.  
 
Bronfenbrenner (1979) believes that the forces within Microsystems, the 
links between them, and the extent and nature of knowledge and attitudes existing in 
one setting about other settings, depend on the broader systems. These systems are 
conceptualised by Bronfenbrenner as the Exosystem and the Macrosystem. The first 
of these systems does not involve the child, but includes institutions and decision   19
making processes which impact on the child’s Microsystems (Garbarino & 
Abramowitz, 1992). How the Exosystem operates depends in turn on the broader 
culture and ideologies of a given society, which provide blueprints for the allocation 
of resources, employment patterns, law, social policy and program delivery. In 
Bronfenbrenner’s ecological systems perspective these blueprints, called the 
Macrosystem, embrace and determine all the other subsystems.  
 
  I believe that Bronfenbrenner’s framework can be successfully used to 
explore the development of children’s racialised thinking, as it provides an 
opportunity to see this development within the everyday experiences that occur in 
the child’s immediate environments (Microsystems). At the same time, however, it 
allows us to see how these environments, and therefore children’s experiences, are 
influenced, if not determined, by the contexts of the broader social processes and 
institutions, which in many aspects reflect the ideology of racism in Australian 
society. 
 
To explore children’s construction of racialised ideas of difference, I adopted 
a qualitative method of inquiry, which employed face-to face semi-structured 
interviews with 3-, 5- and 7-year-old children. As a starting point for these 
interviews, I used photographs of children unknown to the participants, which varied 
in gender, skin colour, hairstyle and clothing. The participants were asked to 
physically categorise the photos and then to explain their choices. This provided me 
with an opportunity to explore what criteria they used to categorise people, how they 
ascribed value to these categories and whether they perceived potential friends in 
racialised terms. The informal conversations that happened once children started   20
talking about their choices allowed them to freely express their thoughts and 
provided me with an opportunity to explore whether their racialised ideas of 
difference were influenced by different racist discourses that are present in Australia.  
To capture children’s body language, such as facial expressions, gestures and 
hesitations as well as their verbal responses, I videotaped the interviews.  
 
In the following chapter of my thesis I discuss in detail the emergence and 
the changing meaning of the categories of ‘race’ and racism as well as the current 
modalities of racist discourse present in Australia. Chapter three looks critically at 
some traditional approaches to the development of children’s racialised thinking in 
the light of research findings and uses Bronfenbrenner’s theory as a theoretical 
framework within which children’s construction of their racialised ideas of 
difference is explored. Chapter four provides an overview of my methodology and 
discusses my method as well as the ethical considerations of this study. The 
subsequent three chapters present my data and the last one focuses on my personal 
reflections on the research process and the implications of my study for practice. 
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Chapter  2  
 
THE NOTION OF ‘RACE’ AND RACISM 
 
Introduction 
  In this chapter I explore the changing nature of ‘race’ and racism and the 
complexity of meanings these notions carry within current social discourse, both 
political and academic. I first explore the concept of ‘race’ and the emergence of the 
sustained racialised discourse within a historical and social context. I argue that as a 
scientific concept ‘race’ and its subsequent hierarchy appeared as a means of 
reconciling the conflict between the ideology of equality and the reality of the 
persistent social inequalities (Malik, 1995). I further examine the current meaning of 
the concept of ‘race’ as a socially constructed and enforced category and explain 
how despite the lack of its objective meaning it continues to exist due to its social 
value and social utility. I also discuss the changing concept of racism, with the 
emphasis on the appearance of the relatively recent phenomenon of the ‘new’ or 
‘cultural’ racism (Barker, 1981; Hopkins, Reicher & Levine, 1997). I argue that 
although the ‘new’ racism is superficially ‘deracialised’, it is not different from the 
old, nineteenth century racism, as it is based on the same process of racialisation of 
human beings and their social relations. Furthermore, ‘new’ racism like the ‘old’ 
racism rationalises and maintains the same divisions between ‘them’ and ‘us’.   
Despite its explicitly expressed rejection of the hierarchy of ‘races’, ‘new’ racism 
assumes the ‘natural’ antagonism between different social groups and a preference 
for ‘your own kind’. Therefore, it provides an argument for the need of majority 
groups to protect their own culture, tradition and nation from the influences of the   23
‘alien’ Other. In the last section of this chapter I discus how the new expressions of 
racism found in Australia fit into the discourse and practices of ‘new racism’, which 
according to Jayasuriya (1999, p.29), is “framed in the new logic of differentiation”. 
Having discussed the changing content and forms of expression of racist discourses, 
I argue that racism is not a static set of images and beliefs, but it becomes modified 
and transformed to fit the historically changing economic and political contexts. 
There is not one, but many forms of racism. In different eras, racism has different 
popular ideological forms (Hall, 1986). However, all these forms of racism lead to 
the exclusion or marginalisation of certain social groups, which are perceived in 
racialised terms. 
 
The ambiguity of the concept of ‘race’ 
 
  Race and its cognate racism are among the most malodorous and disgusting  
  concepts with wide currency at the end of the twentieth century, just as was  
true of them at the end of the fifteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth  
and nineteenth century, especially in the West. (Van Horne, 1997, p.2) 
 
Since its original emergence in the English language in the early seventeenth 
century (Miles, 1993), the idea of ‘race’ has gone through a process of continuous 
change and transformation. The meanings of this term and its validity have been the 
subject of arguments in the past and they still are at present. As Gillborn (1990) 
accurately observes, even the key words and phrases seem to be the subject of 
constant controversy. For example in the early 1960s, the word ‘negro’ and 
‘coloured’ were used by Civil Rights leaders in the United States of America. By the 
end of the decade, however, the same words were viewed as insulting. The meaning   24
of ‘race’ and its related terms appear to be the subject of frequent critical disputes. 
As Hogben (1932, cited in Malik, 1996) asserts: 
 
Geneticists believe that anthropologists have decided what race is.  
Ethnologists assume that their classification embody principles which  
Genetic science has proved to be correct. Politicians believe their prejudices 
have the sanction of genetic laws and the findings of physical anthropology  
to sustain them. (p.2)  
  
It seems that the above words, written over seventy years ago by Lancelot 
Hogben about the understanding of the term ‘race’, still apply in the twenty first 
century. There are many different views on ‘race’ and very little agreement. 
Although the notion of ‘races’ as fixed, natural systems of genetic differences has 
been discredited by scientific findings half a century ago, it is still frequently used in 
everyday discourse. The popular idea of ‘race’ is usually synonymous with ‘colour’.  
People commonly speak about ‘Asians’, ‘Africans’ and ‘Europeans’ and these terms 
appear to be linked to three, traditionally agreed upon, skin colours (Malik, 1996). 
This common tendency to distinguish between different human groups on the basis 
of their physical characteristics reinforces the idea that ‘race’ possesses objective 
reality.  
 
Various theories of race, which emerged in the second half  of the eighteenth 
century and gained their validity through nineteenth century ‘racial science’, 
provided ‘evidence’ for the existence of biologically distinct human ‘races’ and their 
‘natural’ hierarchy. The following part of this chapter explores this process of 
racialisation in historical context. It looks at the emergence of sustained racialised 
discourse and its role in viewing and rationalising social differences and social 
relations as natural.  It also discusses how the changing political and social contexts   25
result in changes in understanding of the meaning and the presence (or its lack) of 
‘race’ in common and academic discourse.  
 
The emergence of the racialised discourse  
 
According to Miles (1989; 1993), the appearance of the concept of ‘race’ in 
social discourse is linked to the process of racialised representation of the Other. 
Although the very term ‘race’ is relatively new, the process of racialisation, a 
tendency to categorise and represent human beings as belonging to supposedly 
distinct, self reproducing  groups based on their signified biological differences goes 
back a long way in history. Miles (1989) asserts that the emergence of the 
representation of the Other has to be viewed in the context of early human migration, 
during which different individuals and groups interacted with each other. During 
these interactions, the ‘representations’ of the Other, which consisted of the images 
and beliefs categorising people in terms of their real or attributed differences when 
compared with the Self, have been produced. As Miles (1989) asserts, the process of 
racialised representation needs to be understood as having a dialectic nature, as the 
images, beliefs and evaluations of the Other refract contrasting images, beliefs and 
evaluations of the Self. Although the process of representation is not exclusive to 
Europeans developing their images about the non-Western Other, in this dissertation 
I refer only to such instances. The representation of the Other is dynamic and 
therefore, significant differences can be traced in the content and methods of 
representation, which are historically specific. For example, the early Western 
racialised images of non European Other found their first theoretical explanations in 
the eighteen century (Vigilant, 1997), however, the sustained racialised discourse of   26
the ‘natural’ hierarchy of superior and inferior ‘races’, has not developed until the 
Romantic reaction to the Enlightenment era and has not received its firm ‘scientific 
basis’ until the nineteenth century, when the universalistic criteria of the 
measurement and assessment started being used to negatively evaluate the Other 
(Miles, 1989).  
 
The first theoretical attempt to racialise human beings by categorising them 
into discrete groups can be found in the works of a Swedish scholar Carolus 
Linnaeus, who in 1758 classified human kind into groups based on their skin colour 
and listed their corresponding, supposedly inherent, personality traits (Vigilant, 
1997, p.50). In the last quarter of the eighteenth century, a German professor 
Blumenbach attempted a “scientific study of human races” (Bernal, 1997, p.84). 
According to Bernal (p.84), Blumenbach claimed “that there has been a single 
creation of a perfect man” (sic). His explanation for human differences centred on 
the concept of the ‘normal’ type of European species who degenerated in other 
continents due to difficult climatic conditions. Blumenbach was the first one to 
publicise the term ‘Caucasian’, which according to him was the first, most beautiful 
and talented ‘race’. Blumenbach’s theory of ‘races’ provided academic backing for 
the racist thinking of the nineteenth century (Bernal, 1997). This is one of the 
reasons for the common belief that modern racism was well established in the 
Enlightenment era. 
 
According to Malik (1996), such a view is one of the many recent 
contributions to the debate of the origins of racism. These contributions highlight the 
importance of the Enlightenment in establishing the modern discourse of ‘race’.   27
They suggest that racialised ideology can be traced back to the categories of thought 
that were characteristic of this era. Authors such as Goldberg or Mosse (cited in 
Malik, 1996, p. 40) argue, for example, that the concepts of reason and universalism 
and the scientific methods of observation and categorisation gave way to a racialised 
thought, as it is through such categories that racialised typology has become evident. 
However, according to Malik (1996), it was not the epistemological categories of 
modernity that initiated racialised divisions of humanity. 
 
Malik asserts that although the Enlightenment era was characterised by a 
growing belief that scientific methods were needed to study human beings in order to 
understand the differences between ‘civilised’ and ‘savage’ people, this ‘scientific’ 
study was a means of establishing our common humanity, rather than, as it was the 
case in the second half of the 19
th century, a means of demonstrating superiority of 
certain groups and inferiority of others. Although some of the Enlightenment 
thinkers evidently held racist views, according to Banton (1987) and Miles (1989), 
there was an absence of any sustained discourse of ‘race’. Even Blumenbach, who 
argued the existence of human ‘races’, accounted environmental or cultural factors 
rather than nature for human differences. The majority of the Enlightenment 
philosophers held a belief in a common, universal human nature which tended to 
undermine any inclination for racialised categorisation (Malik, 1996, p 53).  They 
argued that all humanity was rational and sociable and that there was a static human 
nature shared by all. David Hume (cited in Malik, 1996) expressed well these views 
by stating:  
there is a great uniformity among the acts of men, in all nations and ages, 
and human nature remains the same in its principles and operations…. 
Mankind are … much made the same, in all times and places. (p.48) 
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Many of the Enlightenment thinkers also believed that all people were 
potentially equal. For example, an eighteenth century naturalist and explorer 
Alexander Von Humboldt noted: “Whilst we maintain the unity of the human 
species, we at the same time must repel the depressing assumption of the superior 
and inferior races of men” (cited in Malik, 1996, p. 49). Like Humboldt, the French 
philosopher Rousseau believed that all people were born equal; inequality should not 
be attributed as it is a product of morality and political domain. In his Discourse on 
Inequality Rousseau (cited in Malik, 1996) argued:  
 
Inequality …derives its force and its growth from the development of our  
faculties and the progress of human mind, and finally becomes fixed and  
legitimate through the institutions of property and laws. It follows … that  
moral inequality, authorised by positive law alone, is contrary to natural  
right, whenever it is not matched in exact proportion with physical inequality 
 … for it is manifestly contrary to the law of nature, however defined, … that 
a child should govern an old man, …and a handful of people should gorge  
themselves with superfluities while hungry multitude goes in want of 
necessities. (p. 60) 
 
The belief in human equality and a universal human nature in the 
Enlightenment led some philosophers of this era to a greater than before willingness 
to be more open to unfamiliar values and to their more tolerant attitudes toward non-
European people. For example, Rousseau (cited in Malik, 1996) argued that the 
European travelers failed to understand the diversity of humanity: 
 
In the two or three centuries since the inhabitants of Europe have been  
flooding into other parts of the world …. we have come to know no other  
men except Europeans; moreover it appears from the ridiculous prejudices…  
that every author produces under the pompous name of the study of man  
nothing…more than a study of men of his own country. (p.51) 
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It is important to reflect on how such radical views of common humanity and 
equality held by many thinkers of the Enlightenment eventually led to the 
development of the modern concept of ‘race’ and scientific racism of the next 
century. To do that, we need to look at the emancipatory potential of the 
Enlightenment ideology of equality and common human nature in its particular 
social and political context, which started being characterised by the growing 
conflict about property rights between the new capitalist class and the dispossessed 
and property-less classes, as well as by colonial inequalities.  
 
The modern discourse of ‘race’  
 
According to Malik (1996) at the beginning of the eighteenth century the 
concept of equality and universalism of human nature was used to support the 
political programme of the bourgeois to destroy the old feudal order. As the years 
progressed, the concept of equality became dangerous in maintaining the new 
capitalist order with its inherent private property rights, the exploitation of the 
masses and the oppression of the colonised. By the end of the century, when the 
social inequalities persisted, the interests of competing social forces appeared to be 
irreconcilable. Inequality, including slavery, started being perceived as a price to be 
paid for economic progress and the utility of capitalism. As a result, many began to 
gradually regard social hierarchy with unequal rights assigned to different groups as 
a natural, rather than a social phenomenon. This tendency to view social differences 
as natural became rationalized through the concept of ‘race’.  
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As Malik rightly argues, it was “not racial differentiation that has led to 
denial of equality, but the social constraints placed on the scope of equality that had 
led to the racialised categorisation of humanity” (1996, p.39). As the social problems 
of the new capitalist society persisted through the nineteenth century, social relations 
became increasingly racialised and their ‘natural’ order accepted.  
 
‘Race’ as a means of rationalising class differences  
 
The modern discourse of ‘race’ and its subsequent ideology of racism, 
understood as a process of representation of human differences in negative racialised 
terms (Miles, 1989) in order to justify unequal social relations, in the post-
Enlightenment times arose from the sense that social differences were important and 
not as easily eradicated as it had been believed earlier. There is a strong belief shared 
by many social scientists that the concept of race arose solely out of colonialism and 
the domination of the non-Western world by the Europeans. However, according to 
Malik, although it is true that the theory of race “came eventually to be underpinned” 
by the idea of “the inferiority of non-Western peoples”, initially the “notion of race 
… referred not so much to differences between territorially distinct populations, as to 
[class] differences within a particular society” (Malik, 1996, p.81). The racialised 
idea of difference was developed not only in relation to a colonial Other, but also to 
the underprivileged groups “within the home country” (p. 81). The writings of the 
19
th century aristocrat De Gobineau illustrate well the tendency of linking the 
concept of ‘race’ with class.  
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In his theory, De Gobineau divided humankind into races, which formed 
different social classes in various countries. In his Essays on the Inequality of Races 
he maintained that “every social order is founded upon three original classes, each of 
which represents a racial variety” (cited in Malik, 1996, p. 83). At the top was a 
noble class which consisted of the conquering Caucasian race. The middle class 
composed of the mixed stock, the Hemites, the Semites and the Indo-Germans who 
were descendants of the superior race. The common people belonged to the lower 
race which emerged through, what he called, a ‘mixture of blood’ between the 
Semites and Hemites who were corrupted by blacks. The only pure Germanic race 
was also in danger of being corrupted by the Semites (Bernal, 1997, p. 85). 
According to Bernal (1997), De Gobineau believed that the basic organisation and 
strength of all civilisations were equal to the traits and spirit of the dominant race. He 
also claimed that the idea of equality, which was a part of the ideology of the 
Enlightenment, was ‘unnatural’, as the social hierarchy was necessary for the 
maintenance of natural order. According to Malik (1996), De Gobineau’s theory 
with its “racial typology that incorporated class distinctions”, his assertion that only 
white Caucasian race could be considered as part of history, and his open “hostility 
towards the idea of equality” (p.84), significantly contributed to the development of 
the modern theory of race which dominated the Western world at the end of the 
nineteenth century. By the end of the Victorian era the ‘natural’ hierarchy of races 
was regarded as a ‘scientific truth’. 
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The ‘scientific’ theory of ‘race’ 
 
In the racialised discourse of the nineteenth century, phenotypical 
characteristics of certain populations were signified to divide people into discrete, 
self reproducing groups. This process of racialisation was not only used to rationalise 
the dominant position of the ruling classes in European societies (Malik, 1996), but 
also to justify the provision of labour power under slave relations of production in 
the colonised world. The idea of race was utilised “to dichotomise the owners of the 
means of production and the suppliers of labour power as being naturally different 
‘types’ of human being” (Miles, 1993, p.50). Therefore, the process of racialisation 
became an ideological force, which in conjuction with political and economic 
relations of domination, placed certain populations in disadvantaged social positions 
(Miles, 1993) and justified their exploitation. During the Victorian era, which highly 
valued technological progress, the theory of race needed a strong scientific basis, 
which was provided by the ideology of ‘positivism’ and the new ‘science of Man’. 
 
According to (Malik, 1996), the ideology of ‘positivism’ was used to 
reconcile the contradiction between society’s belief in social progress during the 
Victorian era on the one hand, and its need for social stability and the fear of social 
unrest on the other. As Malik asserts, positivists, such as Augute Comte declared that 
order and progress could be united in science through a rational submission of 
society to the laws of nature. Such ideology allowed social relations with their 
conflicts and divisions to be viewed as a product of natural development and opened 
the way for ‘racial science’. The ‘new science of Man’ provided ‘evidence’ that 
despite superficial similarities, there was a basic ‘permanent heterogeneity’ of   33
humankind both physical and moral. The new ‘science of Man’ which became 
instrumental to ‘scientific’ theory of the hierarchy of ‘races’, was based on a number 
of assumptions. 
 
  The ‘new science of Man’ viewed human development as the triumph 
of the European, white civilisation. One of the important assumptions of the theory 
was a direct correlation between people’s mental abilities and their physical 
characteristics. The investigation of this correlation, called phrenology, laid the basis 
for the future accepted belief that the shape and the size of the head as well as the 
volume of brain could provide a true indication of innate ability and therefore could 
be used to prove the “true hierarchy of races” (Malik, 1996, p.87). The ‘new science’ 
was used to validate the idea that racialised differences between people were 
permanent and that their hierarchy was generated and governed by natural, rather 
than social laws.  
 
Such ‘scientific’ explanations of race that emerged in nineteenth century 
positivism allow us to observe a clear correlation between scientific thought and its 
social context. As Milner (1983, p. 11) notes, scientists are influenced by the social 
arrangements and climate of values around them which impact on their ideologies. 
Scientific theories play an important role in sustaining such arrangements. An 
example of how science was used to naturalise and approve social relations was the 
application of Darwin’s theory of evolution to social processes. As Gosset (cited in 
Milner, 1983) asserts: 
 
the idea of natural selection was translated [by social Darwinists] into  
a struggle between individual members of a society, between different    34
nations and between different races. This conflict … was nature’s  
indispensable method for producing superior nations and superior  
races. (p.13) 
 
 The ‘new science’ was full of contradictions. This, however, did not seem to 
be a matter of concern for the nineteenth, and later for the twentieth century 
scientists, who adapted different theories to match their preformed conceptions about 
the ‘reality of race’. As Malik (1996) claims, racial theorists used science to 
reconcile humanitarian religious and philosophical beliefs about the universality of 
humankind, the legacy of the Enlightenment, with the barbaric treatment of ‘lower 
races’ who, from the second part of the nineteenth century, as a result of certain 
historical factors started being perceived not only in terms of class but also 
increasingly in terms of colour.  
 
The nineteenth century theories of ‘race’ were a part of a broad phenomenon 
of using natural explanations for social processes. The belief in social transformation 
from the previous century was replaced by the doctrine of social order being 
controlled by natural laws. Racial theory provided legitimacy for unequal social 
order. ‘Racial science’ helped to develop a concept of hierarchy, which was 
supposedly sanctioned by forces not within the reach of humanity, and which 
validated the superiority of the ruling class. It proclaimed the fitness of the dominant 
class to rule over the working class and the Western nations over the non-European 
Other. All of this was declared in the name of ‘science and progress’. Such 
determinist forms of racialised thought reflected the political and social changes in 
the second part of the nineteenth century in Victorian England and in Europe. 
According to Malik (1996), these changes resulted from the liberals’ concern for 
social stability  and a fear of the working classes after the revolutions in 1848 and the   35
Paris Commune in 1871;  the strengthening of the nationalism, as well as imperialist 
expansion.  
 
‘Race’ and colonialism – the issue of colour difference in the 
representation of the colonised Other 
 
The expansion of imperialism at the end of the nineteenth century 
significantly impacted on European international relations as well as on domestic 
politics. The fact that the British Empire and a number of other, predominantly 
white, nations held control of the globe seemed to confirm a sense of the ‘natural’ 
superiority of the Western world (Malik, 1996). The opening of new markets and 
new sources of natural resources resulted in feelings of relative economic stability 
within the European nations. In addition, the growing sense of pride in the ‘civilising 
missions’ of the colonising societies encouraged the masses to identify with the state 
and nation. Racialised representation of the inferior Other shifted from being an elite 
ideology to become a part of popular culture. “The gradual admission of the working 
class into the system of political democracy” (Malik, 1996, p.117) at the turn of the 
century, helped to transform the language of race, which became increasingly 
focused on issues of colour, a division between black and white and the “West and 
the Rest” (Fabian, 1983, cited in Malik, p.81) of the world. The idea of a permanent 
racialised social hierarchy was increasingly used to reconcile the obvious 
contradiction between prevailing democratic ideas and the reality of the treatment of 
slaves and colonised people. It can be stated therefore, that the concept of race was 
not static (Miles, 1989). It became marked by colour differences and biological 
inferiority of the non-European Other as a result of Western colonial expansion,   36
although initially it developed as a response to class differences within European 
societies (Malik, 1996). 
 
Classifying people into human race (white) and subhuman race (non-white) 
results, according to Van den Berghe (cited in McConnochie, 1973), in ‘herrenvolk 
democracies’. Such ‘democracy’, understood as a regime in which egalitarian ideal 
applies only to the ‘master race’, allows for exploitation and denial of human rights 
towards the subordinate groups. It is an interesting political and social phenomenon, 
where the acceptance of “the profitable forms of discrimination and exploitation” 
goes hand in hand with the retention of democratic ideology (McConnochie, p.42). 
The nineteenth century theory of race, which was based on such hierarchical 
classification, was used to justify in scientific terms the need for the exploitation and 
sometimes elimination of the inferior ‘races’, in the interest of humankind. At the 
end of the century, this division was clearly marked along skin colour and the 
elimination of the inferior races was perceived as a mission of the Western world for 
the benefit of civilisation (white civilisation). As the American president Theodore 
Roosevelt (cited in Malik, 1996, p.117) stated, everybody must appreciate the ‘race 
importance’ in the struggle between whites and the “scattered savage tribes, whose 
life was but a few degrees less meaningless … than that of a wild beasts”.  
 
Dividing people along skin colour differences and “racial exclusion became a 
way of life” (Malik, 1996, p.118) towards the end of the nineteenth century both in 
colonies, as well as in the home countries. The ‘new science of man’ provided basis 
for the development of the elaborate model of the hierarchy of races, which was used 
to justify early capitalist notions of progress and colonialism. In Australia, these   37
ideas were utilised as a means of rationalising the dispossession of Aboriginal people 
and their inhumane treatment. The end of the nineteenth century also witnessed the 
beginning of immigration controls. For example, in 1896, several states in Australia 
passed Colour Races Restriction and Regulation Acts, which aimed at “excluding 
native inhabitants of Asia, Africa and the Pacific Islands” (Malik, 1996, p.118).   
However, skin colour was only one of the markers used to signify membership of, or 
exclusion from particular racialised groups. Others included different physical 
characteristics as well as the notion of cultural differences. For example, in the late 
nineteenth century in Australia, “not only the Chinese but also the Irish were 
represented as belonging to a race apart, presumed to have essential qualities by 
virtue of their birth identities” (Pettman, 1992, p.9).  
 
The horrors of Nazi Germany and the transformation of the ‘race’ discourse 
 
The rise of fascism in the 1930s and the use of the idea of ‘race’ by Hitler 
and the German Nazi Party to rationalise the extermination of Jews and later against 
other ‘non Aryan races’ started raising social awareness in Europe and North 
America of the danger involved in the particular usage of the discourse of ‘race’. A 
critical assessment of the scientific status of ‘race’ discourse started taking place 
within the academic world in the 1930s and 1940s (Miles, 1989, p. 43). According to 
Miles, theorists such as Hirschfeld (1938), Huxley & Hadden (1935) and Barzun 
(1938) started arguing against the nineteenth century idea of the existence of 
biologically based, hierarchically ordered discrete ‘races’. After the Second World 
War, this debate became even stronger. The historical experience of the death camps 
and the ‘Final Solution’ made the ideas expressed by the eugenicists at the beginning   38
of the twentieth century, that the only way to produce the state of civilisation is 
through the ‘struggle of races’ and the survival of the ‘physically and mentally 
fittest’, no longer acceptable. A number of initiatives were undertaken to re-evaluate 
the scientific status of the concept of ‘race’ and to prevent it from being used for 
similar political purposes in future. 
 
The most significant international project was undertaken by UNESCO, 
which aimed to demonstrate that ‘racial biology’ had no scientific basis (Miles, 
1989). As a result of this initiative, which took a number of years, social scientists 
and biologists gathered available knowledge on the idea of ‘race’ and concluded that 
‘race’ was not so much a biological phenomenon, as it was a social myth. It had also 
been acknowledged that the “myth of race” was responsible for unjustifiable “human 
and social damage” (Montagu, 1972, cited in Malik, 1996, p. 15). To deal with this 
issue, the United Nations charter started promoting the ideas of democratic principles 
of equality, pluralism and mutual respect for all people. These ideals became a 
characteristic of the post-war era political environment in many Western countries.  
 
However, according to Malik (1996), this liberal climate was in many ways a 
temporary gap in history rather than a real change in social consciousness. The 
change of heart of the Western powers in relation to the issue of ‘race’ resulted from 
the unique combination of political, social and economic factors, which included the 
horrors of the Second World War, the political rivalry between the East and West 
and the post-war economic recovery. As the Soviet Union started using the issues of 
racial inequality and exploitation of the colonised world as part of its propaganda 
against the West, the ‘science of race’ needed reassessment in order to prevent a   39
potential undermining of the West’s moral authority in the world.  This resulted in a 
transformation of an official ‘race’ discourse as well as in some attempts of many 
Western governments to officially deal with ‘racial’ inequality. Many Western 
countries “introduced legislation to outlaw racial discrimination [and] some, like 
Britain and the USA, established a whole official infrastructure to ease the problems 
created by the race question” (Malik, 1996, p.17). However, as Malik argues, despite 
these changes, racialised thinking and practices in the Western world were never 
destroyed.  
 
Although the concept of biological ‘race’ was no longer appropriate in the 
official post-war European and North American discourse, the commonsense 
understanding of ‘race’ remained unchallenged and continued to be used in private 
contexts. As Malik (1996) observed, the official acceptance of the liberal consensus 
on ‘race’ was not linked to idealistic reasons, but was a pragmatic response to the 
problems Western societies started facing in the post-war period. The officially 
expressed support for equality and pluralism was a survival strategy of the ruling 
elite, not an ideological change.  
 
The changing boundaries of the concept of ‘race’ 
 
‘Race thinking’ continued to exist not only in private contexts, it was also 
prolonged by a theoretical paradigm of ‘race relations’ developed by some social 
scientists in North America and in Europe (Miles, 1989) in an attempt to address the 
unequal social relations between groups delineated on the bases of signified physical 
characteristics. Although the paradigm was used in western societies to make certain   40
forms of discrimination illegal,   the very notion of ‘race’ relations gave further 
substance to the idea of the existence of ‘races’ despite the contrary scientific 
evidence (Miles, 1989). Furthermore, race relation legislations were full of 
contradictions. For example, in Great Britain, the Race Relations Acts legislations 
were introduced at approximately the same time as the legislation that restricted 
immigration of people from the Commonwealth. Such immigration controls were 
justified in terms of economic prosperity and integrity of the nations. The debate on 
immigration that preceded this legislation indicated that in both official and common 
attitudes to immigrants from the colonies was the fear of ‘undesirables’, who were 
viewed as incapable of assimilating British culture and therefore potentially creating 
social tensions (Malik, 1996). Similar debates and anti-immigration legislations 
happened in many other parts of the western world (Malik, 1996). Although it was 
no longer acceptable to perceive ‘racial’ conflict and inequalities as important forces 
necessary for the social and economic progress and the political use of ‘racial’ 
science became discredited, ‘racialised’ discourse in the post-war era continued to be 
used. It changed its form of expression and became characterised by blurring of the 
boundaries between the concepts of ‘race’, nation and culture. Its underlying 
principles, however, were qualitatively not much different from the nineteenth 
century theories of race.  
 
Changes in the Australian racialised discourse 
 
Some examples of changes in the race discourse can be also found in post-
war Australia. The concept of ‘race’ framed in the language of doctrines of 
biological superiority and social Darwinism started becoming “obsolete and   41
repugnant to intellectuals, conservatives, politicians and the growing middle class 
[…] in post-World War II period of mass migration” (Jayasuriya, 1999, p.19), who 
wanted to distance themselves from the horrors of the Holocaust. In this climate, the 
Immigration Restriction Act (1901), which along with The Pacific Island Labourers 
Act (1910) was later known as the “White Australia Policy” (Jayasuriya, p.17), 
started loosing its credibility and as a result a revised Migration Act was passed in 
1958. This act removed the “blatantly racist” and discriminatory rules from the 
former legislation and “paved the way for the […] significant liberalisation of 
immigration entry requirements” in Australia, “which was initiated by the liberal 
government in 1966 (Jayasuriya, 1999, p.20). Although the reforms appeared radical 
in comparison to the White Australia policy, some social analysts believed that the 
“extent of the  changes” was limited and  indicated  “a persistent faith  in a 
predominantly homogeneous [white] society” (London, 1970, cited in Jayasuriya, 
1999, p.21) in Australia. Despite the changes in legislation, which finally led to the 
abolition of the White Australia policy by Whitlam’s government in 1973, “the 
sentiments of racism associated with … conventional racial ideologies … persist[ed] 
in the popular consciousness …, [although] they were not accorded any degree of 
credibility in public discourse” (Jayasuriya, 1999, p.21). With the economic 
recession of the 1980s and the arrival of large numbers of refugees from Indo-China, 
which caused the “irrational fears of Asian invasion” (Viviani, 1984, cited in 
Jayasuriya, 1999, p.22) in Australia, the sentiments of keeping Australia a strong and 
united nation, free from the undesirable Others, started resurfacing. Although not 
expressed in overtly racialised terms, the anti-Asian immigration debate shared much 
in common with the discredited racist discourse from the Australian past. 
   42
The persistence of the concept of ‘race’ 
 
It seems that the racialisation of people and their social relations in Western 
societies persists despite their declared commitment to equality and tolerance. Social 
divisions and exclusionary practices continue to be drawn along the lines of 
racialised differences, although formally they are justified not in terms of the 
hierarchy of ‘races’ but the need to maintain the cultural tradition and the cohesion 
of the nation. The persistence of ‘race’ and related concepts in academic and 
common discourse, despite scientific knowledge about the lack of its biological 
basis, is an interesting social phenomenon. It seems that the use of the notion of 
‘race’ is related to its social utility. It is convenient, as it rationalises the existing 
social order and the maintenance of the power hierarchy. In the following part of this 
chapter I analyse the current meaning of the concept of ‘race’ and some issues 
related to its use. 
 
‘Race’ as a social construct 
 
Scientific advances, which revealed “the massive commonality of human 
DNA” have discredited the notion of biologically distinct human races (Gillborn, 
1995, p.3). The concept of ‘race’ however is still used in every day language, often 
to describe human groups that share certain cultural characteristics such as language 
or religion (Van den Berghe, 1978, p.9). It also continues to be used in academic 
discourse as both analytical tool and explanatory determinant. Its meaning, however, 
has changed. As  Gillborn (1990) asserts, in the current discourse, the term ‘race’ is 
used to refer to groups of people who are not biologically, but socially defined as   43
having common characteristics. For that reason such groupings are not a biological 
fact, but are socially defined into existence. 
 
The term ‘race’ is no longer read as a permanent, natural system of genetic 
difference. Rather, it “operates as a system of socially constructed and enforced 
categories, constantly recreated and modified through human interaction” (Gillborn, 
1995, p.3). Such understanding of ‘race’, sometimes known as ‘social race’ 
underpins most use of this term in contemporary social discourse and it is in this 
sense that I use it in this dissertation.  
 
In recent years, some writers such as Miles (1989, 1993), or Carter and Green 
(1993, cited in Gillborn, 1995, p.3) have argued that the term ‘race’ should no longer 
be used in theoretical discourse, as it does not survive critical scrutiny. They also 
asserted that the frequent use of terms such as ‘race’, and ‘race relations’ may 
reinforce the idea that ‘race’ has objective, biological existence. They claimed that 
such labels may “prevent people from recognising what they have in common” and 
actively encourage them to assign importance to race “by representing the 
contingent, signified differences between them as transhistorical and fixed” (Carter, 
Green, & Sondhi, 1992, p.87).  
 
As Miles (1989) asserts, ‘race’ has no objective basis. Its existence is related 
to the process of signification in the representation of ‘Others’ in a social discourse. 
Race as a category is entirely imagined (brought into existence) through the process 
of signification. How human kind is divided depends on how people choose to 
represent other people, hence the concept of the representation of ‘Others’. The   44
features that are chosen during the process of representation convey certain 
meanings. Miles (1989) has described such process of signification in the following 
way: 
In Europe, North America and Australasia, the idea of ‘race’ is now usually  
… employed to differentiate collectivities distinguished by skin colour, so  
that races are either ‘black’ or ‘white’, but never ‘big eared’ or ‘small eared’.  
The fact that only certain physical characteristics are signified to define  
‘races’ … indicates that we are investigating not a given, natural division  
of the world’s population, but the application of historically and culturally  
specific meanings to the totality of human physiological variation. (p. 71) 
 
Miles (1989) further asserts that such a process of signification provides a 
basis for the creation of a hierarchy of groups and contributes to inclusion or 
exclusion of groups of people in the process of allocating resources and services. For 
that reason, Miles argues that ‘race’ as a category has no place in social discourse. 
Such a view of ‘race’ appears to be similar to the postmodern and post-structuralist 
analyses, which emphasise the dynamic nature of categories and provisional 
character of definitions of terms such as culture, identity or ‘race’ that are often 
taken for granted. These theories view society as an ever-changing structure and 
emphasise its diversity and heterogeneity, rather than its constant struggle and 
tension between relatively fixed social groups. Such an approach can successfully 
contribute to breaking down assumptions about the homogeneity of majority groups 
and the ‘otherness’ of minorities (Gillborn, 1995, p.69). 
 
Although it is difficult to deny the validity of arguments such as these, there 
is also a need to be aware of dangers that may stem from such approaches. As 
Giroux (1991, p.72, cited in Gillborn, 1995) maintains in relation to post-modern 
discourses:  
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a tendency to democratise the notion of difference … [may lead to] the 
danger of affirming difference simply as an end in itself, without 
acknowledging how difference is formed, erased, and resuscitated within 
and despite the asymmetrical  relations of power. Lost here is any 
understanding of how difference is forged in both domination and 
opposition. (pp. 69-70) 
 
Gillborn (1995) rightly argues in relation to the use of the notion of race, that 
it is important to warn theorists against the danger of “replicating the very fictions 
they seek to expose” (p.5). It is true that the uncritical use of the term ‘race’ may 
contribute to the reinforcement of the idea that ‘race’ has an objective meaning. 
However, as Gillborn further claims it is also important to note that there are a 
number of valid reasons for retaining the category of ‘race’ in theoretical discourse. 
One of these reasons is that although social categories change and evolve over time, 
we still “live in a world and in bodies which are deeply scored by the power relations 
of race and class, sexuality and gender” (Hebdige, 1989, p.89, cited in Gillborn, 
1995, p.70). Whether it is right or wrong, people commonly use the concept of race 
to make sense of the world. In order to engage with the world, and possibly even 
change it, theorists have to find ways of connecting with people’s perspective. By 
using recognisable words, theorists can address themselves to questions that people 
recognise. Simply rejecting the idea of ‘race’ may lead to frustration of theoretical 
discourse and misinterpretation of reality, as  regardless of whether the term ‘race’ is 
or is not used in social discourse, the issues related to exclusionary practices drawn 
along racialised lines exist in people’s everyday lives. Members of many socially 
defined groups face different forms of racism on the regular basis. Therefore, I agree 
with Gillborn (1995), that rather than abandoning the term race, we need to try to 
explore how it is used in a discourse (whether it is a part of policy, theory or   46
everyday practice of individuals and institutions). We also need to analyse who uses 
it, and what consequences it has for representation of the existing social formations.  
 
While analysing how the term ‘race’ is being used, we also need to be 
mindful of the fact that some discourses, although superficially deracialised, still 
fulfil their exclusionary role. Examples of such discourses can be found during the 
post-war era, as well as in more recent years, and can be all classified as different 
forms of racism. In such arguments, those who replace ‘race’ with culture and 
tradition, argue the need to defend the cohesion of the nation from the danger of the 
undesirable ‘aliens’. Although on the surface, these discourses seem to be different 
from the nineteenth century scientific racism, as they do not openly claim superiority 
of any groups, they all serve the same purpose.   
 
In the following section of this chapter, I analyse the changing scope of the 
concept of racism and its forms of expression with the emphasis on a recent 
phenomenon of the ‘new’ or ‘cultural’ racism, and explore its social consequences as 
well as the factors contributing to its appearance and the continuous existence. I 
claim that there is not one essential form of racism. Its content and forms of 
expression change to fit its historically determined political and social contexts.  
  
Conceptualising racism 
  The question of how to conceptualise racism is not purely an academic 
matter.  
How racism is defined is connected with a wider political culture in any  
given historical conjuncture.  
                                       (Salomos and Back, 1994, p.156) 
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The imprecise meaning of racism 
 
Similarly to ‘race’, the concept of racism has been a subject of many debates 
both in the past and at present. Racism appears to be one of the key ideas in daily 
discourse as well as in social science theory. The everyday meaning of the term 
racism is often equated with prejudice, implying a position of ignorance and 
irrational hatred or fear of another racial[ised] group (Gillborn, 1995, p.5). Such 
prejudice tends to be highly stereotyped, emotionally charged and directed towards 
members of a particular group because of their affiliation with that group (Aboud, 
1988, p.6). Although the everyday usage of the term appears to be uncritical, at the 
same time it is heavily negatively loaded (Miles, 1989). What follows, is that to 
claim that someone has expressed a racist opinion is to accuse her or him of being 
immoral and unworthy (Liffman, 1985). Whether certain use of social discourse can 
be described as racist depends on how we define this term. Geoffrey Blainey’s 
(1984) views on Asian migration to Australia for example, have been classified by 
some as clear expression of racism (see Cope and Kalantzis, 1989), while others 
maintained that due to the lack of clarity of the definition of racism such accusations 
could not withstand criticism (Liffman, 1989). 
 
Racism appears to be an imprecise term not only in common usage. Its 
definition also presents difficulties for social scientists. Racism is used as a label for 
so many different things and behaviours in social science, that it lacks precision. 
This lack of precision is linked to the elusive nature of the term ‘race’, which has 
been discussed earlier in this chapter. It is also not clear whether it should be used in 
relation to racist images and beliefs expressed by individuals, a systematic ideology   48
or social practices. Broadly speaking, recently racism has been viewed from two 
theoretical perspectives. The first one locates it at an individual level. Such a 
perspective implies a ‘rotten apple’ theory of racism, which views this phenomenon 
as an inability of some individuals to reason correctly, often linked to their 
“ignorance and irrationality, or even […] pathological personality” (Rizvi, 1993a, 
p.128). Another perspective, represented by theorists such as Gillroy (1987); 
McConnochie, Hollinsworth, and Pettman (1988); or Pettman, (1992) emphasise the 
structural constitution of racism. These theorists argue that racism is to be identified 
in social structures that disadvantage and exclude certain groups from the equal 
distribution of resources and power. This process of exclusion happens through the 
operations of key social institutions, hence the name of institutional racism. As the 
meaning of the term racism is imprecise, some analysts argue that although the term 
is useful as an easily understood statement of moral disapproval, for descriptive 
purposes it “simplifies, emotionalises and condemns more than it clarifies or 
explains” (Liffman, 1985, p.31).  
 
In the following part of this chapter I argue, that despite its lack of clarity and 
precision, the term racism has a proper role in social and historical analysis as it is 
more than just a word that is used to express moral sentiments. It refers to a powerful 
ideology with a long history, which has been reflected in social structures and in 
social practices (Cope and Kalantzis, 1989). For that reason I analyse its changing 
meaning, as whatever definition is adopted or developed in theoretical discourse, this 
has significant implication not only for the scope and direction of this discourse, but 
also for a wider social context. 
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The emergence of the concept of racism 
 
Although the concept of ‘race’ has been present in theoretical and everyday 
discourse for centuries, the word ‘racism’ has very recent origins. According to 
Miles (1989) this term appeared for the first time in English language in the 1930s. It 
was used as a title of a book written by Magnus Hirschfeld, who argued against the 
nineteenth century ‘scientific concept’ of the discrete human ‘races’ and their 
hierarchical order. Although Hirschfeld explored the concept of racism, he did not 
provide any formal definitions for this term. Miles maintains that prior to the 1930s, 
critics of scientific theories of ‘race’ did not use the concept of racism to identify 
their ideological object. 
 
The original definitions and the use of the term racism appeared, according to 
Miles (1989), as a result of two processes. The first one being the growing body of 
scientific evidence undermining the idea of biological ‘races’ with their distinct 
cultural characteristics and levels of ability. The second factor that contributed to the 
original development of the definition of racism was the reaction to the experience of 
the Holocaust and the Second World War. Racism became conceptualised as a result 
of a need to formulate the coherent rejection of the way in which the ‘scientific’ 
theories of ‘race’ were utilised in practice to exterminate and oppress certain socially 
constructed groups. 
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Racism: an ideology or social practice? 
 
According to Miles (1989) the concept of racism refers to a form of ideology, 
with a set of assumptions and images. Such ideology presupposes a process of 
racialisation, a form of representation based on the signification of certain 
phenotypical and/or genetic characteristics of human beings. Such characteristics are 
used as criteria for identifying a collectivity, the racialised Other, who are 
represented as having unchanging origins and status and who are inherently different 
in comparison with the Self. In racist discourse such a process of racialisation is 
negatively loaded. People who are represented as the different Other are further 
attributed with additional (negatively evaluated) inherent characteristics, either 
biological or cultural.  The Other is defined as a problem and is often represented as 
a threat to the Self. This process of representation, which led to the construction of 
the concept of ‘races’, has been and is continuously used, either explicitly or 
implicitly, in racist discourses.    
 
The second meaning of racism includes not only ideology, but also 
intentional practices and/or unintentional processes or consequences. Although Miles 
(1989, 1993) maintains that the concept of racism should be used exclusively in 
relation to ideology, I would like to use this term in a broader sense, because it is 
difficult to separate racist thought from racist structures and practices, as the former 
finds its expression in the latter. I agree with Jayasuriya, who claims that “racism as 
an ideology constructs differences which impinge on the way every day experience 
is perceived, embodied and reflected in the range of social institutions” (1999, p. 5) 
and processes.    51
An example of racism as an ideology may be the theory developed at the end 
of the nineteenth century, which proclaimed the superiority of certain races and 
generated a hierarchy that justified the dominant position of the ruling class. This 
ideology claimed to be developed in the name of ‘science and progress’ and 
provided legitimacy for inequality. The concept of racism was originally defined in 
relation to this theory. For example Montagu (1974) defined racism as an ideology 
which 
alleged  that something called ‘race’ is the prime determiner of all the 
important traits of body and soul, of character and personality of human 
beings and nations … This something called ‘race’ is [allegedly] a fixed 
and unchangeable part of the germ plasm, which transmitted from 
generation to generation, unfolds in each people as a typical expression 
of personality and culture. (p. 14) 
  
Similarly to Montagu, other theorists such as Banton, Barzun, Huxley and 
Haddon or Benedict (cited in Miles, 1989) developed definitions of racism with 
reference to the same specific historical and political framework. For that reason it 
has been argued that such definitions had little or no meaning outside its context. 
According to Miles (1989, p. 47), in the absence of the nineteenth century discourse 
of race with its related, discredited by science assumptions, some theorists such as 
Banton “concluded that racism was dead”.  
 
Although Banton (1970) is right that in the current social and historical 
context the traditional definition of racism shaped by the specific historical and 
political framework has no place, recent daily and theoretical discourse indicates that 
racism is far from being dead (see Herrnstein & Murray, 1994). For that reason, 
rather than being rejected, the definition of racism as ideology needs to be revised 
and transformed. In order to ensure the application of the definition of racism outside   52
its original nineteenth century historical context, racism needs to be viewed as an 
ideology that takes a number of different forms (Hall, 1980; Miles, 1989). One of its 
instances was ‘scientific racism, often also called ‘crude’ or ‘popular’ racism 
(Gillborn, 1990; Halstead, 1988). There are other forms of racism, however, that are 
still live and well in the twenty first century. 
 
The changing face of racism: From biology to culture 
 
Scientific or popular racism had been discredited after the Second World War 
as a false and politically dangerous doctrine. As a result, explicit assertions that 
‘race’ determines different levels of ability between individuals and can therefore be 
used to justify existing inequalities could no longer be a part of an acceptable public 
argument. For that reason, post-war social discourse was officially deracialised. 
However, as I argued earlier, such deracialisation was a pragmatic strategy. Racist 
ideology did not cease to exist; it only moved the concept of ‘race’ from the field of 
biology to the sphere of culture (Barker, 1981). The concept of ‘racial’ groups was 
replaced by ‘cultural’ or ‘ethnic’ groups and it has been implied that these groups 
were unable to successfully coexist on an equal basis (Jayasuriya, 1999). As Kohn 
(1996, p.278) asserts: “As race disappeared from the physical anthropology 
textbooks, ‘difference’ became embedded in cultural theory…. The Romantic 
doctrine of innate ‘racial’ character was reborn as an idea of difference, entirely 
product of culture, but just as immutable”. In racist political discourse, the new 
concept of ‘cultural difference’ replaced the notion of ‘race’; however, both of them 
played the same role of marginalisation and exclusion. Margaret Thatcher’s speech   53
during her pre-election campaign (1978, cited in Barker, 1981) illustrates well this 
trend: 
[…] people are rather afraid that this country might be swamped by  
people with a different culture. And you know, the British character has 
done so much for democracy, for law, and done so much throughout the 
world, that if there is a fear that it might be swamped, people are going 
to react and be rather hostile to those coming in. (p. 15) 
 
 
There are two important aspects to Thatcher’s argument. The first one being 
that there are some ‘fixed’ cultural differences between British people and those who 
are going to ‘swamp’ them. The second aspect of this argument is that such 
differences are the natural source of social conflict as those who possess the cultural 
heritage and tradition are going to defend it. Such new ‘deracialised’ discourse 
substitutes the concept of the superiority and inferiority of separate ‘races’ with 
groups of different cultures who do not fit in the culture and tradition of the nation. 
Although not explicitly using the category of ‘race’, such discourse still operates in 
damaging ways for those who are perceived as not being a part of the cultural 
tradition (of white Europeans).  
 
   Such spurious deracialisation of discourse and the construction of cultural 
minority groups as being a threat to the cultural heritage and tradition of a nation 
reflect an important theme in modern racist ideology in many Western societies. 
Images like that allow justifying the existing social structures and inequalities as a 
natural tendency to protect the cohesion of the nation without openly employing 
racialised categories or using an argument of supremacy of one group over another. 
Racist discourses of that nature can be found in Britain (see Barker, 1981; Soloms, 
1993), in the United States (see Edelman, 1971; Solomos, 1993), in Western Europe   54
(see Hopkins, Reicher & Levine, 1997) as well as in Australia (see Jayasuriya, 
1999).  
 
According to Barker (1981), who refers only to Britain, but whose argument 
can be generalised to other political and social contexts, such a tendency fits in a 
wider ideology, which allows hostility towards racialised minorities groups and 
denies that it is a form of racism. This ideology permits politicians and other 
members of society to advocate openly for immigration controls based on racialised 
criteria and rationalise it by their ‘concern’ for the ‘continuation of tradition and 
nationhood’. Enoch Powell, a member of British Parliament in the 1960s and 1970s 
who took an active role in the debates on British immigration issues and successfully 
managed to influence the restrictions to the immigration law illustrates this trend. 
When questioned about his views during a television interview, Powell (cited in 
Gordon & Klug, 1986) justified his non-racist position by stating: 
 
If by being a racialist, you mean a man who despises a human being 
because he belongs to another race, or a man who believes that one race 
is inherently superior to another in civilisation, or capability of 
civilisation, then the answer is emphatically no. (p.20) 
 
Similar examples can be found in Australia, where arguments against Asian 
immigration (Blainey, 1984; Howard, 1988, cited in Ricklefs, 1997), or against the 
potential success of multiracial society (Hanson, 1996) were not interpreted by some 
members of Australian society as a manifestation of racism, but a natural tendency to 
prefer ‘your own kind’ and the need to preserve the culture of the nation. Although 
such discourses cannot be categorised as racist using the traditional definition of this 
concept, as they do not explicitly presuppose superiority of one ‘race’ over another,   55
they play a similar role. They represent people in terms of racialised categories 
(although often not explicitly) and portray the Other as possessing certain fixed 
characteristics, which present a threat to the Self. They also use these characteristics 
as a basis for including or excluding certain groups from existing social structures. 
Since the 1980s, some theorists such as Barker (1981), Gilroy (1987), Gordon and 
Klug (1986), and Hall (1988) have started conceptualising this kind of discourse as a 
‘new’ or ‘cultural’ racism, which in comparison to the old nineteenth century racism 
differed in its forms of expression, but remained similar in its content, scope and 
some broad social consequences.  
 
What is new in ‘new racism’ 
 
This ‘new racism’ appears to be based on two main assumptions. The most 
central of them is the ‘natural’ tendency of people to categorise each other by their 
perceived race and a natural affinity between members of the same race. Although 
the term race is commonly replaced in such discourse by other terms, the similarity 
of meaning is quite apparent. O’Keefe (1986), for example, claims that “the idea that 
people could live without a racial sentiment, without a sense of history or continuity 
or identity is an obvious nonsense” (p.189, cited in Hopkins’ Reicher & Levine, 
1997, p. 308). Similarly, Cronin asserts that “our need is not simply to be with others 
of our own kind, but to enact repeatedly the interfusion of our own identities with the 
identities of others” (1987, p. 46, cited in Hopkins, Reicher & Levine, p. 308). A 
fundamental role in the ideology of ‘new racism’ is played by culture and national 
identity. As Hopkins, Reicher and Levine claim, the culture of an individual “is seen 
as a reflection of one’s social heritage and … is the … basis on which people are   56
said to recognise others as similar and experience feelings of affinity”. In the 
discourse of new racism, it is rather impossible “for people to take on a new culture 
alien to their own heritage” (p. 309).  
 
New racists claim that as the racialised minority groups, being distinctly 
different from the majority, are unable to adapt to the culture and tradition of the 
dominant groups, the mere existence of such communities presents a threat to the 
tradition of the nation. This assertion informs the second assumption of the new 
racism’s ideology, which refers to a ‘natural’ antagonism between members of 
different cultural groups. As Margaret Thatcher put it in one of her speeches, “the 
moment a minority threatens to become a big one, people get frightened” (cited in 
Solomos, 1993, p. 193). The inevitability of conflict between the majority and 
minority groups as well as the defensive tone of the discourse of new racism is also 
well illustrated by Mishan’s (1988, cited in Solomos, 1993) argument in Salisbury 
Review. He stated: 
 
Opposition to the creation of a multi-racial society may well spring 
primarily from a deep concern about the future of our country, on arising 
from a belief that  its transformation over a short period from a relatively 
homogeneous population to one of a popular racial mix, on balance, have 
adverse effects on its institutions and character, or at any rate, may be 
more likely to do harm than good. (p. 194) 
 
Parallel concern about the threat to British tradition as a consequence of 
multiculturalism has been also expressed by Maitland (cited in Gillborn, 1995), who 
argued that: 
We should not allow non-believers to undermine our traditions…. It is a 
tragedy that the teaching of the Christian faith has become woefully 
neglected in the face of multiculturalism which is promoting minority 
faith at the expense of Christianity.   (p. 22)   57
 
In Australia, Pauline Hanson (1996) expressed similar unease about the 
threats posed to ‘our tradition’ by Asian immigrants. By focusing on the inability of 
the ‘aliens’ to successfully coexist with the majority group, she clearly paraphrased 
Margaret Thatcher’s 1978 pre-election speech: 
 
I believe we are in danger of being swamped by Asians. Between 1984 
and 1995, 40% of all migrants coming to this country were of Asian origin.  
They have their own culture and religion, form ghettos and do not assimilate. 
(no page number) 
 
Such discourses construct the Others as outsiders, who present a direct 
challenge to ‘our’ culture. The division between ‘us’ and ‘them’, who will never be a 
part of ‘our tradition and faith’, appears to be impossible to overcome. For all these 
reasons, it seems to be only natural to fear the foreign Others, as they threaten our 
national identity. As Barker (1981) asserts, the ‘new racism’s’ construction of 
difference means that: 
 
you do not need to think of yourself as superior – you do not even need 
to dislike or blame those who are so different from you – in order to say 
that the presence of the aliens constitutes a threat to your way of life.  
(p. 18) 
 
To like your ‘own kind’ and to be prejudiced is, according to new racism, a 
part of human nature. As Honeyford (1986) claims: 
[…] to be prejudiced is, quite simply, to be human. All men and 
women, whatever their origin, creed or colour, are prejudiced. We all 
have a tendency to prejudge whether out of social conditioning or prior 
experience. Sometimes our judgements are irrational and sometimes 
they are sound. (p.52) 
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It appears that the ‘new racism’ is no different from the old one. Although it 
explicitly rejects the notion that some ‘races’ are naturally superior to others, it 
assumes their natural antagonism and the preference for ‘your own kind’. The 
discourse of new racism is superficially deracialised, however, it uses the themes of 
overcrowding and the threat to ‘our culture’, ‘our language’, ‘our religion’ and ‘our 
way of conduct’, which are alien to members of other cultural groups. Although the 
term ‘race’ is not commonly employed in this discourse, it is quite obviously 
implicated in it. We can hear in it the themes of the good, old scientific racism with 
its claims about the inability of the inferior races to reach the level of ‘our 
civilisation’. The difference here is mainly in terminology, not in the substance.  
 
The ideology of ‘new racism’ is based on the same principle of signification 
involved in the process of representation of the Other that was employed by the ‘old’ 
racism. However, instead of using phenotypical obviousness, it takes up a concept of 
cultural difference. As Cope & Kalantzis (1985) argue, “While the shift to a greater 
emphasis on cultural obviousness within racist ideology is interesting, the practice is 
fundamentally the same”. It is based on “labelling visible manifestation of difference 
linked to varying places of origin” and positioning it as a cause for “serious social 
problem[s]”, instead of viewing these problems as resulting from the existing social 
inequalities that contribute to “social frustration or dissatisfaction” (p.26).  
 
Whether it is cultural or phenotypical, obviousness is given social 
significance. The social function of such racist ideologies remains the same despite 
the fact that their content might appear different. One might ask whether the idea of 
the unchangeable cultural differences is really qualitatively different from the   59
Romantic concept of innate ‘racial character’ and how the idea of nationhood and 
tradition differs from the idea of a superior ‘race’. I agree with Gillborn (1995), that 
the ‘deracialised’ talk of ‘new racism’ is inherently no better than the old one. All 
these discourses signify differences between people and use them to justify the 
exclusion or inclusion of individuals or groups in the existing social structures. The 
only difference is that one of them is based on the rhetoric of inferiority of ‘races’, 
while the other is framed in the “logic of [cultural] differentiation” (Wieviorka, 
1995, cited in Jayasuriya, 1999, p.6). All of them, however, can be categorised as 
racist ideologies or simply as variations of racism.  
 
The presence of a ‘spurious deracialised’ arguments can be noticed not only 
in political but also in academic discourse. One of the powerful examples of the 
latter is The Bell Curve by Herrnstein and Murray (1994). The authors argue that 
there is scientific evidence (based on intelligence tests) of a cognitive gap between 
whites and blacks in the USA. They further argue that this gap cannot be wholly 
explained by social and environmental influences and cannot be “the result of biased 
tests in the ordinary sense of the term”. Although this difference, as Herrnstein and 
Murray explain, “may well include some (as yet unknown) genetic component” they 
assure the readers that it is not “entirely genetic” (p.312). Nevertheless, they claim, 
using a number of statistical data, that some minority groups fit better into the jobs 
and societal roles that do not make cognitive demands. Herrnstein and Murray 
express their concern that this cognitive gap may lead in future, through an ongoing 
dysgenic effect, to the lowering of the intellectual capital of the country. Although 
they avoid direct references to the ‘inequality of the races’ and try not to call 
attention to their biological assumptions, their discourse appears to imitate the all too   60
familiar nineteenth century racist tradition. Their argument plays the same role as the 
racist discourse did one hundred years earlier. It uses the presumed ‘natural’ 
differences between socially constructed groups to legitimise the existing social 
inequalities. 
 
We are all the same: A colour-blind approach  
 
It is apparent to me that the concept of ‘race’ and racism are as powerful at 
present as they have been in the past. As the idea of biological differences has been 
discredited, racist discourse replaced it with cultural ones. Such a preoccupation with 
difference led some analysts and politicians to develop a paradigm of ‘race-
blindness’ (Kohn, 1996, p.277), which is based on the assumption that by ignoring 
difference we make everyone equal. In other words, if we deny difference, it might 
go away. Its underlying assumption is that acknowledging differences contributes to 
creation of social problems. Therefore to eliminate racism we simply need to treat 
everyone alike. Such an approach, often called a colour-blind approach (Halstead, 
1988), is according to Gillborn (1990) simple and convenient. It appeals to 
‘commonsense’ notions of justice and requires no changes in existing social 
structures. It gives advice to people to ignore differences and get on with their life 
(Honeyford, 1989, cited in Gillborn, 1990).  
 
 For that reason the colour-blind approach is categorised by some as a form 
of racism. Halstead (1988) calls it an unintentional racism. He maintains that treating 
people the same, when in relevant respect they are different, may involve social 
injustice to the same extent as treating them differently when in relevant respect they   61
are the same. In order to categorise the colour-blind paradigm as a form of racism, 
however, we need to adopt a different approach to conceptualising racism.  
 
Consequences of colour-blind racism 
 
As I mentioned earlier in this chapter, racism can be conceptualised not only 
as a form of ideology, but also as a combination of discourse and practices, which 
intentionally or unintentionally protect the advantages of the dominant group and 
disadvantages the minority groups. Such racism is called by some ‘institutional 
racism’ (Halstead, 1980; Miles, 1989). According to Gillborn (1995, p.5), this 
concept of racism emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, in response to growing support 
for civil rights and anti-discrimination legislation. As the notion of equality of 
opportunity became popular, racism started being perceived as certain practices and 
procedures that denied certain groups equality. Such practices and procedures were 
often considered independently of human intentionality and/or a specific ideology. In 
the context of such definition the colour-blind approach can be viewed as a form of 
racism.  
 
Although unintentional, a colour-blind approach may lead to racism in social 
policy, educational programs, teaching and childcare practices, and many more. If 
we are perceived as all the same, then there should be a common standard developed 
that fits all our needs. For that reason there is no need to contextualise curricula, 
teaching strategies or childcare routines. It seems simple and convenient. As 
Halstead (1988) argues however, it does not work in practice as it is based on the 
principle that all people are equal, but fails to take into account the contingent facts   62
of existing inequalities and disadvantage from which certain social groups have been 
suffering and suffer still in our society. 
 
How the colour-blind approach can be applied into practice can be well 
illustrated by Pauline Hanson’s (1996) maiden speech in which she stated her views 
on reconciliation: 
 
Along with millions of Australians, I am fed up to the back teeth with the 
inequalities that are being promoted by the government and paid for by the  
taxpayer under the assumption that Aboriginals are the most 
disadvantaged people in Australia … This nation is being divided into 
black and white, and the present system encourages it … We do not want a 
society in Australia in which one group enjoy one set of privileges and 
another group enjoy another set of privileges ….Reconciliation is 
everyone recognising and treating each other as equals. (no page number) 
 
In her later speech, Hanson (1997) clarified this point: 
  
My immediate goals are … to treat all Australians equally and in doing  
so, abolish the devices and discriminatory policies we now have, such as  
those related to multiculturalism and Aboriginal affairs. (p. 6) 
 
  It seems apparent, that when applied to social policies and practice, a colour-
blind approach allows the ruling elite to maintain its dominant position as the 
common experiences are defined in terms to which a majority group can relate more 
easily than the minority groups.  
 
Unfortunately not dead: The social utility of ‘race’ and racisms 
 
  I have argued that racism, although expressed in more subtle ways in 
comparison to its earlier forms of expression, persists in social discourse and   63
practice. It has many different forms and modalities and for that reason it is 
sometimes difficult to identify.  The concept of race and the ways it is used in racist 
ideologies persist because of its social value and social utility. The reason for such 
persistence is that different forms of racism “are perceived to reinforce the safety, 
security and comfort of the familiar in the face of the anxiety, insecurity and 
discomfort of the unfamiliar” (Van Horne, p. 8). The ideology of ‘new racism’ 
(Barker, 1981; Miles, 1989; Gillborn, 1995; Hopkins, Reicher & Levine, 1997) 
which replaced the old, crude racism based on the assumptions of the biological 
supremacy, illustrates well the idea of social value and social utility racism. Its 
effects can be observed at the beginning of the twenty first century, as those who 
have been beneficiaries of “racial inheritance struggle to maintain what Lincoln 
understood to be the superior position” (Van Horne, p. 9).  
 
The ideology of liberalism of the post-war era (discussed earlier in this 
chapter) made an impact on the expression and form of racist ideologies as well as 
on people’s individual racialised ideas of difference. Some research findings (see 
Brown, 1995) indicate a decline in racist beliefs in the last thirty years in countries 
such USA, Australia and Great Britain. Some new, less reactive measures show, 
however, that this decline seems to be a result of changing social desirability norms 
rather than internalised non-prejudiced beliefs. Hostility towards various racialised 
groups is not overtly expressed by the dominant group members; it does not mean, 
however, that it does not exist. As Brown (1995) asserts, racism has not declined, it 
only changed its form of expressions from open hostility to more indirect, subtle 
ways. 
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It seems that having the knowledge that ‘race’ has no objective existence 
does not automatically stop people from perceiving the world and social relations 
along racialised lines. The negative perception of the Other can be rationalised 
through the ‘natural’ hierarchy of races, but can be also easily legitimised by natural 
liking of one’s own kind and the preference for one’s own culture. Different 
historical and political contexts have different forms of racist thought and have 
various populations as its objects (Miles, 1993). Different modalities of racism are 
formed in actual cultural practices (Hall, 1986b) of representation that sustain 
particular racist constructions of social differences and social relations. As we 
perceive and interpret individual differences during the process of signification, the 
way we attach meaning to such perceived differences depends on the social context 
we are in. The reason that racism does not decline is a result of the complex nature of 
social processes through which racist thinking is developed. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I argued that despite the lack of objective existence, the 
concept of race persists because of its social utility. As Gilroy (1987) maintains, race 
is socially and politically constructed and different forms of racialisation are 
maintained and secured through elaborate ideological work. Despite its various 
meanings, which change and are struggled over to suit particular political contexts in 
different historical eras, race continues to be employed in different forms and 
modalities of racist ideologies that legitimise social inequalities and existing power 
structures. Although the relatively recent phenomenon of the ‘new’ racism is   65
superficially ‘deracialised’, as it replaces the concept of ‘race’ with that of culture 
and nation, it is inherently no different to the nineteen century biological racism.  
 
For example in Australia, new racism, with its “logic of differentiation” and 
the importance of national unity and social cohesion (Jayasuriya, 1999, p.6) was 
used as successfully to justify the need for an anti-Asian immigration policies in the 
1980s and 1990s, expressed by politicians such as Geoffrey Blainey, John Howard 
or Pauline Hanson, as the old racism framed in the logic of  inferiority and the need 
to preserve the superior races was used in the nineteenth century to justify the 
colonisation and inhumane treatment of Aboriginal people. Similarly the concept of 
‘race’ was used in the second half of the nineteenth century in Australia to legitimise 
hostility towards Asian immigrants and all non-white settlers in the name of 
defending the homogenic fabric of the young Anglo-Australian nation. These racist 
sentiments resulted in the passing of the discriminatory immigration legislations in 
1901 (Immigration Restriction Act) and 1910 (The Pacific Island Labourers Act), 
later known as the ‘White Australia’ policy (Jayasuriya, 1999).  
 
As I stated earlier, all forms of racism have the same purpose. Regardless of 
their object and forms of expression, they signify and attach certain meanings to 
differences between people and use them to exclude or include individuals or groups 
from existing social structures. In Australia, the marginalisation and exclusion of 
Aboriginal and other non-European groups was justified by different forms of 
racisms framed in the language of doctrines of biological superiority and social 
Darwinism during colonial times and later in the discourse about nationhood, 
cultural integrity and social cohesion.   66
In the next chapter I explore in more detail the complexity of the 
development of racialised thinking and how it relates to children, as well as some 
factors contributing to this process. This will be discussed in the context of 
environmental influences within the framework of Bronfenbrenner’s ecological 
systems approach to human development. 
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Chapter 3 
 
DEVELOPMENT OF CHILDREN’S RACIALISED THOUGHT 
 
Introduction 
 
I argued in the previous chapter that racism does not have an essential form 
(Hall, 1986a, Miles, 1993, Jayasuriya, 1999). Racist meaning is constructed in and 
through ideology, which changes its form and modality to suit particular historical 
and political contexts. In this chapter, I explain my position in relation to how young 
children relate to different expressions of racism. I argue here that children develop 
their racialised ideas of difference and social relations within the specific contexts of 
their “everyday experiences and that these experiences are socially organised, 
determined by social processes that extend beyond the scope of everyday 
experience” (Rizvi, 1993, p.126). In other words, children’s racialised thinking 
develops within the complex network of information and practices, which are formed 
and maintained within racist ideologies existing in a given society.  
 
The ‘common sense’ ideology of racism 
 
Before I discuss this any further, I would like to explain my understanding of 
ideology, which is consistent with that of Hall (1986). Hall asserts after Gramsci 
(1971) that the concept of ideology consists of two distinct levels; it refers to an 
internally consistent system of thought, as well as to “the categories or practical 
consciousness, or what Gramsci called “common sense” ” (Hall, 1986b, p.30). This   69
critical distinction between the coherent system of thought and the ‘common sense’ 
ideology is particularly useful in relation to racism and for that reason I discuss it 
here in more detail.  
 
Any ideology has its coherent philosophical core, its conception of the world, 
with its principal social function to join and bring together “the entire social block” 
(Gramsci, cited in Hall, 1986a, p.20). However, the formal coherence of an ideology 
is only historically effective if it enters into and transforms and modifies the 
everyday thought of the masses. This is the “common sense” (Gramsci, cited in Hall, 
1986a, p.20) ideology. It is a philosophical core of any ideology elaborated “into 
practical and popular forms of consciousness” (Hall, 1986a, p.20), which affect the 
broad masses of society in the form “of a cultural movement, political tendency, 
faith or religion”. Such common sense ideologies are not static. As Rizvi (1993a) 
claims, following Hall, such ideologies are organic, as the common sense 
consciousness “is not an individual, but a relational, collective phenomenon located 
in practices” (p.130). Ideologies continually change “as people encounter and learn 
new ways of acting upon the world around them” (Rizvi, 1993a, p. 130). Racism as 
an ideology changes as it becomes “challenged, interrupted, and reconstructed, in the 
actual practices in which people engage” (Rizvi, 1993a, p.129).  Particular 
modalities of racism are formed in specific cultural practices “of representation, 
which make it possible to sustain particular racist constructions of social difference” 
(Rizvi, 1993, p.131) and social relations.  
 
Each historical context has a common sense, popular ideological form of 
racism. Popular racism is not coherent and logical (Hall, 1986b). It is often   70
contradictory and consists of a generalised set of ideas and practices, which enable 
“people to make sense of their everyday experiences by making them seem natural” 
(Rizvi, 1993a, p.131).  
 
Racialised representation and children 
 
In the remaining part of this chapter I would like to address the issue of how 
children relate to different racialised representations constructed in and maintained 
through popular racist ideologies. As I mentioned in my introduction, in this 
dissertation I adopt the perspective of some current research on children and race 
(Rizvi, 1993a; Troyna & Hatcher, 1993; Connolly, 1996, 1998b; van Ausdale & 
Feagin, 2001) and claim that children are active learners who develop their 
knowledge through interactions in their social world and who posses a certain level 
of competence that allows them to “comprehend, process and articulate their needs 
and experiences” (Connolly, 1996, p.172). For that reason they do not simply 
replicate racist discourses to which they are exposed, but actively struggle with their 
contingent and often contradictory nature, while trying to make sense of their social 
world (Connolly, 1998b).  
 
There are many theories that attempt to explain children’s racialised ideas 
and beliefs. Research on children’s racialised thinking traditionally engaged a 
number of frameworks that aimed to explain it from the perspective of the formation 
of racial attitudes. As attitudes refer to “lasting, general evaluations of people, 
objects or issues” (Baron, Byrne & Suls, 1989), studies that employed an attitude 
framework perceived racism in children as a fixed phenomenon. As Connolly   71
asserts, within this framework a prejudiced child is assumed to “act upon these 
prejudices regardless of context” (1996, p.174).   
 
In the initial phase of my dissertation I was also influenced by the view that 
children’s racialised interpretation of their social world could be viewed from a 
perspective of attitudes. However, during my fieldwork, and later during my data 
analysis, I realised that children’s racialised understanding of their social world is 
quite complex and often contradictory and therefore it needs to be conceptualised not 
as a lasting, stable orientation, but as a dynamic process which unfolds in the specific 
context of children’s every-day experiences.  
 
I use Bronfenbrenner’s (1979) ecological perspective on human development 
as a broad framework from which to explore children’s racialised thinking. I believe 
that this perspective is a useful one, as it provides us with an opportunity to position 
the process of racialisation in the context of children’s engagement in the practices 
of popular racism in their immediate environments (Microsystems) such as school, 
family or neighbourhood. At the same time, however, it allows us to see how these 
“cultures of childhood” (Troyna & Hatcher, 1993, p.110) are influenced by the 
broader social processes in our society. 
 
In the next section of this chapter I critically discuss some of the frameworks, 
which have been commonly employed to analyse children’s racialised conception of 
themselves and their social world in the past and at present. In doing so, I 
demonstrate how some of these frameworks, on the one hand, ignore the role 
structural factors of the society play in children’s perception of social difference and   72
social relations, while on the other, they fail to acknowledge the active role children 
play in their own learning and understanding of the world. 
 
Developmental antecedents for prejudice? 
 
  Katz (1982) asserts that learning about differences among people involves 
similar principles as any other categorising process. It is based on the process of 
classification where certain cues are selected to differentiate one group of objects 
from another. Young children practise their classification skills during the process of 
learning about the world and apply them not only to non-living objects but also to 
people. Their early classifying attempts are based upon cues, which are easily 
visible. This, according to Katz (1982) might be a reason why gender cues are 
learned about so easily. As children’s early cognitive learning involves colour 
recognition and the use of colour as a classification device, Katz asserts that it is not 
surprising that children often use skin colour cues as a basis for classifying people at 
an early age. What is surprising, however, is that young children “exhibit differential 
evaluative responses to different skin colour” (Katz, 1982, p.21). There are a number 
of studies demonstrating for example, that white children demonstrate pro-white bias 
from an early age (Aboud, 1980, 1988; Friedman; 1980; Verna, 1982; Ramsey, 
1987, 1991; Black-Gutman & Hickson, 1996). Some studies also demonstrate that 
black pre-school children demonstrate a similar preference (Aboud, 1980, 1988; 
Branch & Newcombe, 1986; Spencer & Markstrom-Adams, 1990; Aboud & Doyle, 
1995). Some early theories suggested that the preference for white skin is a result of 
certain ‘natural’ tendencies, which can be observed during the first years of the 
child’s life.   73
One such theory developed by Williams and Morland (1976) argues that all 
children begin life with a preference for light and an aversion of dark as a reflection 
of primitive feelings about day and night. Williams and Morland speculated that pro-
white bias originated from a basic human tendency to link darkness to visual 
disorientation and therefore to associate it with fear. Lightness, on the other hand, is 
associated with fear-reduction. The preference of lightness over darkness is believed, 
therefore, to be a developmental antecedent for preferring white over dark skin. 
According to this theory, “cultural factors” such as “language connotations, lower 
status associated with dark skin” are believed to be mere reinforcers of “these initial 
tendencies” (Katz, 1982, p.22). Although such explanation might appear convincing 
to some, many research findings demonstrate that social factors play a far more 
important role than the above theory suggests.  
 
Studies undertaken by Hraba and Grant (1970); Fox and Jordan (1973) and 
Katz & Zalk (1974) for example, which employed different colour dolls or pictures 
techniques, demonstrated either an inconsistent pro-white bias amongst young Black 
children or a clear preference for Blacks. A study by Kircher and Furby (1971) based 
on children’s picture preferences, also found that while the pro-white bias within 
White pre-school American children increased with age, their Black peers did not 
show such tendency. It was found that 5 year old Black kindergarten children 
showed no pro-white bias in comparison to a four-year-old group. Furthermore, 
Finkelstein and Haskins (1983), who observed pre-school children’s social 
interactions at school, reported a strong preference of both White and Black children 
for same colour peers. These preferences became even stronger at the end, in 
comparison to the beginning, of the school year. An increase in pro-black attitudes   74
amongst older minority group children, in comparison to pre-school years, has been 
also reported by Aboud (1988), Spencer & Markstrom-Adams (1990) and Aboud & 
Doyle (1995). Kircher and Furby (1971) as well as Katz (1982) suggest that change 
in attitudes within Black minority children may be a result of the ‘black is beautiful’ 
sociopolitical movement in the USA at the end of the 1960s which contributed to the 
positive change of Black people’s self image and the development of pride in their 
blackness. However it is interesting to note “that although responses of Black 
children have changed, the responses of young White children have not. White 
children never express preferences to be a member of any racial group but their own” 
(Katz, 1982). These findings seem to demonstrate that rather than being a result of a 
‘natural tendency’, the preference for a certain skin colour might be linked to 
prevailing ideologies in a given society.  
 
Another explanation for very young children’s same-race bias phenomenon 
was developed by Allport (1954) and was based on the assumption that children’s 
negative evaluation of others, who are perceived by them as ‘racially’ different, is a 
result of a general fear of strange and unfamiliar things. This classical theory, like 
the later one developed by Williams and Morland (1976), also does not withstand 
critical scrutiny. Firstly, while it could possibly explain children’s preference for 
‘same-race’ peers, it does not provide an argument for some Black children’s pro-
white bias. Secondly, it does not explain why White children raised in a 
heterogeneous social milieu demonstrate similar pro-white preferences as those who 
were brought up in homogenous environments (Ramsey, 1987, 1991). Furthermore, 
while based on this theory it could be argued that the ‘fear of strange and unfamiliar’ 
and its consequent negative evaluation could be reduced by early and frequent   75
contact, anecdotal evidence reported by Katz (1982), in relation to upper-class 
Southern White children in USA reared by Black nannies, does not support this 
argument. Hewstone & Brown (1986) as well as Turner (1987, cited in Troyna & 
Hatcher, 1992) also argue that positive interethnic contact is not enough to reduce 
children’s racist assumptions and feelings. 
 
These early attempts to explain children’s early ‘racial’ prejudice in terms of 
‘natural’ antecedents do not seem to be confirmed by research findings. Some more 
comprehensive theoretical formulations regarding children’s racialised thinking are 
needed to better understand its development. In the following part of this chapter 
some such perspectives will be briefly critically discussed.  
 
Personality factors and children’s racialised thinking 
 
  One of the perspectives on the development of racist attitudes in children 
links it to personality problems. This perspective is based on the assumption that 
individuals’ political and social attitudes are “an expression of deep lying trends in 
personality” (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson & Sanford, 1950, p.1). These 
personality trends make some people, more than others, receptive to certain 
prejudiced ideas prevalent in a given society at a given time. Such differences in 
receptivity according to the theory developed by Adorno et al. (1950), can be 
attributed to different parenting styles. Adorno’s perspective was strongly influenced 
by Freud’s psychoanalytical theory, and was based on the assumption that the 
development of a child is the result of constant repression and redirection of 
biological drives by social expectations.    76
 Adorno et al. (1950) argued that prejudiced people have been exposed in 
childhood to an authoritarian upbringing which imposed on them rigid conventional 
rules of conduct. Authoritarian parenting style, characterised by unreasonable high 
expectations, harsh punishment and law responsiveness to children’s needs, results 
in children’s frustration and aggression towards their parents. Due to the fear of 
punishment, however, children avoid expressing hostility toward their parents or 
other authority figures and redirect their aggression to substitute targets. According 
to this theory the most likely substitute targets are those perceived as weaker or 
inferior to oneself, for example, members of a cultural minority groups or other 
socially devalued categories such as women or homosexuals. The authoritarian 
“personality syndrome” (Brown, 1995) manifested itself in the person’s cognitive 
style, which in turn affected the affective and behavioural components of attitudes. 
Adorno et al. (1950) believed that due to family upbringing, the child developed a 
simplistic way of thinking about the world in which people and their actions were 
rigidly categorised as either ‘right’ or ‘wrong’. This tendency resulted in an 
inflexible, intolerant cognitive style receptive to stereotypes about social groups and 
hostility towards minority groups. 
 
Despite its strong historical role in stimulating empirical research, this 
approach to understanding racialised thinking has been widely critisised for a 
number of reasons. One of these criticisms refers to the methodology of research 
findings seemingly confirming the personality explanation of prejudice. This 
criticism centred on the correlation between authoritarianism and other variables 
such as levels of education or social class (Brown, 1995). These correlations might 
suggest an alternative explanation for the genesis of prejudiced attitudes, linking   77
them to structural factors of a society. In addition, research findings by Mosher and 
Scodel (1960, cited in Aboud, 1988) discovered a reasonable correlation between 
children’s and their mothers’ ethnocentric attitudes, but lack of consistent association 
between the mothers’ childrearing practices and their children’s level of prejudice. 
These findings point to the role of social factors in development of prejudiced 
attitudes rather than to personality problems resulting from a harsh and rigid 
parenting style. 
 
The explanations of ‘racial’ prejudice in terms of individual personality 
problems also fail to explain the uniformity of prejudiced attitudes across whole 
groups in society or its historical specifity. For example, it does not explain the 
uniformed anti-Semitism in the majority of German society during the Nazi era, a 
sudden growth of anti-Muslim attitudes during the civil war in the former 
Yugoslavia in the 1990s, or the attacks on Islamic mosques throughout Australia 
after September 11 in 2001.  
 
Theories that attribute  racist attitudes to personality problems not only 
ignore the importance of situational social factors such as attitudes of others around 
us, the norms of one’s group or the relationships between one’s groups and others 
(Brown & Yee, 1988), they also underestimate broader societal norms and social 
structures. The cross-cultural research by Pettigrew (1958) which examined racial 
prejudice in South Africa and the US and some further studies by Heaven (1983) and 
Duckitt (1988) indicate that the origins of racist attitudes are more closely linked to 
the prevailing societal norms and structures to which individuals are exposed to, than 
to any personality problems.    78
Explaining prejudiced ‘racial’ attitudes in terms of personality problems 
carries “dangerous implications for social actions against racism” as it redirects 
efforts from “social action” to “individual therapy” and shifts the emphasis from the 
broader social structures to a family unit (Milner, 1983, p.34). As Rizvi (1993a) 
argues, referring to the concept of Henriques (1984), “this view implies a ‘rotten 
apple’ theory of racism predicated upon a set of normative assumptions about the 
nature of the sane, rational, and unprejudiced individual” (p.128). Such a perspective 
suggests that racism can be dealt with by educational or therapeutic interventions and 
ignores the importance of social and historical factors that create a climate for racist 
assumptions within society as a whole.  
 
Social Reflection Theory and Prejudice 
 
  One of the explanations which emphasises the important role of social 
context in the development of prejudiced racialised attitudes, claims that the latter 
are the reflection of the differential values attached to different groups in a stratified 
society (Aboud, 1988, p. 18). According to this perspective, groups which possess 
different power and status will be viewed differently (Morland & Suthers, 1980) and 
if they are in competition, then ingroups and outgroups also will be differently 
viewed and valued (Sherif & Sherif, 1969; Tajfel, 1978). According to this theory, 
children’s perception of different groups within a society reflects how these groups 
are valued or devalued by this society.  
 
  Another version of this theory attributes acquisition of racist thinking in 
children to the direct socialisation by parents and other usual channels of cultural   79
transmission. As Aboud (1988, p.18) claims, according to this theory “children adopt 
attitudes corresponding to the social structure as perceived by their parents and other 
significant adults”. This perspective is linked to the hypothesis of some learning 
theories such as Social Learning Theory (Bandura, 1977), which emphasise the role 
of imitation and reinforcements in the learning process. According to this theory 
children’s learning is strongly influenced by the important adults who serve as their 
role models and who reward children’s desirable behaviour. For that reason children 
reproduce prejudices of their parents and other important people in their life as they 
identify with them or want to please them. They also receive constant messages 
about various social groups through other channels such as media or literature which 
reinforce their developing stereotypes and prejudices (Siraj-Blatchford, 1994).  
 
  Such a perspective is confirmed by some empirical studies which provided 
evidence of the role of direct parent socialisation on children’s attitudes (Spencer, 
1983), or those that observed some correlations between exposure to mass media and 
children’s prejudiced and stereotypical thinking (Zuckerman, Singer & Singer, 
1980). Although this evidence points to the importance of direct socialisation in the 
development of prejudice, other studies (for example, Branch & Newcombe, 1980; 
Davey, 1983), found limited evidence of the link between attitudes of parents and 
those of their children. Furthermore, the direct socialisation theory of prejudice does 
not seem to be easily reconciled with the non-linear nature of the growth of prejudice 
found in a number of studies (Aboud, 1988; Doyle & Aboud, 1995).  
 
It seems that children do not simply uncritically absorb the attitudes of 
people around them. They play a far more active role in their developmental   80
processes, and for that reason in their development of racialised ideas of difference 
and social relations, than traditional socialisation explanations suggest. Another 
theoretical perspective on children’s racialised ideas about their social world has 
been offered by social psychology, which links the development of prejudice to more 
general cognitive, social and affective changes which happen in children during the 
first years of their lives. 
 
Social-cognitive theories and ‘racial’ attitudes 
 
  Although differing in emphasis on specific cognitive factors influencing 
development of ‘racial’ attitudes, all social cognitive developmental theories are 
based on one common assumption. They all attribute primary importance in 
development of prejudiced racialised thinking to the cognitive capacity for 
categorisation, which helps children to make sense of their environment and to locate 
themselves in that environment by providing them with social identities (Brown, 
1995). Social-cognitive theories claim that prejudice in young children is inevitable 
because of their cognitive limitations and view their racist assumptions as being 
qualitatively different from adults’ prejudice due to a different understanding of the 
social world. 
 
  One such theory developed by Aboud (1988) claims that ‘racial’ prejudice is 
linked to the child’s development of social cognition and affective processes. Aboud 
maintains that young children’s “cognitive limitations filter and distort 
environmental input” (p.22). Due to this mechanism, the social context in which 
children are raised plays a secondary role in the formation of their racist   81
assumptions. Because of their immature cognition very young children form rigid 
categories which are based on concrete information and have a tendency to think in 
global rather than relative terms as well as to accentuate perceptions of ‘racial’ group 
characteristics (Ramsey, 1987). According to Aboud (1988, pp.22-25), as children’s 
affective, perceptual, cognitive and attention capabilities change with maturity, 
which allow for a shift from self to groups to individuals, prejudice decreases or 
becomes qualitatively different. This is a result of the initially rigid stereotypes 
becoming more flexible and more likely to change in response to counter-stereotypic 
or individuating information. 
 
  There are some dangerous implications of social-cognitive theories of 
prejudiced racialised thinking. Firstly, these theories justify the existence of 
prejudice in children by viewing it as a developmental phenomenon. Such a 
perspective seems to provide support for the ideology of ‘new racism’, where “to be 
prejudiced is, quite simply, to be human” (Honeyford, 1986, p.52). Secondly, such a 
perspective provides an argument that with age and a consequent increase in 
cognitive and social maturity, children’s prejudice should disappear due to their 
capability to judge people in terms of their unique individual characteristics rather 
than group membership as well as their ability to utilise evidence contradicting 
racialised stereotypes.  
 
  However, a number of overseas studies show that school children of 10 and 
11 years of age whose cognitive development should allow for identification of 
individual differences between members of various ethnic groups, demonstrate high 
level of ‘racial’ prejudice (for example, Troyna & Hatcher, 1992).  Similar findings   82
in relation to 10-12 years old children were reported in an Australian study by Black-
Gutman & Hickson (1996). Educational policy initiatives in the U.S.A. and in 
Britain in the 1970s and 1980s, which followed studies conducted within the social-
cognitive framework (for example Milner, 1975, 1983; Davey, 1983), and which 
resulted in multicultural education and opportunities for children’s positive 
interactions with diverse cultural groups did not bring the expected reduction of 
prejudice and intergroup tension in schools (Hatcher & Troyna, 1993).  Prejudiced 
thinking in relation to racialised difference persists at different levels in societies (see 
Brown, 1995) and, therefore, it seems to be a consequence of broader social 
processes rather than cognitive immaturity. 
 
  My argument so far suggests that acquisition of racialised thinking is a 
complex process and as such needs to be viewed from multiple perspectives, as no 
single theory of prejudice seems to provide a sufficient explanation. Prejudice cannot 
be viewed as simple function of individual personality dispositions or cognitive and 
perceptual factors. Neither can it be regarded as a result of direct socialisation 
processes as children play an active role in constructing their knowledge and 
understandings (Vygotsky, 1978).  
 
 Some studies (Ramsey, 1991, Black-Gutman & Hickson, 1996) seem to point to 
the importance of environmental factors in the development of highly prejudiced 
children. These studies, however, conducted within a positivist, quantitative 
paradigm tried to simply ‘measure’ or quantify the salience of race in children’s 
understanding of the social world, overlooking the importance of the context in the 
process of racialisation (Connolly, 1996). Although they provided a description of   83
this process, their contribution to our understanding of its complexity is not without 
limitations.  
 
Naturalistic research studies from overseas (Troyna & Hatcher, 1992; Wright, 
1992; Connolly, 1996; 1998b; Downey, 1998; van Ausdale & Feagin, 2001) as well 
as Australia (Palmer, 1990; Rizvi, 1993a; MacNaughton & Davis, 2001) contribute 
to a better understanding of the complexity of processes that underpin children’s 
racialised ideas of themselves and their social world. I adopt the perspective of some 
of these studies and claim that children play an active role in their own learning and 
develop their knowledge through interactions within their specific socio-cultural 
context. I also view children as possessing a certain level of competence that allows 
them to “comprehend”, process and “articulate their needs” and experiences 
(Connolly, 1996, p. 175).  
 
Children have been denied such competence by the traditional developmental 
research, which seems to have influenced even some relatively recent ethnographic 
field studies such as the one conducted by Holmes (1995). Although Holmes reports 
that she aimed to discover the ‘real meaning of race’ for children, she started her 
investigation with the assumption that children are ignorant of racist behaviours 
unless they are taught otherwise. This belief in children’s social incompetence 
seemed to influence her research design and data analysis. Not only did she frame 
her work in developmental terms, but she also seemed unable to engage the 
participants in any meaningful way in her study and appeared to overlook the 
importance of allowing them the space to reflect on or articulate their own 
experiences or thoughts.   84
 
There is a gradually growing body of research in relation to racialisation of 
difference which emphasises young children’s social competence. For example, an 
important ethnographic study with children between three to six years of age in a 
multiethnic preschool setting in the USA has been conducted by van Ausdale and 
Feagin (2001). The authors question the ways in which children are commonly 
conceptualised as being cognitively immature and unable to understand “the 
implications of race and racism” (van Ausdale & Feagin, 2001, p.2). Based on 
detailed observations of children, van Ausdale and Feagin provide evidence which 
demonstrates that “three-, four- and five-year-olds often hold a solid … 
understanding of the dynamics of race” (p.2). Their study reveals that young children 
are quite competent to use their ‘racial’ knowledge and able to apply it to fit the 
particular context of their interactions.  When using racist remarks for example, they 
do not act indiscriminately, simply imitating what they heard from others, but are 
able to competently use them to explain and justify their actions to an interested 
adult. Van Ausdale and Feagin demonstrate that children are “independent actors and 
constructors” who are able to “employ racial and ethnic concepts as important 
integrative and symbolically creative tools in the daily construction of their social 
lives” (p.26). 
 
Children’s social competence is also emphasised by Connolly (1998b), whose 
ethnographic study explores in detail the social worlds of the five- and six-year old 
“children in an English multi-ethnic … primary school and its surrounding 
community” (p.2). Based on a large number of interviews with children as well as 
their observations, this study demonstrates the complexity of children’s social worlds   85
and the “active and diverse ways in which … [children] make use of the discourses 
on ‘race’ (p.5). Unlike research conducted within traditional socialisation and 
developmental models, Connolly’s study gives voice to young children themselves 
and places their “perceptions and experiences at the heart of analysis” (p.5). 
 
Connolly’s work (1998b) is particularly important not only because it recognises 
children’s social competence and the complex and multifaceted nature of their social 
worlds, but also because it demonstrates that racialised thinking, which is “clearly 
evident among the children’s peer group cultures” (p.2) needs to be considered 
within the broader context of the social organisation of the school, the local 
community and “the racist ideas and assumptions” (p.40) at the level of national 
politics.  Connolly argues that the racialised discourses that are present at all these 
levels are not static.   At the national level, they change its form and modality to fit 
the economic and political context of the country. At the level of local community, 
these “racist ideas and assumptions” get “refracted and understood through people’s 
day-to-day experiences of living in particular” (p.40) area. This is where they 
become a part of the discourses which Hall (1986b) and Rizvi (1993a) call, after 
Gramsci, the ‘popular racism’.  Connolly’s study describes the complexity of ways 
in which such ‘popular racisms’ become a part of children’s worlds and “the active 
role they play in managing, adapting and reproducing discourses on ‘race’ within 
this” (p.5) context. 
 
Similarly to Connolly, van Ausdale & Feagin (2001) and Rizvi (1993a) I adopt 
for my study, the perspective on the dynamic, and context specific nature of racism 
and children’s social competence in comprehending the dynamics of ‘race’. Within   86
these understandings, children are viewed not just as passive recipients of racist 
discourses, but as active agents who strive to deal with the contradictory nature of 
information they receive in relation to the racial Other in order to make sense of their 
worlds.  Like Connolly (1996, 1998b) and Rizvi, I see children as developing their 
racialised ideas within the specific context of their everyday experiences, which “are 
socially organised, determined by social processes that extend beyond the scope of 
everyday experience” (Rizvi, 1993a, p.126).  
 
Adopting an alternative framework 
 
To view development of prejudiced racialised thinking in the context of complex 
environmental influences which impact children’s everyday experiences, I use the 
framework of Bronfenbrenner’s (1979, 1993) bio-ecological approach to human 
development, which emphasises the importance of the context or the environment 
within which any of the processes of human development are situated. Although on 
the surface such a perspective resembles “social psychology on the one hand and 
sociology or anthropology on the other” (Bronfenbrenner, 1979, p.12), what 
differentiates an ecological approach from other frameworks is its emphasis on the 
way the accommodation of a human organism to its immediate environment is 
influenced by “forces emanating from more remote regions in the larger physical and 
social milieu” (p. 13). The crucial element of an ecological perspective, therefore, is 
the principal role accorded to the interactions between different levels of influences, 
rather than to “the more conventional notion of a particular stimulus acting as a 
singular cause to produce a predictable outcome or change in the state of properties 
of a discrete phenomenon” (Glossop, 1988, p. 7). Bronfenbrenner’s perspective   87
permits one to observe the interconnectedness between the processes of human 
development, the environments in which this development occurs, and the reciprocal 
relationships between the elements of the environments as well as the environments 
themselves within which any person develops. For those reasons this framework 
appears to be particularly useful for exploring young children’s racialised 
conceptions of themselves and their social world in the broad context of different 
levels of influences. Another reason this approach seems to be most appropriate for 
analysing the acquisition and nature of ‘racial’ attitudes is its phenomenological 
treatment of both the environment and development of individuals.  
 
As Bronfenbrenner (1979) argues, at the foundation of ecological theory lies 
the “phenomenological conception of the environment”  (p. 23). From that 
perspective the main focus of ecological research is an understanding of how the 
processes of human development are influenced by the interrelations between the 
developing person and the multiple contexts in which s/he lives, as these contexts are 
experienced by that person. The conception of human development as incorporated 
within his ecological theory is also phenomenological in its nature as it emphasises 
“not the traditional psychological processes of perception, motivation, thinking and 
learning, but … their content – what is perceived, desired, feared, thought about, or 
acquired as knowledge” (p. 9). Bronfenbrenner maintains that the most important 
elements in the environment that influence human development are those that “ have 
meaning to the person” (p. 22) and that what is important to understand is the 
environment “ as it is perceived rather than as it may exist in ‘objective’ reality” (p. 
4). For that reason it is important to pay attention to the particular circumstances out   88
of which such meanings emerge and acknowledge their particular socially, 
historically and culturally relative expressions. 
The phenomenological conception of the environment as well as human 
development has therefore, important implications for research into children’s 
racialised understanding of the social world. It highlights the importance of viewing 
children’s interpretation of racialised differences as a result of various direct 
interactions and broader social influences, which contribute to the development of 
different meanings understood as being context specific rather than universal. This 
framework will be also used to highlight the factors that need to be considered in 
order to help children develop a critical approach to diversity and difference that 
they face everyday in our society. 
 
  The following part of this chapter provides a brief overview of 
Bronfenbrenner’s theory and its implications for studying the development of 
children’s racialised thinking. 
 
Bio-ecological approach to development of racialised thinking 
 
Bronfenbrenner’s understanding of human development rests on the 
assumption that how individuals grow and develop depends on the interplay between 
biological and environmental factors. From that perspective, racialised conceptions 
of the world can be viewed as a result of biological factors (such as temperament or 
maturation of perception and cognition) which interact with external environmental 
factors at a number of levels.  
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Bronfenbrenner’s model proposes that all human beings are born with certain 
genetic developmental potentials. These potentials become actualised in the context 
of the environment which, in his theory, is conceptualised in the systems terms. 
These environmental or social systems can be viewed “as a set of nested structures, 
each inside the next, like a set of Russian dolls” (1979, p. 3) which are all linked and 
interrelated and which directly and indirectly provide risks or opportunities for 
developing individuals.  These social systems provide different levels of influences 
from the most immediate settings called Microsystems, in which individuals directly 
participate, through Mesosystem settings which consist of links between 
Microsystems, through Exosystems which have an indirect bearing on individual’s 
development, to a Macrosystem, understood by Bronfenbrenner as the broad 
ideological and institutional patterns of a particular culture which form the blueprints 
for human development. In the following part of this chapter I will discuss the 
characteristics of each of the above systems and their implications for the 
development of children’s racialised thinking. 
 
The Microsystem and children’s perception of social difference and social 
relations 
 
The first and the innermost level of influences, a Microsystem, involves the 
immediate settings that contain the developing individual. These are the settings in 
which children develop and in doing so experience and create reality. Direct 
interactions between the individuals and other people, objects and symbols, called 
the proximal processes, which take place within these settings, are presumed to lead 
to particular kinds of developmental outcomes. These outcomes represent the   90
actualisation of genetic potentials for effective psychological functioning and 
involve the processes of perception, cognition, emotion, and motivation. Proximal 
processes determine therefore, how one’s potential for differentiated perception and 
response, directing and controlling one’s behaviour, acquiring knowledge and skills, 
developing mutually rewarding relationships and finally modifying and constructing 
one’s physical, social, and symbolic environment become fulfilled (Bronfenbrenner 
& Ceci, 1994, p. 569). It is assumed that to be effective, these direct interactions 
must occur on a fairly regular basis and over extended periods of time.  
 
The quality of proximal processes and racialised thinking 
 
For that reason proximal processes take place in the child’s immediate 
environments, Microsystems,  such as home, child care centre, school or 
neighborhood. According to Bronfenbrenner and Ceci (1994), proximal processes 
are dynamic in nature  
as their form, power and direction vary systematically as a joint function  
of the characteristics of the developing person, of the environment – both 
 immediate and more remote – in which the processes are taking place, and  
of the nature of the developmental outcomes under consideration. (p.572) 
  
One of the essential features of a supportive proximal process within a 
microsystem is its ‘reciprocity’ based on the give and take interaction between the 
child and other people involved in these interactions. If such interactions are 
characterised by both respect and challenge and are responsive and stimulating at the 
same time, they enhance developmental potential. When on the other hand, the 
interactions are negative or characterised by the imbalance of power, they can bring 
developmental risks (Garbarino, 1985).   91
 
  Such interactions create the microsystem’s emotional climate or an affective 
tone (Garbarino, 1985) which contributes to the child’s development of self-image 
and self-esteem. If such climate is positive, children have an opportunity to develop 
a positive self-concept and a feeling of personal self-worth (high self-esteem). If the 
opposite is true, children may develop a negative view of themselves. The 
microsystem’s affective tone is determined by a range of microsystem behaviours 
including what is or is not said or what is or is not done (Garbarino, 1985, p.55).  
 
 Children’s  microsystem  interactions often go beyond a simple dyad “formed 
whenever two persons pay attention to or participate in one another’s activities” 
(Bronfenbrenner, 1979, p. 56).  As the child develops, the dyadic and later triadic 
relationships grow in complexity and expand to include more participants.   
Therefore, children’s development can not only be enhanced by the high quality of 
direct interactions within a dyad (i.e. parent – child; caregiver-child), but also by the 
observed differences in dyadic experience because of the involvement of a third 
party (Garbarino, 1985, p. 52). Such interactions provide children not only with 
feedback about how valued (or not valued) they are, but also how those around them 
are being perceived by others (for example whether their playmates are respected by 
their teachers, caregivers, parents or other members of their peer group). Through 
these interactions children become aware of different social roles and their position 
in society (Bronfenbrenner, 1979, p. 85).  As every position in society is defined by 
certain  role  expectations which determine how the holder of such position is 
supposed to behave and how others are to act toward her, understanding of social 
roles gives children the indication of the status different people in society have.    92
 
Understanding of social roles  
 
Different roles, according to Bronfenbrenner (1979, p. 85), “are usually 
identified by the labels used to designate various social positions in culture … [they] 
are typically differentiated by age, sex, kinship relation [or] occupation”. They can, 
however, also be determined by other parameters such as ethnicity or race.   
Children’s direct as well as observed interactions with significant people such as 
teachers, parents, caregivers and peers provide them with feedback about how 
important or unimportant these different roles are. 
 
Therefore children’s Microsystem interactions can impact on the 
development of the racialised conception of their social world.  Children, who in 
many microsystem settings (such as childcare centre, school or neighborhood) are 
faced with diversity are continuously exposed to interactions between members of 
various social groups. They either experience these interactions directly or observe 
others who are involved in their proximal processes.  Depending on the quality of 
these interactions, their balance of power and the amount of reciprocity, children 
develop their understanding of how different groups are perceived and treated by 
their parents, teachers, neighbours or friends. If these interactions are warm, positive 
and respectful towards members of different social groups, they may contribute to 
children’s positive image of these groups. If on the other hand, the interactions 
between the members of different groups are characterised by lack of respect or 
power imbalance, children may develop an understanding that some groups are more 
important than others.    93
 
  Similarly, children also receive information about the value of certain groups 
as a result of their representation or the lack of, in various microsystems. If certain 
groups are underrepresented or absent from children’s schools, neighbourhoods or 
childcare centres, whether in the physical environment, or at the certain levels of 
human environment (for example the presence or absence of teachers, caregivers or 
other people in managerial roles from a group with which individuals identify 
themselves), it may give children a certain message about the 
importance/unimportance of themselves and others. Vandenbroeck (1999) calls it 
‘racism by omission’ and maintains that when all  
 
the symbols in the family, the community or the institution come from  
one single reference group, this gives [children] the message – whether 
intentionally or not - that the world is supposed to be a uniformed place  
and that there is only one way to be. (p.104) 
 
Such understanding may have certain implications for the development of 
children’s self concept as well as their self identity. 
  
  Understanding identity as an inclusive concept 
 
The concept of self identity and its role in the development of racialised 
thinking is controversial. From the perspective of social psychology, for example, 
(see Brown, 1995) developing one’s own identity is a result of a natural tendency to 
categorise. As I argued earlier in this chapter, grouping objects helps children to put 
some order into their world and therefore, to better understand it. As Katz (1982) 
maintains, children start placing people into different categories based on gender or   94
‘race’ in their early years of life as a result of the very same process. According to 
Brown, such a tendency of social categorisation has complex affects on people’s 
attitudes towards members of their own and other groups as it distorts people’s 
perceptual and cognitive functioning. As Brown argues, it accentuates the 
differences between different groups and similarities within one’s own group and 
therefore leads to intergroup discrimination. According to this theory a preference 
for one’s own group and a negative perception of the outgroup is a natural 
consequence of the ‘normal cognitive process’. In the light of this theory, prejudice 
in children could be perceived as a result of their need to understand the world and 
their role in it as they try to establish their positive social identity.  
 
  Identity thus conceptualised appears to fit very well into the discourse of 
‘new’ racism discussed in the previous chapter. Such identity, often called “cultural 
identity” (Vandenbroeck, 1999, p.19), implies tradition and common beliefs that 
must be defended against influences of other groups and as such, serves as the basis 
for social segregation. For that reason it appears important to clarify the meaning of 
self identity.  
 
According to Vandenbroeck (1999, p.19) there is a need to move away from 
understanding the concept of identity as something “clearly delineated, complete and 
constant over time” as such an assumption “is not only untrue, but [also] dangerous” 
as it leads to stereotyping. Identity needs to be viewed at the multiple levels, as 
people belong to a variety of groups and/or cultures and attribute different 
significance to these groups. There are a number of reference groups such as 
linguistic, religious, gender and social classes or family groups. All of these groups   95
need to be taken into account when considering one’s identity although they will be 
at various levels of importance for different individuals. For that reason, rather than 
talking about a ‘typical’ communal identities of German, Polish, English or 
Aboriginal people with stable, distinguishable and recognisable characteristics, it is 
more appropriate to refer to “the dynamics of identity” (Pinxten & Verstraete, 1998, 
cited in Vandenbroeck, 1999, p.21) understood as processes of identification 
characterised by continual change. As Vanderbroeck asserts, such identities have a 
multiple dimension, which result from belonging to an increasing number of 
communities and exposition to a variety of models in the era of globalisation, 
“increased mobility and fast information distribution” (p.22). Therefore, there is a 
need to stop understanding identity as “an exclusive concept: you are either this or 
that” and consider it as “inclusive and to substitute the word ‘and’ for ‘or’ ” (p.23). 
 
  Therefore, the important adults in children’s life such as parents, childcare 
workers and teachers need to recognise the variety of groups to which children 
belong and offer support for this diversity. Recognising the importance of individual 
characteristics and diversity within groups to which the child belongs, may help 
children develop their positive (multiple) identities and, at the same time, it may 
contribute to their better understanding of the identities of others. To achieve that, 
however, there is a need for a clearer recognition in various Microsystem settings of 
how individuals define their membership to different groups, as for some people it 
can be more complex than for others. Assuming that an Italian child will regularly 
attend a mass at the catholic church every Sunday morning, or that an Aboriginal 
child will live with her large extended family might prove to be true, but only if 
these families identify with certain reference groups and traditions. As many people,   96
however, go through the continuous process of change, it is important to recognise 
and respect their individual multiple identities. By doing that, we can avoid 
stereotyping and positively contribute to an understanding that, as Vanderbroeck 
(1999) asserts referring to Biarnes (1999), people build their “identity that refers 
both to the groups and to unique, personal elements-which are a function of personal 
history and the course of life” (p.24). 
 
  In order to support children’s positive self image, self esteem and multiple 
self identities, which are of paramount importance for their future social competence 
and their positive and satisfying participation in the world, it is necessary to 
acknowledge heterogeneity of groups to which children may belong. MacNaughton 
and Davis (2001) demonstrate that at a young age of 4-5 years, some Anglo-
Australian children construct their knowledge about Indigenous Australians, which 
recreates some elements of the  colonial ‘othering’ and “create a colonial self-
identity based on a binary opposition between ‘black’ and ‘white’ as signifiers of 
who they are” (p.92). According to these researchers, such understandings are 
developed as a result of children being exposed to different discourses in a variety of 
settings, which included childcare centres, family, kindergarten or peer groups 
among others. Children who demonstrated some less stereotypical views on 
Aboriginal Australians were those who attended early childhood programs that made 
an active effort to provide children with less homogenised views on Aboriginal 
people and their cultures.  
  
  Children play an active role in their own learning. Overseas research by 
Troyna and Hatcher (1992), Connolly (1996, 1998b), van Ausdale and Feagin (2001)   97
and some Australian studies by Rizvi (1993a) and MacNaughton and Davis (2001) 
demonstrate that children struggle with different modalities of popular racism to 
which they are exposed through everyday experiences at school, neighbourhood or 
family environment. Their racialised conception of the world is often contradictory. 
According to Rizvi, for example, some primary school children involved in his 
study, who were comfortable with the “perception of security derived from ‘racial’ 
separation” at the same time held “an affinity to the principles of multiculturalism” 
(p.135) and social justice.  
 
  As children’s understanding of the world and their role in this world is 
constructed within their Microsystem interactions, there is a need to explore what 
messages children receive in their immediate settings and what occasions they have 
to reflect on and challenge different racialised ideas and assumptions. Such 
opportunities may positively impact children’s actualisation of their potential and 
their understanding of the principles of positive relationships with others. 
  
  As children participate in many different settings, their perception and 
construction of their understanding of themselves and others will not only be 
influenced by the forces within these settings. It will also depend on the how the 
microsystems are linked with each other. This brings my discussion to the second 
level of environmental influences conceptualised by Bronfenbrenner (1979) as a 
Mesosystem. 
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The Mesosystem and its role in children’s perception of social difference and 
social relations 
 
  A mesosystem according to Bronfenbrenner (1979, p. 25) “comprises the 
interrelations among two or more settings in which the developing person actively 
participates”. A mesosystem is not a separate system; it is a system of microsystems. 
Some examples of mesosystems for a child are the links between a family and 
neighbourhood, school and family, family and peers or childcare and school. A 
mesosystem is established when a child first enters a new setting. This is called by 
Bronfenbrenner (p. 210) an “ecological transition”. An ecological transition can be 
either positive or negative for the child depending on how much support the child 
receives from both the new and the old setting. If the child who enters school for the 
first time is accompanied by a parent who is positive about this new environment 
and at the same time is welcomed by a teacher with enthusiasm and obvious 
acceptance, the transition is likely to be a positive event for the child. Such 
developing mesosystem will be strong and may impact positively on the child’s self 
image and self esteem. If, on the other hand, there is an absence of connections, the 
resulting mesosystem will be weak and can create a risk for the child’s view of 
her/himself and possibly of others. 
 
  As Garbarino and Abramowitz (1992) maintain, the strong mesosystem is 
characterised by a number of connections between the settings and the quality of 
these links. If the child is the only connection and the microsystems make 
incompatible demands resulting from the conflict of values, the mesosystem will be 
a source of sociocultural risks for the child. If the school or childcare centre for   99
example, values only one set of cultural beliefs and creates the environment that does 
not reflect the child’s family culture in any way, the child receives messages framed 
in the ‘rhetoric of differentiation’. Such messages convey the meaning that the 
settings in which a child participates are ‘incompatible’ and contributes to a 
reinforcement of the ideology of new racism in which the alien cultures will never fit 
in the mainstream, as ‘they’ will never be like ‘us’.  This can result in the feelings of 
inferiority, anger and resentment of a child from minority group towards her/his own 
family. Similarly, children who belong to the majority group receive messages about 
how they and their families are valued in comparison to the others within the 
microsystems in which they participate.  
  
  Respect for each other – does it matter? 
 
  The amount of respect the child’s family setting will receive from other 
microsystems will make a direct contribution to the development of the child’s 
attitudes towards herself and others (Vanderbroeck, 1999). To help children to 
develop their positive multiple identities, they need to experience strong 
mesosystems characterised by respect and justice for all. If the child’s new 
microsystem such as school or childcare reflects the real life inequalities, where 
diversity is often ignored and western, middle-class values and a way of life are 
presented as a norm, children’s racialised conception of the world will become 
reinforced. If on the other hand, the teachers/caregivers develop a positive 
relationship with the parents, characterised by a high level of acknowledgement and 
respect for the cultural values, customs, forms of communication and lifestyles of the   100
family, children’s positive attitudes toward themselves and others can be enhanced 
(Vanderbroeck, 1999).  
 
Strong and positive mesosystems are characterised by respect for the child 
from the members of both contributing microsystems and by respect for each other’s 
value systems. If the child’s family microsystem is considered as inferior by the 
school or childcare microsystems, it will have a negative impact on the child’s 
perception of her/himself and on how others will evaluate her/him and that group.  
 
The impact of a micro- and mesosystem on the child’s view of the world and 
her/his role within it cannot be understood fully without looking at its antecedents in 
the exo-, and macrosystems, which are the other two outer layers of influences in 
Bronfenbrenner’s theory. This is because, as Garbarino & Abramowitz (1992) argue, 
the role parents [or other important adults] play in guiding and protecting children 
can be likened to how the community guides and protects its members.  
 
Bronfenbrenner (1979) believes that the forces within the microsystems, the 
links between them and the nature of knowledge and attitudes existing in one setting 
about the other, depend on the broader settings. These settings, conceptualised by 
Bronfenbrenner as exosystems, do not involve the child, but the events that occur 
within them impact indirectly on the child or the child’s microsystems. Examples of 
exosystems include parents’ workplace, the family informal network as well as 
decision making bodies that impact on the child’s microsystems, such as school 
boards or childcare management committees. Exosystem influences also include 
social policy and delivery of programs or services which provide a formal network   101
of support for children’s families (Garbarino, 1985; Garbarino and Abramowitz, 
1992).  
 
An example of an exosystem influence on the child’s conception of social 
differences can be a decision of Education Department to include education with 
either multicultural or anti-racist focus in the school curriculum, or to provide or not 
provide support for children for whom English is a second language. Although the 
child is not involved in this decision making process, it will have a direct impact on 
what will be taught at school, how it will be organised and therefore it will have a 
bearing on how children at this school will perceive and possibly evaluate each 
other. Whether such decisions will be made, however, and in what form they will be 
adopted, will depend on the ideology and the value system that underlie society as a 
whole. 
 
How an Exosystem operates depends on the culture of a given society, which 
through its ideologies provides blueprints for the allocation of resources, 
employment patterns, law, social policy and program delivery. Within 
Bronfenbrenner’s ecological perspective such cultural blueprints are conceptualised 
as a Macrosystem, the broadest level of environmental influences which embrace all 
the other ‘subsystems’. In the last section of this chapter I will discuss some aspects 
of an Australian Macrosystem, its impact on the Exosystem and their possible 
implications for children’s racialised thinking. 
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Exo- and Macrosystem’s role in the development of children’s racialised 
thinking 
 
  According to Bronfenbrenner (1979, p.26), the macrosystem refers to 
“consistencies, in the form and content of lower-order systems (micro-, meso-, and 
exo) that exist or could exist, at the level […] of the culture as a whole, along with 
any belief system or ideology underlying such consistences”. Bronfenbrenner further 
argues that it appears, as if in each society the various microsystem settings (such as 
childcare, school, playground or neighborhood) had been constructed from the same 
sets of blueprints (cultural and ideological), as they all look and function very much 
alike in one society but might be distinctly different in another. These intersocietal 
contrasts exist also at the meso- and exo-system levels as the patterns of cultural 
beliefs, values and ideologies affect social practice and find implementation in 
governmental policy, employment patterns or programs of community support in 
each society. 
 
  It can be argued, therefore, that how children experience and create reality 
within their microsystems depends on the cultural and the ideological blueprints of 
the society in which they live, as these blueprints “underlie the organisation of 
institutions, the assumptions people make about social relations, and the workings of 
the political and economic system” (Garbarino & Abramovitz, 1992, p.50). It is 
important to emphasise here that culture translated into the concept of macrosystem 
creates the possibility of criticising it on the grounds that it may hamper 
development of some individuals. It creates an opportunity to view the existing   103
‘consistencies’ in a given society as not serving the best interest of some of its 
members.  
  
 Understanding  culture  and  ideology from an ecological perspective appears 
to be particularly useful in relation to development of racialised thinking, as it 
emphasises the link between the ideology and social values and the settings of 
society in which individuals grow and develop their understanding of themselves and 
others. Depending on the ideology adopted by a given society, some of its members 
may be either advantaged or disadvantaged, which consequently brings certain 
implications for how these individuals will perceive themselves and how they will be 
perceived by others. In societies which value individuality, personal responsibility 
and materialistic achievement, failure to achieve is often perceived as a matter of 
“individual deficiency”, not a result of lack of opportunities or social support 
(Garbarino & Abramowitz, 1992, p.57). For that reason, those who are not 
‘successful’ are often perceived as inferior. 
 
Macrosystem ideologies and their impact on other systems 
 
  History is full of examples of how various ideologies disadvantage certain 
groups and its members on the basis of belonging to these groups. One of such 
ideologies is racism. In the previous chapter I discussed how the concept of race and 
racism changed and continued changing throughout history and how its different 
forms and modalities exist and/or coexist in different social and political contexts. I 
also argued that the phenomena of ‘race’ and racism persist as they rationalise and 
justify the existence of social structures and the unequal distribution of power and   104
resources in societies. Here, I would like to argue that racist ideologies, which exist 
in a given macrosystem are a direct threat to the development of individuals as they 
provide blueprints for societies which are “in error” (Garbarino & Abramowitz, 
1992, p.50). As these blueprints filter through all the other ecological systems and 
impact on everyday social practice, they disadvantage certain individuals on the 
basis of their belonging to different social groups and contribute to the racialised 
representation of these groups and their social relations. Such constructed 
understandings become a part of common sense racist ideologies at the level of 
various Microsystems.  
 
  Australia is considered to be one of the most culturally diverse countries in 
the world. According to Vajda (1996)  
 
Australian society comprises people representing 140 different ethnic 
backgrounds. They speak approximately 100 imported languages and 
approximately 50 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander languages.  
Australians identify themselves with more than 80 religions. (p.36) 
 
However, it can be argued that despite this cultural pluralism, diversity in Australia 
has been in the past, and still is, regarded negatively and that Australian social 
relations between the dominant and the minority groups are deeply rooted in racist 
ideologies (Jayasuriya, 1999).  
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Australian Macrosystem and lessons in racist tradition  
 
Historically, Australian governments, colonial, state and federal did not aim 
to create a culturally and linguistically diverse community. Jayasuriya (1999), who 
refers to Hartz (1964) asserts, that since the time of early European colonisation, 
Australian social relations were governed by “the influence of the ethos of an ‘Anglo 
fragment’ society”, with the dominant group exercising “a degree of cultural and 
structural hegemony” (p.7). The importance of moral values and beliefs to be shared 
by all members of society was considered as an essential antecedent for the well 
being of that society. These beliefs were underpinned by the assumptions of 
functionalist sociologists such as Durkheim (cited in Parsons, 1937), who claimed 
that although division of labour and diversity were important in any culture, a certain 
level of social cohesion was essential to keep societies together.  
 
In such a climate, any groups or individuals that differed in their values and 
beliefs as well as in their physical characteristics from the British ‘norm’ were 
considered by the dominant group as inferior and undesirable. These racist 
ideologies not only resulted in the unequal social relations between the British 
colonisers and the Indigenous Australians, but also underpinned the 1901 
Immigration Restriction Act,  which influenced Australian immigration policy for 
over half of a century (Jayasuriya, 1999), ensuring that Australia only accepted into 
the country those people who were considered as ‘desirable’. These policies, among 
others, aimed at creating a culturally homogeneous “Anglo-centric and Anglo-
conformist society” (Matthews, 1981, p.250).  
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The need for stimulating economic development and to deal with the 
shortage of labour at end of the Second World War resulted in changes in 
immigration policies. However, as Australia had by now a “strong and well learned 
cultural tradition of racism and isolationism” (Cope, Castle & Kalantzis, 1991, p.5), 
the new large-scale immigration program was not welcomed by the society. To deal 
with that problem, the government adopted the policy of assimilation which aimed at 
reconciling the need to increase immigration to Australia and at the same time to 
maintain the homogeneity of the society which was perceived as a necessity for its 
‘social cohesion’ and ‘harmonious existence’. For that reason, although migrants 
from countries other than Britain were allowed to settle in Australia, they were 
encouraged to go through the process of ‘re-socialisation’ which equated to giving 
up their previous values and forms of behaviour in order to fit into a British mould. 
The policies of assimilation, as well as that of ‘White Australia’ were underlined by 
the same ideology of maintaining a monocultural society (Matthews, 1981). A 
certain degree of ‘ethnic pluralism’ was permitted, but only if the minority groups 
were ‘learning’ to fit into the dominant culture. 
 
  The consistent negative attitudes towards non-English cultures were aimed 
not only at migrants, but also at Australian Indigenous people. From the early days 
of colonisation, the exploitation and denial of human rights of Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander people was rationalised by racist theories, which I discussed in the 
previous chapter. Indigenous people were perceived as intellectually, morally and 
physically inferior to Europeans and considered  as lacking basic human qualities: 
If we take into account the creasing of the cerebral surface, the difference 
between the brain of Shakespeare and that of an Australian savage would 
doubtless be fifty times greater than the difference between the 
Australian’s brain and that of an orang-utan. In mathematical capacity the   107
Australian, who cannot tell the number of fingers on his two hands, is 
much nearer to a lion or a wolf than to Sir Rowan Hamilton […]. (Fiske, 
1893, cited in McConnochie, 1973, p.43) 
 
  The idea of the inferiority of the Aboriginal ‘race’ was repeatedly used 
during Australian history to justify the social degradation and the gradual destruction 
of every aspect of Indigenous life. Since the early years of British colonisation, land 
use, law, spiritual beliefs and cultural values of Australian Indigenous people have 
been systematically disturbed. This was often legitimised by the theory of social 
Darwinism and its related concepts of the natural selection and survival of the fittest: 
“Without a history [sic] they have no past; without religion [sic] they have no hope; 
without a habit of forethought and providence they have no future. Their doom is 
sealed…” (Wigg, 1879, p.xxxviii, cited in McConnochie, 1973, p.44). “During these 
years of ill-treatment” a number of policies were adopted to codify it and to legalise 
the “non-human terms”, which were used to label Aboriginal people (Mc Connochie, 
1973, p.80). One of such policies, which had an extremely detrimental effect on 
Aboriginal kinship, family structure and their identity in general was the policy of 
protection adopted by colonial governments between 1837 and 1920s (Hollinsworth, 
1998). As a result of this policy Aboriginal people were to be moved to reserves or 
missions and were in total control of their European ‘protectors’.  
 
This legislation denied Aboriginal people their right to move from one 
reserve or mission to another, to marry or to have children without the permission of 
the Chief Protector. The Aborigines Protection Acts also gave the authorities the 
right to forcibly remove Aboriginal children of ‘mixed decent’ from their ‘incapable’ 
parents and place them in “orphan schools, missions and other residential 
institutions” (Hutchins & Sims, 1999, p. 9), and later in foster homes. This process   108
aimed at assimilating Aboriginal children into the dominant culture. Their names 
were changed and they were denied the right to know who their parents were and 
where they came from. They also often experienced emotional and physical abuse. 
The process of removing Aboriginal children from their families, referred to by 
Aboriginal people as the Stolen Generations, continued till the 1970s (National 
Inquiry into Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from their 
Families, 1997). 
 
It can be seen how the prejudiced values and beliefs of members of the 
dominant culture became institutionalised through legislation, policy and practice of 
various institutions, which directly and indirectly influenced the everyday life of 
Aboriginal people providing them with developmental risks. This indicates how 
macro- and exo-system embrace and control the functioning of microsystems in 
which individuals experience and create reality. Australian segregationist policies 
restricted Aboriginal people from participating in many areas of public life. It 
excluded them from public census and from the right to vote until 1967. As 
Aboriginal social structures were destroyed, it was inevitable that their lifestyle 
would change. As many oral histories attest (Morgan, 1987; Ward, 1987; Nannup, 
Marsh & Kinnane, 1992), dispossession of Aboriginal people from families and 
culture often lead to a deterioration of their self identity. This happened as a result of 
the dominant group considering their values and norms as worthless for such a long 
time that it became a “self-fulfilling prophecy” (Vajda, 1996, p.42).  Although some 
Indigenous cultures and people fought back and retained a strong sense of both 
personal as well as group identity, many experienced strong feelings of hopelessness 
and inability to struggle against various forms of racism they were continuously   109
experiencing and eventually denied their cultural heritage (see National Inquiry into 
Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from their Families, 
1997). 
 
The beginning of pluralism?   
 
  The horrific experiences of the Second World War initiated changes in 
people’s racialised thinking and the questioning of crude racist ideologies. These 
changes, which I discussed in the previous chapter, also began filtering into 
Australian society. Since the mid-1960s government policies that disadvantaged 
members of the cultural minority groups in Australia started being widely criticised. 
At the beginning of the 1970s the new idea of the “family of the nation” emerged 
and gave way to the policy of multiculturalism (Matthews, 1981, p. 251). The 
underlying concept of this policy was that different ethnic groups can live together in 
harmony governed by a degree of consensus rather than coercion.  
 
  The change of ideology at the macrosystem level brought also changes at the 
level of exosystem.  As the policy of multiculturalism recognised the right of all 
Australians to equal treatment and opportunity, the Racial Discrimination Act of 
1975 made it unlawful to discriminate on grounds of race, colour or ethnic origin 
(Jayasuriya, 1999). Since the introduction of multicultural policies at the national 
level under the Whitlam government, the need for government programs and welfare 
services and for providing opportunities for minority groups to participate in political 
structures also started being acknowledged. Throughout the years, the understanding 
of how to best provide for these needs has been changing and resulted in either   110
ethnospecific or mainstream services. Some of the ethnospecific services that 
emerged in the late 1970s as a result of Galbally Report (Migrant Services and 
Progranmes: Report of the Review of Post-Arrival Programs and Services for 
Migrants, 1978) were ‘ethnic’ schools, grant-in-aid programs or Multicultural 
Education Program which provided classes in English as a second language and SBS 
radio and television. Although criticised by the advocates of mainstreaming, these 
services provided ‘ethnic’ minority groups with some opportunities to address their 
individual, specific needs. Another outcome of this report was the recognition of the 
need to introduce ‘multicultural education’ at schools as a means of acknowledging 
the existing ethnic diversity in the society and fostering intercultural understanding 
(Matthews, 1981). 
 
  The mainstream approach to multiculturalism which emphasised ‘social 
justice for all’ resulted in ethnospecific services being dismantled and the “service 
provisions for immigrants [integrated] into those for the rest of the population”. 
While the policy of mainstreaming can be regarded by some as a means of furthering 
equality, its critics believe that the dismantling of the ethnospecific services and the 
emphasis on mainstreaming has its roots in economic rationalism and it can be 
equated to “a return to the old notion of assimilation” (Sargent, 1994, p.173). 
 
  The adoption of multicultural policies brought some changes at the 
exosystem level not only for migrants but also for Aboriginal people. The 
establishment of the Aboriginal Medical Service which aimed to assist Indigenous 
people to be autonomous in determining their health care needs is an example of this 
(Fagan, cited in Saggers & Gray, 1991). Furthermore, changes to government policy   111
in 1972 enabled Aboriginal people to form Indigenous organisations and activist 
groups, which contributed to the increased awareness of Aboriginal culture and 
tradition between both Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians (National Inquiry 
into Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Straight Islander Children from their 
Families, 1997).  
 
Still ‘them’ and ‘us’ – the ‘new’ era of assimilation? 
 
Although Australian multicultural policies brought many changes which on 
the surface appear quite radical, to develop a deeper understanding of its real nature 
we need to look at it more closely. This policy has been originally developed to 
“manage a variety of white cultures”, whose members presumably shared the same 
moral convictions, but who resisted the assimilation process into to “the dominant 
mainstream culture” (Stratton, 1998, p.10). As Stratton argues, from its very 
beginning the policy was very conservative in its “understanding of culture as a 
discrete and homogenous entity”, and it did not address the issue of how to deal with 
“non-white cultures thought by many to have distinctly different moralities” (p.10). 
Such policy places migrant, ‘ethnic’ cultures in a “peripheral” position to a “core 
Anglo-Celtic culture”. Such an ideology of multiculturalism constructs Australian 
society as consisting of ‘migrants’, who might have been born in Australia, “but who 
are not from British or Irish background” and “Australians” or “real Australians”, 
who might be only first or second generation residents in Australia, but whose 
ancestors “settled Australia” (p. 10).  
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Although the policy allows pluralism “to those groups distinguished as 
ethnic” … [this pluralism] “is limited to the cultural sphere”. Other areas of 
Australian social life such as “political and legal” remained “dominated by British … 
premises and institutional forms” (Stratton, 1998, p.11). Since the endorsement of 
multicultural policies in the 1970s, “the fundamental assumptions of the 
government” (p.11) have changed very little and the power has remained in the 
hands of those who have traditionally held it. The policy of multiculturalism in 
Australia continues to privilege white, Anglo-Celtic core culture. It continues the 
ethnic/Australian divide, which is present in many aspects of life.  
 
Multiculturalism as diversity and education 
 
  Such versions of “multiculturalism as diversity”, sometimes identified as a 
“life style” approach, accepts and sometimes even celebrates cultural differences, at 
the same time, however, the minority groups are assumed to identify with the Anglo-
Australian culture. Such multiculturalism promotes tolerance and understanding of 
cultural differences and equality of opportunity as the ultimate goals for a society, 
but neglects “deeper structural issues … such as access to political power and the 
distribution of social and economic resources” (Bell, 1997, p.41).     
  
  Multiculturalism thus understood has implications for Australian education, 
which faces many issues.  Firstly, due to its underlying assumption that cultural 
traditions are homogenous and static such education ignores the dynamic nature of 
identities of individuals and groups especially in the context of relocation “through 
the process of migration and coming in contact with other cultures” (Rizvi 1993b,   113
p.6). The celebrations of ‘cultural traditions’ within such multiculturalism often 
contribute to development of stereotypes and do not take into consideration that as 
“individuals and groups encounter new situations and confront new problems they 
not only form new networks but also theorise their traditions differently” (p. 6).  
 
  Secondly, within such a multicultural ideology, racism is perceived as “a 
product of ignorance, perpetuated by negative attitudes and individual prejudices” 
(Rizvi, p.6). The goal of multicultural education underlined by such 
conceptualisation of racism is to deal with its issues by providing students with 
knowledge about different cultures, which is presumed to deal with their 
misconceptions and as a result to change their negative attitudes.  
 
How harmonious is our ‘family of the nation’ – the new modalities of 
racism 
 
Australian reality demonstrates that multiculturalism conceptualised within a 
lifestyle framework does not seem to lead to the expected harmonious coexistence of 
different groups or positive changes in attitudes towards minority groups. For 
example, despite the increasing awareness and understanding of Aboriginal cultural 
values and tradition, Aboriginal people remain the most common targets of 
prejudice, hostility and ethnocentrism of the wider society. According to current 
Report by Race Discrimination Commissioner Bill Jonas (Mallabone, 2001), there is 
a high level of discrimination against Australians who do not fit the Australian 
stereotype. Recent consultations with hundreds of Aboriginal people and migrants 
revealed that “Aborigines [sic] were the most obvious victims of racism, however 
discrimination was also prevalent against other ethnic and religious minoritities”.   114
The report states that “The inherently racist process of colonisation provided the 
basis and continued presence of systematic racism in Australia” (p.1) and that 
Australia’s institutions which are based on the British models are unresponsive to the 
needs of those from the non-British background. The Report also stated that the 
participants of the consultations frequently raised the issue of the education sector 
being a product of a specific cultural model unresponsive to cultural differences in 
teaching and learning. 
 
There are also other examples of racism which have been demonstrated in 
Australia in the recent years. Such examples include the attacks on Muslim 
communities throughout Australia after the September 11, or the support of the 
broad segments of our society for the Howard’s government treatment of asylum 
seekers and its policy on Aboriginal reconciliation. There are also voices of the 
“conservative critics of multiculturalism such as the Hansonites, who seek cohesion, 
or social conformity through assimilation” (Jayasuriya, 1998, p.1) and warn us, 
utilising the rhetoric of the new racism, about the consequences of ethnic pluralism.  
 
It appears that after thirty years of multicultural policy, racism in its new 
modality based on the argument of cultural incompatibility of ‘them’ and ‘us’ is still 
alive and well in Australia. It seems that in order to deal with it, the entire agenda of 
multiculturalism needs reassessing: its principles, policy and implementation. 
Multiculturalism with its rhetoric of access and equity, which according to 
Jayasuraya (1998, p.1) “in essence […] was a state directed strategy to ‘manage’ and 
absorb migrant communities”, needs to be replaced by a policy that adequately   115
addresses and acknowledges “the facts of ‘difference’, the stark reality of Australia 
as a pluralist (not a plural) society (Jayasuraya, 1998, p.1). 
 
Such changes seem of prime importance, as despite multicultural policies and 
the resulting legislation, policies and services, the social position of minority groups 
and their perception by the members of majority culture changed very little. This is 
especially true in relation to the Indigenous people who continue to be the most 
disadvantaged group in Australia in the areas of housing, education, employment and 
health (Haralambos, Van Krieken, Smith & Holborn, 1996). 
 
Conclusion 
 
What I argued in this chapter is that development of children’s racialised 
conception of the social world needs to be considered as a result of the multiple 
levels of social influences. Children’s construction of racialised understanding of 
difference and social relations occurs in their microsystems, the immediate settings 
in which individuals grow and develop. These settings, however, exist and function 
in the context of a broader framework of ideological and cultural blueprints 
(macrosystem) which shape the social structures, policy and operation of institutions 
(exosystem), which either support or disadvantage members of different social 
groups. This in turn influences the nature of the microsystems and the proximal 
processes within these settings, which directly influence children’s understanding of 
themselves and others and their feelings towards them. The Australian Macrosystem 
with its prevailing ideologies of racism towards Aboriginal people and non-English 
migrants, provides a backdrop for everyday practices, which maintain the   116
representation of the Other as being different and posing a threat to ‘our’ culture and 
tradition. These sentiments coexist with the legacy of colonial racist discourses and 
the official ideology of the multicultural ‘harmonious Australian family’. Within this 
context young Australian children struggle to make sense of the variety of discourses 
to which they are exposed in order to understand their social world. 
 
To deal with racist assumptions all ecological systems need to be considered, 
as the changes in the microsystem settings are influenced by changes in the ‘big 
picture’. This is the moral imperative of the ecological approach (Garbarino & 
Abramowitz, 1992, p.51). Therefore, individuals working with children have a moral 
obligation to try to influence the broader social structures and to challenge children’s 
prejudiced racialised understanding of difference between people and their social 
relations. One way of doing the latter is by creating within the micro- and 
mesosystem a ‘just community’, where all children and their families are recognised 
and valued and where their multiple identities are acknowledged and strengthened. 
Such microsystem settings can help children develop their positive self concept and 
self-esteem, which form the basis for their future competence and  encourage them to 
positively participate in the world by questioning and rejecting various forms of 
racism in our society that disadvantage individuals on the basis of belonging to 
certain socially constructed groups.   117
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4  
 
 METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   118
Chapter 4  
 
 METHODOLOGY 
 
Introduction and research questions 
 
My study aims to contribute to a better understanding of how some Australian 
children construct their racialised ideas of difference and social relations. Research 
demonstrates that even very young children notice and respond to differences in 
people’s physical characteristics such as skin colour (Downey, 1998). The empirical 
findings from the US and Canada indicate that children group people in racialised 
categories at around 4-5 years of age (Kircher & Furby, 1971; Katz, 1982; Milner, 
1983; Sigelman, Miller, & Whitworth (1986) and that some of them start  attaching 
negative value to those whom they construct as the ‘racial’ Other. Furthermore, 
research by George & Hoppe (1979), Jarret (1981), Ramsey (1991) and Rizvi 
(1993a) show that children may develop negative racialised images even in relation 
to the members of groups with whom they have no direct social relations. This seems 
to suggest that from an early age children start perceiving people in racialised terms 
and that their images of difference and social relations may become value laden. 
How children develop these images and why they attribute negative value to some of 
them has been a subject of controversy among the researchers. Traditional 
approaches to children’s racialised thinking tend to view it from a developmental or 
socialization perspective. I discussed some of these theoretical and interpretive 
frameworks in Chapter 3 and stated that they do not withstand critical scrutiny for a 
number of valid reasons. These reasons have been discussed by other researchers   119
(for example Troyna & Hatcher, 1992; Rizvi, 1993; Connolly, 1996, 1998b; van 
Ausdale & Feagin, 2001) and I would like to restate some of them here. Firstly, these 
traditional perspectives underestimate children’s social competence and their active 
agency in their own learning (Connolly, 1996, 1998b; van Ausdale & Feagin, 2001). 
Furthermore, they usually focus on purely cognitive and affective developmental 
aspects, ignoring the important role structural factors in society play in the 
development of children’s racialised thinking (Troyna & Hatcher, 1992). In addition, 
these perspectives view children’s racist images within a framework of attitudes and 
therefore tend to assume that racism and children’s racialised identities are fixed and 
expressed in a consistent way regardless of context (Connolly, 1996, 1998b). 
 
However, there are different types and modalities of racism and their forms of 
expression change to suit historically and politically determined social contexts 
(Hall, 1980; Miles, 1993). In Australia, children are exposed, in their different 
Microsystems, to a number of common sense racialised discourses, which are often 
contradictory (Rizvi, 1996). As it becomes increasingly recognized that children are 
competent and active agents in the construction of their social world (Connolly, 
1996; 1998b; Lloyd-Smith & Tarr, 2000; Spyrou, 2001; van Ausdale & Feagin, 
2001; James & James, 2004), it can be argued that they engage and struggle with 
these messages in order to make sense of their social world. For that reason, 
children’s racialised ideas of difference are neither coherent nor static (Connolly, 
1996, 1998b). 
 
My study aims to explore how some young Australian children construct their 
racialised images of difference and social relations and to increase our understanding   120
of how they relate to different racialised discourses to which they are exposed in 
their immediate social environments (Microsystems). Such understanding could 
positively contribute to dealings with the issues of racism, which as I argued in the 
previous chapters, is still alive and well in our officially declared multicultural 
society, and to help to critically evaluate strategies being currently employed to 
combat racist assumptions in children. As I acknowledge the complex and dynamic 
nature of racism and “the active role the individuals […] play in the formation and 
reproduction of discourses on race” (Connolly, 1996, p.176), I adopted a qualitative 
approach to my study, which allows for more in-depth analysis of children’s 
responses. Such an approach seems to be conducive to drawing out possible 
contingencies and contradictions inherent in the racist beliefs, which articulate in 
“the broader context of social relations that define children’s experience of the 
world” (Rizvi, 1993a, p.131).  
 
  Given my aims, this study has been informed by the following research 
questions: 
  Do some young Australian children use ‘race’ as a dominating category in 
structuring their perceptions of self and others? 
 
  Is there a link between the study participants’ racialised categorization and their 
verbally stated playmate preferences?  
 
  How do some young Australian children ascribe value to their racialised ideas of 
difference? 
 
  Do the study participants’ racialised ideas of difference reflect discourses, to 
which they are exposed?  
 
 
 
 
   121
Methodological approaches 
 
There is ample research literature, both classical and more recent, on children’s 
racialised thinking. However, the majority of research procedures to study this topic 
has been used and developed overseas and is related to North American or European 
contexts. As children’s racialised thought develops in the complex political and 
social context, the generalisability of the overseas findings to an Australian context 
is difficult to assess.  
 
In Australia, the issue of racism and very young children is relatively 
unexplored. Apart from the findings of Palmer (1990); Rizvi, 1993a; Black-Gutman 
& Hickson (1996); MacNaughton & Davis (2001), and some results from the 
unpublished research conducted by teachers interested in this topic (for example 
Barnes, 1991, cited in MacNaughton & Davis, 2001) we have very limited 
knowledge of how young Australian children construct their racialised images of 
differences between people and their social relations and how they ascribe value to 
them. As we live in a multicultural society, there is a need to broaden our 
understanding of this phenomenon. 
 
There is also a need to address the issue of the relative role cognitive versus 
environmental factors play in development of children’s racialised thought. Many 
researchers (Aboud, 1988; Doyle & Aboud, 1995; Katz, 1976; Ramsey, 1987) who 
adopt a social-cognitive perspective suggest that racism in children should be 
attributed to their immature cognition. Such a perspective appears to provide support 
for the ideology of ‘new racism’ (discussed in previous chapters), where “to be   122
prejudiced is, quite simply, to be human” (Honeyford, 1986, p.52). It can be argued 
that this perspective allows us to conveniently accept children’s bias towards 
racialised differences as a status quo developmental phenomenon, which therefore 
does not require any action.  My study challenges this perspective and emphasizes 
the need to view the development of racist thought in children within the framework 
of specific societal beliefs and ideologies. To do that, I adopt an ecological 
framework to human development, which has certain methodological implications 
related to the research paradigm and therefore to the methods of data collection and 
analysis.  
 
The majority of the traditional studies in relation to young children and ‘race’ 
adopted quantitative, highly experimental designs, which aimed to test hypotheses 
deriving from a certain theory of prejudice such as Social Reflection Theory, the 
theories that link racialised thought to personality problems or Social-Cognitive 
Developmental Theory (discussed in the previous chapter). As a result of the adopted 
positivist research paradigm (Patton, 2002), the majority of these studies used 
statistical techniques in attempting to determine correlations among psychological 
variables to identify causal relationships. These techniques were based on one or 
more of three kinds of attitude tests as a method of collecting data. The tests ranged 
from a forced choice format questions used in the classical Clark’s Doll Technique 
(Clark & Clark, 1947), to the multiple-item tests such as Projective Prejudice Test  
(Katz & Zalk, 1978), and the Pre-School Racial Attitude Measure (Williams, Best, & 
Boswell, 1975) that involved aggregation of many evaluative adjectives in many 
different contexts, to the tests that used continuous rating scales  that provided many 
rather than just two response alternatives (Aboud, 1988). These studies looked at the   123
racialised thought from the perspective of attitudes and therefore treated it as a 
consistent and stable tendency to see the world regardless of context. For that reason, 
they tried to simply measure or quantify it, disregarding the complex and often 
contradictory nature of the process of racialisation (Connolly, 1996, 1998b). 
  
Quantitative techniques do not recognise the dynamic nature of development as 
well as the social context (Bronfenbrener, 1979). Therefore, their suitability for 
studying the complexity of children’s racialised thinking can be questioned. 
Experimental methods provide an opportunity to ‘measure’ the salience of race in 
young children, but do not allow us to demonstrate how children’s racialised images 
and the way they attribute value to these images can vary from one context to the 
next (Connolly, 1996, 1998b). Statistical techniques often do not allow for 
exploration of factors such as the personal relevance of the phenomenon under study 
for the study participants, the multiplicity of the participants’ previous experiences, 
or their perceptions of what responses are socially desirable. These factors seem of 
paramount importance in studying children and ‘race’.  
 
Towards Naturalistic Inquiry 
 
In order to move away from the logico-positivist paradigm, which uses 
quantitative and experimental methods to test hypothetical-deductive generalisations, 
I adopted a broad framework of Bronfenbrenner’s approach to human development, 
which lends itself to qualitative, more naturalistic approaches to inquiry. Patton 
(2002, p. 39) refers to Guba (1978) as defining naturalistic inquiry as a ‘discovery-
oriented’ “approach that minimizes investigator manipulation of the study setting   124
and places no prior constraints on what the outcomes of the research will be”. 
Naturalistic inquiry offers an opportunity to identify contextual elements, which 
cannot be matched by any other paradigm. As qualitative methods allow for studying 
various phenomena in their natural context, they are particularly useful for exploring 
human behaviour, thoughts and feelings which are determined by this context to a 
great degree. “How people behave, feel, think can be only understood if one gets to 
know their world and what they are trying to do in it” (Gillham, 2000, p.12). Such 
inquiry also helps us to explore complexities that are beyond the scope of more 
‘controlled’ approaches. For all the above reasons a qualitative, naturalistic approach 
seems most appropriate for exploring children’s racialised thinking. 
 
There is a great variety within qualitative inquiry methods, which stem from 
various theoretical traditions and orientations. My study has been influenced by the 
broad epistemological framework of interpretivism (Schwandt, 2000), according to 
which the aim of human sciences is to understand human action. From an 
interpretivist perspective, what distinguishes human (social) action from the 
movement of physical objects is its meaningfulness. To understand a particular 
social action, therefore, one must grasp the meanings that constitute that action. As 
the meanings of social action depend on the context and intentions of the actor, to 
understand the action’s meaning one must grasp its certain intentional context and 
the system of meanings to which it belongs (Schwandt, 2000, p.191). To find 
meaning in an action or to say that one understands what a particular action means 
requires an interpretation of that action. This process of understanding (achieving 
Verstehen) or interpreting is differently represented by different philosophies of 
interpretivism.    125
Phenomenological influences 
 
My methodology has been influenced by Alfred Schutz (1899-1959) who 
extended the philosophical tradition of phenomenology of Edmund Husserl (1859-
1938) and established it as a major philosophical and “social science perspective” 
(Patton, 2002, p.105). Husserl’s main philosophical assumption, according to Patton 
was that “we can only know what we experience by attending to perceptions and 
meanings that awaken our conscious awareness” (pp. 105-106). Our initial 
“understanding comes from sensory experience of phenomena”, which later 
“becomes described, explicated and interpreted” (p.106). As description and 
interpretation are very closely linked, it is very often difficult to separate them. 
Interpretation is essential to an understanding of experience and the experience 
includes the interpretation. 
 
Schutz’s extension of Husserl’s phenomenological views focuses on the ways in 
which members of society attend to their everyday lives. According to Schwandt 
(2000), Schutz’s “phenomenological analysis is…concerned with understanding how 
the intersubjective social world (Lebenswelt) is constituted” (p.192). Schwandt 
maintains that in order to understand the meaning of one’s action, we need to 
reconstruct the origins of the objective meanings of that action in the intersubjective 
communication of individuals in the social life-world. “There is no separate (or 
objective) reality for people. There is only what they know their experience is and 
means. The subjective experience involves the objective thing and a person’s reality” 
(Patton, 2002, p.106). For that reason, according to Schutz (1964, cited in Gubrium 
& Holstein, 2000), the social sciences’ role is to look at how the life world, the world   126
every individual takes for granted, is experienced by individuals. Safeguarding “this 
subjective point of view is the only, but sufficient guarantee that the world of social 
reality will not be replaced by a fictional, non-existing world constructed by 
scientific observer” (p.489).  
 
Methodological implications: developing shared meanings through inductive 
inquiry and human-as-instrument approach 
 
The process of reconstruction of objective meanings in the intersubjective 
communication draws our attention to the context in which such communication 
occurs (as meaning is context dependent) as well as to the role such communication 
plays in constituting social reality of everyday life. The process of such 
reconstruction therefore requires inductive analysis, which involves exploration of 
individual meanings and leads to discovery of how individuals experience and 
construct their social world.  This has certain implications for the qualitative 
researcher influenced by social phenomenology.  
 
Firstly, the inductive inquiry implies that “the researcher attempts to make sense 
of the situation without imposing pre-existing expectations of the phenomenon or 
setting under study” (Patton, 1990, p.44). In relation to my study this means that 
children’s racialised thinking is grounded in each individual child’s direct 
experience(s), rather than imposed on them a priori through hypotheses or deductive 
construction. Adopting Bronfenbrenner’s theory of human development as a 
theoretical framework for studying this phenomenon appears to be particularly useful 
here, as “its phenomenological foundation” recognizes that “prevailing conceptions 
of scientific explanation deny the variability of human circumstances and the   127
relativity of human perceptions and conceptions of those circumstances” (Glossop, 
1988, p. 12). Bronfenbrenner (1979) recognizes that the “development of a person is 
situated within a value-relevant environment”. In order to understand this 
development, “a phenomenological sensitivity to the individual’s perceptions and 
conceptions of the environment is required”.  This sensitivity is imperative as, 
according to Bronfenbrenner, the “most important elements in the environment that 
influence human development are those that ‘have the meaning’ for that person” 
(p.4). The researcher therefore needs to understand the environment as it is perceived 
rather than as it may exist in ‘objective’ reality.  
 
It can be inferred that such phenomenological sensitivity can lead to the 
development of shared meanings between the researcher and the participants, of the 
phenomenon under study. The phenomenological notion of shared meanings fits into 
the concept of ecological validity, which has been defined by Bronfenbrener (1979, 
p. 29) as “the extent to which the environment experienced by the subjects in a 
scientific investigation has the properties it is supposed or assumed to have by the 
investigator”. Ecological validity requires certain characteristics of the relationship 
between the study participants and researcher, which are based on collaborative 
engagement and mutual respect. The importance of such close relationship has been 
emphasized by Bronfenbrenner (1979) and it forms the second implication of the 
phenomenological focus adopted by my study. 
 
To achieve such a relationship with children and explore their experience and 
interpretation of the phenomenon in question, I adopted the human-as-instrument 
approach which allows for flexibility, insight and sufficient adaptability to   128
encompass and adjust to the variety of realities that may be encountered (Lincoln & 
Guba, 1985). This approach provides an opportunity to build on unspoken or implicit 
knowledge, which Lincoln & Guba (1985, p.40) describe as “tacit knowledge”, in 
addition to propositional knowledge (expressed in the language form), which is 
especially useful when the nuances of individual perspectives need to be understood. 
The human-as-instrument approach appears to be highly suitable in researching 
sensitive areas such as racialised thought which, as I stated before, is quite complex 
and at times may become contradictory. This approach allowed me to capitalize on 
children’s verbal responses and the same time to be sensitive to what they were 
communicating through their body language or through their avoidance to respond to 
some of my questions. Furthermore, in research which involves young children, 
whose ability to focus on the task and their willingness to respond to unfamiliar 
people may be quite limited, such an approach allows for the development of trust 
and the researcher’s better understanding of each participant’s individual needs.   
 
Learning from empathy 
 
Direct close contacts between researcher and study participants provide an 
opportunity for learning from empathy. “The value of empathy is emphasised in the 
phenomenological doctrine of verstehen”, which “refers to the unique capacity of 
human beings to make sense of the world” (Patton, 2002, p. 52). Empathy involves 
an ability to take and understand the “position, feelings, experiences and worldview 
of others”. The capacity for empathy is an important asset that can be used for 
human inquiry into social phenomena. “The tradition of verstehen places emphasis 
on the human capacity to know and understand others through empathic   129
introspection and reflection based on direct observation of and interaction with 
people” (Patton, p.52). The role of the researcher influenced by the 
phenomenological tradition therefore is to understand social phenomena from the 
actor’s own perspective and to examine how s/he experiences it and perceives it. 
Such understanding, according to Patton (1990), can be achieved by either adopting 
a phenomenological “focus on what people experience and how they interpret the 
world” or by a “methodological mandate to actually experience the phenomenon 
being investigated” (p. 70). In the case of the latter, the employment of participant 
observation  is necessary. The former understanding of the phenomenological 
approach, however, allows for the exploration of people’s experience of the 
phenomenon under study through the use of the in-depth interviews.  
 
My study, which to a certain degree was influenced by the phenomenological 
perspective, strove to establish the meanings of children’s construction of racialised 
images of differences between people and their social relations. This was achieved 
through individual interviews, which for the purpose of capturing non-verbal 
communication were videotaped. Although my method did not include systematic 
observations, I established a rapport with my participants through the means of pre-
interview play sessions arranged in their natural environment of school and child 
care centres. These one hour sessions, which I conducted twice a week for three 
weeks allowed for a direct and personal contact with the children and helped to 
develop my better understanding of their interests and individual needs. 
 
Although my interviews were semi-structured, as I started them with set 
questions in relation to the photographs presented to the study participants, and   130
therefore do not fit fully into a typical phenomenological framework, I used this 
strategy as a starting point to the more informal conversations with children. These 
more open parts of the interviews allowed me to explore more fully the participants’ 
individual meanings and lead me to a better understanding of the ways they 
experienced and constructed their social world in relation to difference. According to 
Connolly, open interviews offer children “the space to [freely] express themselves 
and to follow their lines of thought” (1996, p.175) and therefore seem most 
appropriate in researching the contingent and sometimes contradictory nature of 
racialised thinking.  
 
Although in principle, I agree with the advantage of using unstructured 
interviews for exploring the phenomenon in question, it seems that when designing 
my research method I did not fully trust my young participants’ social agency and 
competence in rationalizing their social experiences. As a result, in my initial phase 
of the interviews I followed a more traditional, structured method, which allowed 
children to involve their senses and to physically manipulate the photographs during 
the categorization process (for the detailed description of the interview procedures 
see the data collection section in this chapter).  This method provided me with some 
interesting results. However, it was not until I engaged in a more open discussion 
about my participants’ choices, that I realized how I had underestimated their ability 
to actively embrace their experiences and to strive to make sense of their social 
world. This was especially true in relation to the five and seven year old children. I 
realized during my inquiry how important it is to enter it with an open mind and to 
follow new paths of discovery as they emerge.  
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Maintaining empathic neutrality 
 
Although my study was not fully phenomenological in nature, I took an active 
and involved role in it as a researcher. From the perspective of the phenomenological 
tradition, such an active role promotes empathy and provides the researcher with “an 
empirical basis for describing the perspectives of others”, as well as with 
opportunities for “legitimately reporting his or her own feelings, perceptions, 
experiences and insights as part of the data” (Patton, 1990, p.58). While developing 
empathy and insight, I also made every effort to maintain, what Patton (2002, p. 53) 
termed, empathic neutrality. At first glance such a term appears to be contradictory. 
However, I agree with Patton (2002) that empathy and neutrality can be 
simultaneously maintained. Patton explains that empathy refers to “a stance toward” 
study participants and “communicates interest” in them and a “caring” attitude 
towards them (p.53). Neutrality on the other hand, refers to an open and non-
judgmental attitude toward research findings. Maintaining empathic neutrality can be 
quite challenging in researching sensitive issues such as racialisation of differences 
between people and their social relation, as participants’ understanding of such 
phenomena can be in direct opposition to the researcher’s views and feelings toward 
the subject matter. Therefore, it is important for the “investigator to become aware of 
and to deal with selective perception, personal biases, and theoretical 
predispositions” (Patton, 1990, p. 56).  
 
I strove to maintain empathic neutrality throughout my study. My pre-interview 
meetings with the children allowed me to build a positive and respectful relationship 
with them. These sessions were dedicated to observing children at play with their   132
friends and while they were completing various tasks. I also engaged in some 
unstructured child-initiated conversations and games with the participants. The 
newly developed relationships facilitated development of empathy, while at the same 
time assisted me with trying to be non-judgmental toward children’s ways of 
ascribing social meanings to racialised differences discussed during the interviews. 
Maintaining neutrality was not without problems due to the sensitive nature of my 
study. Despite my best efforts to remain neutral, there were certainly times during 
the course of interviews when I felt irritated or even upset by children’s biased 
opinions. I wondered whether the participants could sense my feelings and how this 
could have possibly influenced their answers. I also realized, that despite my efforts 
to develop a friendly relationship with the participants, some of them seemed to 
perceive me as an ‘authority’ and appeared to look to me for ‘correct’ answers and 
responded at times as in anticipation of approval. I discuss this issue in more detail 
in this chapter, in the section ‘Designing interviews’. 
 
‘Extensive’ versus ‘intensive’ research 
 
  Adopting a qualitative approach to researching racialised thinking may pose 
questions about its levels of generalizibility. Qualitative research is often criticised 
for providing a poor basis for generalisation from one context to the next. Although 
the validity of the in-depth study of a particular situation might be acknowledged, it 
is often considered to be of limited use unless its findings have general relevance to a 
wider audience (Hamersley, cited in Connolly, 1998, p.122). Such ‘relevance’ is 
commonly denied due to the qualitative study samples, which are often small and are 
not representative of a wider population. However, “qualitative data deals with   133
meanings” (Dey, 1993, p.3) not with numbers. As Connolly (1998) argues in relation 
to ethnographic studies, but whose argument, I believe, can be extended to 
qualitative research in general, the underlying philosophy of qualitative  research is 
to identify and understand certain “social processes and practices and the specific 
sets of causal relations that exist within them” (p.123).  
 
Qualitative data, unlike “extensive research” (Sayer, 1992), is not concerned 
with “common patterns, regularities and distinguishing features” of a whole 
population, but provides us with detailed information about the precise nature of the 
phenomenon in question (Connolly, 1998). For that reason, although not resulting in 
the law-like generalisations (Stake, 1995), qualitative research has the potential to 
appeal to a wider audience by contributing to the general knowledge, enhancing 
understanding of the phenomena under study and offering heuristic insight 
(Ferguson & Ferguson, 2000) . Qualitative research, called by Sayer (1992) 
“intensive” research, provides us with the data that can be compared to “a pool of 
accumulated knowledge into which the user may dip” (Rossman & Rallis, 1998, 
p.13, cited in Ferguson & Ferguson, 2000, p.184) when required. As my study was 
based on a small sample, it does not aspire to any universal ‘truths’ about children 
and racism. Rather, it provides some in-depth information about how some young 
European-Australian children involved in my study go about the process of 
racialising social differences and ascribing value to them.  
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Before and after: reflections on my data collection 
 
  In order to explore the process of children’s racialisation of social 
differences, I used the method of face to face interviews. The departing point for the 
development of these interviews was influenced by my knowledge of some earlier 
studies related to young children and ‘race’.  This resulted in the adoption of the 
photographs technique and some structured categorising tasks, similar to those that 
have been used in some recent as well as in more classical studies related to this 
topic (e.g. Sigelman et al., 1986; Ramsey, 1991; Black-Gutman & Hickson, 1996). 
These studies looked at the racialised thinking from the perspective of attitudes and 
therefore, as I stated earlier, tried to ‘measure’ them through the use of tests. 
Although, originally, I also adopted the attitude framework for my study, I looked at 
attitudes as a complex phenomenon influenced by both the children themselves as 
well as by some broad environmental factors, rather than attributing them to a single 
factor such as personality characteristics or developmental cognitive immaturity. For 
that reason, I intended to explore children’s racialised views in more detail than 
quantitative approaches would allow me to do. Although I used some structured 
categorising tasks, children’s responses to them were more of a starting point to a 
further, more open data collection than a source of data in itself. Each of my 
interviews involved some pre-established questions followed by informal 
conversations during which new, often unexpected questions emerged. I moved 
away from the positivist experimental approach towards a more naturalistic 
framework, believing that racialised thought cannot be simply measured by 
statistical counts of children’s responses to the categorising tasks. Bronfenbrenner’s 
ecological approach to development was used as a conceptual framework to view   135
children’s attitudes to racialised difference, positioning them in the context of 
multilayered, interrelated environmental influences. It was not until I collected and 
analysed my data that I realised that the framework of attitudes does not fit 
children’s racialised thought, as the latter is far from being stable and coherent.   
  
  Situating my research within the framework of Bronfenbrenner’s ecological 
theory of human development was a useful approach as it allowed me to 
conceptualise children’s development of racialised thought within a context of their 
immediate settings, influenced by some broader social structures. However, the 
adopted methodology made my investigation less complete than it might have been. 
To gain deeper insight into the ways in which young children who participated in 
this study construct their understanding of differences between people and their 
social relations, a more rounded ethnographic approach would have been beneficial. 
Such an approach would certainly have allowed for a deeper exploration of the 
development of children’s racialised images within their immediate social contexts. 
However, given the time constraints of this study, as well as the general 
apprehensive reaction with which the information about my research was met by 
some parents, teachers and administrators whom I approached long before the 
commencement of my study, my methodology has been compromised. My data was 
collected in only one the children’s social settings and the generalised tasks that 
children were set to complete had little relation to their day-to-day experiences. This 
methodological limitation of my study needs to be acknowledged. Thus, while my 
findings illuminate certain aspects of the importance of children’s Microsystems in 
which they construct their ideas of ‘race’ and the link of these ideas to some broader 
social structures, they are partial.    136
  During the process of data analysis I also came to the conclusion that the 
suitability of the design of my second interview had to be re-assessed. Although I did 
not intend to rely on statistical methods to measure children’s possibly biased views, 
the initially adopted attitude framework made me strive to find a way to demonstrate 
how consistent children were in ascribing either positive or negative value to their 
racialised understanding of difference. Initially, I believed George Kelly’s Theory of 
Personal Constructs (1955), would be a useful framework for exploring this 
phenomenon. Kelly asserts that people cannot reach interpretation-free reality. In 
order to understand the world, they develop constructs (make assumptions) about its 
different elements. These constructs are formed by people during the process of 
striving to develop their personal meanings (Bannister & Fransella, 1980, p. 15). 
Various constructs, which represent objects, events and people are highly subjective 
and depend on how individuals see them. Each event, person or object is seen 
(constructed) differently by different people, depending on their individual 
interpretation.  The world is viewed by each person as a system of correlated 
dichotomous constructs. Each of them has two poles, a negative as well as the 
positive one. People only choose for themselves that alternative in dichotomised 
construct that seems to make most sense to them. Therefore, according to Kelly 
(cited in Bannister & Fransella, 1980), they only move in those directions that seem 
to elaborate their existing construct system. This elaboration may take two forms.  
 
The first of these forms is that of a definition, which confirms those aspects of 
experience that have been fairly actively construed. The second form of elaboration 
is that of extension, which reaches out to increase the range of the construct system 
by exploring new areas that are only partially understood.  This aspect of choice in   137
Kelly’s theory has some important implications for understanding prejudiced 
thinking in relation to racialised difference.  
 
Kelly asserts that people’s prejudiced judgment involves an extensive use of 
constellatory constructs, which are characteristic of stereotyped or typological 
thinking. In the prejudiced argument such constructs are used in the pre-emptive 
manner. People view objects of their prejudice in a very narrow and totally non-
propositional way. They only choose this alternative in a dichotomized construct that 
confirms their previously developed definition. It can be argued therefore, that in 
order to confirm their existing construct system, children who started developing 
prejudice in relation to racialised difference will demonstrate a tendency to choose 
only the negative poles of constructs, which define the objects of their prejudiced 
thinking.   
 
It can be argued further, that if one constructs a person/group in a negative way 
because of this person’s/group’s certain characteristics, s/he will consistently assign 
this person/group with negative features, due to an inability to see a multiple level of 
characteristics and roles each individual can have. Therefore, children’s consistent 
positive or negative way of ascribing value to people on the basis of their skin colour 
or other racialised characteristics could suggest their prejudice. The design of my 
second interview was influenced by Kelly’s theoretical framework and although I 
did not use the repertory grid technique originally designed by him, I adapted some 
of his ideas.  
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When looking at my results from the second interviews, I realised how little 
meaning my findings would have and how simplified they would have been if I did 
not include more open ended questions, which followed the structured part of this 
interview. As my data collection was completed, I had no other choice, but to only 
reflect on the inadequacy of such structured interviews in the process of exploring 
the complexity of children’s thoughts and feelings in relation to difference. 
Children’s way of describing individual photographs was rarely entirely positive or 
negative. The description of photographs representing the same racialised group was 
also not always consistent. I realised that Kelly’s framework was less useful than I 
originally thought, as it did not allow for unearthing the multiplicity of factors that 
may affect children’s development and expression of racist assumptions.  
 
Study sample 
 
As the purpose of my inquiry was to focus in depth on the phenomenon of 
children’s construction of racialised differences, the technique of purposeful 
sampling (Patton, 2002) was employed. According to Lincoln & Guba (1985), the 
purposeful sampling lends itself to naturalistic type of inquiry, as it increases the 
scope or range of data exposed, which is often not achievable through random 
sampling. It also increases “the likelihood that the full array of multiple realities will 
be uncovered” (p.40). Purposeful sampling allows selecting information-rich cases 
for an in-depth study and, in comparison to random statistically representative 
sampling that permits generalizations from the sample to a larger population, aims to 
select a smaller number of cases which help to illuminate the question under study 
(Patton, 2002, p. 230).   139
I selected for my study a small homogenous sample of twelve children. In 
order to reduce the number of variables, this sample was bounded by the first spoken 
language, socio-economic status and cultural background, as each of the children 
spoke English as their first language, came from a middle-class European-Australian 
background, and lived as well as attended a service (either child care centre or 
school, depending on the age of the child) located in two culturally and socio-
economically diverse areas in Perth, WA. These rather affluent suburbs with pockets 
of state housing occupied by significant population of migrants as well as Indigenous 
people, have been targeted to ensure that all the study participants had some direct 
contact (possibly at various levels of involvement) with members of various cultural 
groups. One school and two childcare centers, the latter two located in close physical 
proximity to each other, were selected for this study.  
 
As one of the aims of this study was to explore possible age differences in 
children’s construction of racialised differences, three different age groups (3-year 
olds, 5-year olds and 7-year olds) were selected. Two girls and two boys represented 
each age group. 
 
Collecting the data 
   
My face-to-face interviews involved some semi-structured tasks as well as 
some more open ended questions. A number of studies (for example Lerner & 
Schroeder, 1975; Sigelman, Miller, & Whitworth, 1986; Ramsey, 1991) suggest that 
although ‘race’ appeared to be an organizing attribute in children’s responses to the 
categorizing tasks and in their social preferences during some free choice tasks, it   140
was not a concept that children readily spoke about in their responses to open ended 
questions. According to Ramsey (1991), this may be a result of young children’s 
language limitations as well as their tendency to focus on more obvious transitory 
visual attributes such as clothing or hair style.  
 
Being influenced by these findings, I structured the interviews around a 
number of focus questions and tasks, which involved responses to a set of 
photographs, and were used as a starting point to some more open-ended 
conversations. Using photographs to explore young children’s responses is a well 
known technique used in a number of studies (Sigelman, Miller & Whitworth, 1986; 
Ramsey, 1987, 1991; Aboud & Doyle, 1995; Black-Gutman & Hickson, 1996). 
These studies proved that photographs can be successfully used to explore some 
aspects of children’s perception of ‘race’; many of them, however, relied heavily on 
quantitative methods of data collection and analysis. I adopted the technique of using 
the photographs in my study, but complemented the structured tasks with more open-
ended means of collecting my data. 
 
Developing photographs 
 
In order to ensure age and contextual appropriateness of the photographs, two 
sets of children’s photographs were developed for the purpose of my study. Each of 
these sets included twelve children who represented three groups commonly defined 
in Australia as European-Australians, Aboriginal-Australians and Asian-Australians. 
As the study participants lived in and attended culturally diverse services, it was 
more than likely that the photographs presented to them reflected the physical   141
characteristics of children with whom the participants have had contact, and possibly 
interactions, in their different social Microsystems (Bronfenbrenner, 1979), such as 
family, school, childcare centre or neighborhood. Photographs of four children and 
an equal number of boys and girls represented each of these three broadly defined 
groups. Each of the photographs showed a child’s head and shoulders. All children 
were dressed in everyday casual clothes and some of the girls wore jewelry. To 
match the age of the participants with the age of children in the photographs as 
closely as possible, the first set included photographs of children between 3.5 and 5 
years of age, while the second one had photographs of 7 year olds.  
 
To address the question of whether children have a generalised reaction to 
people who look different to them (Sigelman, Miller, Whitworth, 1986), the 
photographs of children within each of the groups varied significantly in either skin 
tone, and/or hair and eye colour. The European-Australian children were represented 
by one couple with light hair, light eyes and rather pale complexion. The other two 
children had dark hair and eyes and olive skin. The Asian-Australian group was 
represented by photographs of two children from Chinese background, with black 
hair and relatively light skin and two Indian children (two Kurdish children for the 
older age group) whose skin tone was much darker. Similarly, within the Aboriginal-
Australian group, there were two photographs of children with fairly light skin, and 
two whose skin was much darker. These children also varied in the colour of their 
eyes and hair, with two of them being blond and blue eyed and the other two having 
brown eyes and hair. Each pair of children was of mixed gender. The photographs of 
children were taken in the outdoor settings of childcare centres, schools or private   142
homes and therefore varied in their background. All the children in the photographs 
were unknown to the study participants. 
 
Designing interviews 
 
To explore children’s racialised thinking two interviews were designed. As my 
study involved very young children who were aged between 3 and 7 years, I strove 
to organize the interview settings in the most possible natural and developmentally 
appropriate way. To help children focus on the task and avoid unexpected 
disruptions I arranged to interview all children individually in the rooms that were 
familiar to them, but located in the quiet areas of either their school or childcare 
centres. My research assistant and I visited these environments with the children 
from each age group several times prior to the interview sessions. During these visits 
we talked about our future interviews and the participants had an opportunity to look 
and play with the camera recorder, as in order to increase the accuracy, richness and 
reliability of data collection, the interviews were intended to be videotaped. The 
intention behind the videotaping was to capture not only children’s verbal responses, 
but also the complexity of their body language such as face expression, gestures as 
well as silences and hesitations, which could possibly increase my understanding of 
children’s views in relation to the phenomenon under study. Although the video 
recording was viewed as a possible source of ‘tacit’ knowledge and therefore 
considered of high importance, in case of children not feeling comfortable about it, 
the possibility of taking notes was also taken into consideration. 
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To ensure developmental appropriateness of the categorizing tasks during the 
interviews, all the participants were tested for classification skills and for their 
understanding of the concepts ‘same’ and ‘different’ prior to the interview sessions. 
To achieve that, all children were presented with a number of stick figure drawings 
which varied in size, shape, hair style and clothing and asked to point to those who, 
they felt, looked the ‘same’ and identify those that were ‘different’.  
 
As children are often viewed as being “impressionable in nature” (Connolly, 
1996, p.180), I tried to avoid presenting them with tasks and questions that might 
encourage them to think along racialised lines. For that reason, the pre-interview 
tasks described above, similarly to the procedure used in the study by Ramsey 
(1991), did not include colour as a differentiating attribute for categorizing the stick 
figures, to avoid prompting children to sorting the on the basis of skin colour. 
Furthermore, when designing structured tasks to be used during the interviews, I 
kept away from forced choice categories, which could lead children to focusing on 
characteristics commonly perceived as ‘racial’ because of the lack of any other 
possibilities. During our more open conversations I was careful not to use terms and 
questions that might encourage racialisation of difference or to suggest my value 
position. This was done to minimize the possibility of children trying to provide me 
with answers, perceived by them as socially desirable.  
 
According to Connolly (1996, 1998b), despite a common belief that children are 
naive and socially incompetent, they demonstrate awareness of adult-child power 
relations in various social contexts in which they participate, quite early in their 
lives. As a result of this awareness, in order to please adults, children often try to do   144
and say things that, in their view, are expected of them. This might have some 
serious implications for the adult researchers, as their presence “can have an effect of 
foregrounding the appreciation and use of adult discourses [by children] as a way of 
demonstrating [their] social competence” (Connolly, 1996, p.182). It is important to 
acknowledge this potential influence, as it emphasizes the need for the researchers to 
be reflective when collecting data and analyzing children’s responses. 
 
There is one more issue related to the adult-child power relationship in research. 
This problem is linked to the possible risk of the qualitative researcher conducting 
studies on sensitive topics such as ‘race’, to condone children’s prejudiced views in 
an attempt to maintain empathic neutrality. It has to be acknowledged that leaving 
children’s racist views untouched creates a risk of conveying a message that such 
views are acceptable. Although such result is certainly undesirable, condemning such 
views during interviews also does not seem to deal with the problem, as it does not 
stop children from drawing upon such views and reproducing them in other contexts 
(Connolly, 1996, p.180). I aimed at maintaining neutrality during my study, at the 
same time however, while allowing children to freely express their prejudiced 
beliefs, I sometimes questioned them on these assumptions. When challenging some 
of the children’s responses, I was aware, that my neutrality as a researcher was being 
compromised, as children could possibly have read these questions as a sign of 
‘getting their answers wrong’. However, I felt at times, that by posing some more 
challenging questions, I provided children with an opportunity to reflect on their 
ideas. A similar strategy was employed by Connolly (1996, 1998b).  
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The time frame of 20 minutes was put on the interview sessions to match 
young children’s short attention span. I also planned however, that for the seven year 
olds, individual variations might take place, if they spontaneously elaborate on their 
answers and maintain their interest in the task. Although the original study design 
anticipated the use of two interviews for all participants, the pilot study conducted 
with two three-year old children revealed that they were not able to understand the 
task involved in the second interview. For that reason this interview was only 
conducted with the five- and seven-year-old children. 
  
Conducting interviews 
 
During the interviews all children were asked to undertake a series of tasks: 
 
1. At the beginning of the first interview the individual participants were presented 
with all the photographs one by one and asked if they knew or seen anybody who 
looked like that. As physical categorization seemed to be most developmentally 
appropriate, children were asked to sort the photographs by placing them onto one of 
two paper circles, one of them being blank and the other marked by a flower, where 
the flower indicated difference.  Children’s answers were followed up by informal 
conversations about who were the children to which those in the photographs were 
similar. The purpose of this part of the interview was to determine whether the study 
participants had a direct contact with children from diverse cultural background and 
to establish the nature of such relationships.  
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2. The next part of this interview looked at how children categorise people. All the 
participants were presented here with the photographs in the sets of three. Each triad 
consisted of children of both genders who represented different cultural 
backgrounds. Similarly to the first task, children were asked to physically place the 
photographs into two groups, those who looked similar and the one who looked 
different. The choice of the photographs in each set allowed children to use a variety 
of categorising characteristics such as gender, facial structure, skin or hair colour, or 
some more transitory attributes such as hair style, jewellery or clothing. This task 
was to explore what type of cues children predominantly use during the process of 
categorising people. Presenting children at any one time with three pictures, which 
differed in more than one way aimed at avoiding forced choices. After the 
completion of the task, the participants were asked to clarify their choices. This 
provided children with an opportunity to freely talk about various personal 
experiences in relation to difference. These conversations varied in length and detail 
depending on the age and individual characteristics of the participants of my study. 
 
3. In order to establish how children perceived differences between themselves and 
others, all the participants were presented with all the photographs placed in front of 
them on the table and asked to select as many photographs as they wanted of 
children who, in their perception, looked like them. After physically placing the 
photographs on the “like me” or “not like me” circle, the children were then asked to 
discuss their choices. Similarly to the previous tasks, this one also reduced the 
possibility of forcing children to choose any of the photographs as a result of the lack 
of any other options.  
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4. A similar procedure was used to explore children’s playmate preferences. As 
before, all photographs were placed in front of the participants, who were asked to 
choose those children they would like to play with, or have as a friend. Again, the 
participants had a choice of selecting as many or as few photographs as they wished 
to. After physically selecting the photographs and placing them into two groups, the 
participants were asked to clarify their choices. This provided the children with an 
opportunity to talk about their own friends and different dynamics that characterized 
their playmate interactions as well as to talk about children who were part of their 
Microsystems, but with whom they did not interact. 
 
5. The second interview aimed to investigate how children ascribed value to 
racialised differences and its design was influenced by Kelly’s theory of personal 
constructs, briefly discussed earlier in this chapter. All the participants were asked to 
describe, by a set of adjectives, the same children whose photographs were presented 
to them during the first interview. To establish the shared meanings of the 
descriptive terms between the interviewer and the participants, these terms were 
elicited during the story reading sessions which preceded each interview. After a 
story was read, each participant was asked to describe its characters. The adjectives, 
whether positive or negative, were then recorded and the understanding of it, as well 
as its antonym was discussed with each individual child. During the actual interview, 
children were presented with individual photographs and asked to use the adjectives 
elicited earlier to describe the children in the photographs.  
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Ethical issues 
 
Exploration of sensitive topics such as ‘racial’ discrimination and prejudice 
can be a source of stress for both the study participants as well as the services 
involved (Australian Association for Research in Education, 1993). Including 
children who are naturally quite vulnerable in research studies, can also create 
potential risks. Such risks relate to the young age of children involved, their limited 
attention span and the power relations between the child and an adult researcher. 
Being involved in an interview might be a stressful and tiring task for young 
children. For the above reasons a risk assessment (Patton, 2002) was carried out and 
the management plan was developed to reduce the potential risks. As I stated earlier, 
all interviews were conducted in a familiar environment; they were short in duration 
and were introduced as an enjoyable game. The participants were free to stop at any 
time and were informed that the activities are not a test and that they are not being 
assessed on their answers. All the participants were provided with an opportunity to 
make choices by physical manipulation of photographs as such method is considered 
to be conceptually the easiest and most natural way of categorising for young 
children during the pre-operational and concrete operational period of cognitive 
development (see Piaget, 1979; Piaget & Inhelder, 1973). 
 
Every effort was also made to minimise the possibility of ‘stranger anxiety’ 
(Berk, 2002). As young children quite often fear unfamiliar adults and need to build 
trust in them for the meaningful interactions to take place, both I as well as the 
researcher assistant met with all the children prior to interview sessions. As I stated 
earlier, we made frequent visits to the school as well as the childcare centres and   149
informally engaged with the three and five year old participants by taking part in 
their play with peers. Informal conversations and game playing also took place with 
the seven year-old children during recess and lunch time at their school.  
 
  All children were also asked to verbally agree to take part in the interviews 
and to have their interviews videotaped. Due to this procedure, two interviews with 
the three-year-old participants were not videotaped, as one of the children clearly 
objected to it and the other demonstrated a high level of apprehension in the presence 
of the research assistant. I took notes of the children’s verbal responses during these 
two interview sessions and additional comments about their body language were 
written straight after the interviews were completed. All children were asked to give 
me a verbal permission to interview them and the older participants were also asked 
to sign a written permission for participating in the study. All parents were informed 
about the purpose of the study as well the procedures that were going to be used 
during interview sessions, before being asked to sign the consent form for their 
children to be involved in the study. They were also assured about the confidentiality 
of the study and about their right to withdraw their children from the study at any 
time. All children were also told they “could stop the game at any time” if they were 
tired or ask any questions they wanted me to answer (see Appendix 2). 
 
In analysing the data and documenting results, I ensured that no 
documentation, which may prove to be harmful or embarrassing to participants or 
the services involved, would be published. In order to maintain confidentiality, 
location of the children services as well as any other details that could allow for   150
identification of the services or research participants and their families have been 
falsified.  
 
Data analysis 
 
  The process for analysing my data was informed by some broad 
philosophical assumptions that guide qualitative studies (Creswell, 1998). These 
assumptions, as described by Guba and Lincoln (1988), relate to researcher’s 
understanding of the nature of reality (ontological issues), the relationship between 
the researcher and the study participants (epistemological issues), the role of values 
in the study (the axiological issues) and the process of research (the methodological 
issues). I address some of these assumptions here and discuss their practical 
implications for my data analysis.  
 
  Firstly, in relation to the ontological assumption, qualitative researchers 
accept the view that “reality is constructed by individuals involved in the research 
situation” (Creswell, 1998, p.76). To reflect the multiple realities, qualitative 
researchers directly quote participants’ words and provide evidence of different 
perspectives. As my study has been influenced by phenomenology, I adopted a view 
that the phenomeon of racialised difference has no separate reality. Each child might 
construct this phenomenon in a different way and associate it with different 
meanings, which depend on how they experience it and understand it. Therefore, 
when describing my data, I reported a variety of statements representing children’s 
diverse perspectives on the phenomenon under study. I provided “thick description” 
(Denzin, 2001) of what happened during the interviews and, when appropriate, some   151
important background information about the child or the circumstances preceding the 
interview. The human-as-instrument approach adopted for this study provided me 
with an opportunity to build not only on the propositional knowledge, which was 
based on what children said (most of the time recorded verbatim, but sometimes 
summarised for the convenience of the audience), but also on tacit knowledge. This 
knowledge came from a close observation of children’s body language (for example: 
eye contact and gestures) during the interviews, the way they answered questions 
(the promptness of their responses, hesitations), as well as from the silences, which 
occurred after some questions had been asked. The videotaped records, which 
allowed for multiple viewing of the interviews proved to be an invaluable source of 
that knowledge. I used this knowledge in the description as well as in the 
interpretation of my data. 
 
  The second philosophical assumption, which guides the qualitative 
researcher’s inquiry, refers to the epistemological position. It is concerned with ‘how 
we know what we know’; “the possibility and desirability of objectivity, subjectivity, 
causality, validity and general-izability” (Patton, 2000, p.134). In relation to this 
question, I took the stand of learning from empathy. For that reason I tried to 
minimise the “distance” and “objective separateness” (Guba & Lincoln, 1988, p. 94) 
between myself and the study participants. In my role of the researcher, my active 
involvement with the study participants before and during the interview sessions 
allowed me to be more flexible and spontaneous in using prompting questions to 
encourage children to elaborate on their answers and to clarify their meanings in 
relation to their construction of racialised differences. It also promoted empathy, 
which helped me to understand, describe and interpret their perspectives. This   152
empathy was gradually developed as I visited all the study participants either at 
school or childcare centres prior to the interviews. These pre-interview sessions, 
which allowed for informal interactions, contributed to the development of mutual 
trust. I noticed that the participants’ behaviour towards me changed significantly 
with every visit. Initially, some of them, and it was especially true for the three and 
five-year-old children were quite reluctant to even talk to me. With time, they 
greeted me with a smile, initiated interactions and started making suggestions in 
relation to the type of activities that we could do together. These visits helped me to 
get to know each child and therefore to become more sensitive to their individual 
likes and dislikes and to the differences in their attention span and ways of 
expressing their ideas and feelings. The bond that we developed helped to minimize 
the ‘researcher’s effect’, as children started interacting with me in an informal way 
and treating me more like an older ‘friend’ and less as an authority figure. I inferred 
this change in children’s attitude towards me on the basis of the less formal language 
that they started using when speaking to me, jokes that they chose to share with me 
and some personal stories that they told me in relation to their home, 
school/childcare, or peer environment. This bond helped me to be more 
understanding and caring towards my participants and to maintain neutrality in 
relation to their images of the racialised Other, which were sometimes quite 
negative, and to appreciate their struggle in dealing with the often contradictory 
nature of their racialised thoughts and feelings.   
 
While acknowledging the development of rapport and empathy, I was mindful 
during my data analysis that children’s willingness to openly share their views on 
racialised difference should not be taken for granted. After all, I was still an adult   153
and therefore could have been perceived by children as an authority figure and our 
power relation considered as being unequal. I noticed during the process of 
analyzing my data that some children repeatedly asked me whether I was going to 
share their interview records with their parents or with their teachers regardless of 
the fact that I told them at the beginning that it was up to them to decide.   
 
Qualitative research presents challenges in relation to the general credibility of 
its findings. According to Patton (2002, p.542) the criteria that can be used to judge 
such credibility of the research study are linked to its theoretical orientations, 
philosophical underpinnings as well as its specific purpose.  Some of these criteria 
refer to the objectivity versus subjectivity of the data as well as of the objectivity of 
the investigator. As Patton (2002) maintains, some qualitative researchers who place 
priority on traditional scientific criteria, emphasize objectivity of their studies as well 
as the inquirer. These researchers use multiple coders and calculate “intercoder 
consistency to establish the validity and reliability of pattern and theme analysis” (p. 
545). These procedures aim at minimizing investigator’s bias. Within the broad 
interpetivist tradition, however, the subjectivity of the investigator is acknowledged 
and the possible bias it discussed and taken into consideration. The quality of the 
study conducted within the interpretivist tradition is viewed as its ‘trustworthiness’ 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1986), which is judged against its ‘dependability’ and 
‘authenticity’. Patton explains the former as following a systematic process of data 
collection and analysis and the latter as a “reflexive consciousness about one’s own 
perspective, appreciation of the perspective of others and fairness in depicting 
constructions in the values that undergrid them” (2002, p.546).   
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I strove to maintain dependability while analysing and presenting my data, and 
therefore provided thick description that speaks for itself and provides readers with 
an opportunity to make their own interpretations. To increase the validity of 
conclusions I used analyst triangulation. To do that, I asked a number of my 
colleagues to read the interview transcripts and provide me with their own findings.  
These findings were later compared for accuracy. While using all these strategies, I 
was fully aware that my data description and interpretation were influenced by my 
personal voice and perspective.  After all, even the choice of quotes and the 
identification of themes are tinted by our subjective views on what is important or 
what is irrelevant. According to Patton, qualitative research “calls for, even demands 
a sense of voice and perspective” (2002, p.66). They are needed in order to report 
with confidence on findings that are not based on statistical calculations, which can 
be easily replicated and confirmed. Qualitative findings are open to multiple 
interpretations; there is no single and universal truth. Therefore, my interpretation is 
only one of many possible ones.  
 
The aspect of authenticity of my study needs to be addressed within the context 
of axiological assumptions, which relate to the role values play in research. 
Qualitative researchers acknowledge that research is value laden. Therefore, while 
analyzing my data I strove to be “attentive to and conscious of the cultural, political, 
social, linguistic, and ideological origins” (Patton, 2002, p.64) of my own as well as 
my participants’ perspectives on racialised difference. I used Bronfenbrenner’s 
theory of human development as a framework to report on children’s complex nature 
of racialised thought and a possible influence a number of racialised discourses, 
which are expressed in different forms and modalities at the different levels of the   155
social structures in Australia, might have on this thought. It is important, however, to 
acknowledge here that some of my claims being made are conjectural in nature due 
to the methodological limitations of my study, which I discussed earlier in this 
chapter. 
 
In order to depict the nuances of children’s voices and the often changing 
dynamics of our interviews, when describing and interpreting my data, I used a 
personal voice in the tradition of “an I-Though perspective … [which] acknowledges 
the humanity of both self and others and implies relationship, mutuality and genuine 
dialogue” (Patton, 2002, p. 64). This perspective requires reflexivity on behalf of the 
researcher. When presenting my data, I included not only the perspectives of my 
respondents but also reflected on how they perceived me and what shaped and might 
be shaping their world view. I also included my own views on children’s racialised 
thinking and discussed what influenced them. In doing so, I drew upon the 
theoretical bases that underpin my understanding of children’s learning process and 
the phenomenon of the social construction of ‘race’ and racism, which I discussed in 
chapters 2 and 3.  
 
 In relation to methodological issues I followed the inductive process of data 
analysis. Inductive analysis, according to Patton, is characterized by “immersion in 
the details and specifics of the data to discover important patterns, themes and 
relationship” (2002, p. 41). Such a process adopts a discovery oriented approach and 
places no constraints on the research outcomes. Inductive designs allow the 
important analysis dimensions to emerge from patterns found in the raw data without 
presupposing what the important dimensions will be. However, according to Patton   156
conducting a fully holistic-inductive analysis and implementing naturalistic inquiry 
is not without problems. He maintains that such studies “are always a matter of 
degree” and refers to Guba (1978) who compares the practice of naturalistic inquiry 
to “a wave on which the investigator moves from varying degrees of a ‘discovery 
mode’ to varying emphasis of a ‘verification mode’ in an attempting to understand 
the real world” (Patton, 2002, p.66). 
  
  Although my study adopted a discovery oriented approach, as I did not 
hypothesise my research outcomes, its original design included some presupposed 
dimensions of analysis linked to my research questions. I intended to explore the 
criteria that children used in structuring perceptions of themselves and others as well 
as the criteria for their verbally stated playmate choices. I also aimed to establish 
whether the study participants ascribed social value to their racialised ideas of 
differences and whether they had certain preferences in relation to any of the three 
groups commonly defined as Europen-Australians, Asian-Australians and 
Aboriginal-Australians.  
 
  In order to do that, all the interviews were transcribed and coded for common 
patterns and themes that emerged within these broad dimensions.  Some of these 
patterns were quite unexpected. I discovered, for example, that although all children, 
regardless of age, displayed a common tendency to categorise people along 
racialised characteristics such as skin colour, only some of them attached social 
meanings to these categories. For some children certain characteristics, commonly 
considered as ‘racial’, carried negative connotation, while for others these   157
characteristics seemed to be simply the visually most obvious differentiating 
features.  
 
  Similarly, in relation to the verbally stated playmate preferences, only some 
children consistently linked their negative choices to the racialised characteristics. 
For others, these potential choices were influenced by interplay of a number of 
factors, which included gender, their personal experiences as well as various 
messages possibly received at home, school or peer environment. Certain patterns 
were also identified in relation to how children justified their negative choices. Some 
of the participants ‘blamed the Others’, while other children seemed uncomfortable 
to even talk about their negative choices. The tendency to avoid talking about 
racialised difference seemed to be a recurring theme during the content analysis.  
  
  Another recurring theme related to children’s often contradictory perceptions 
of the racialised Other. These perceptions often seemed to reflect a number of 
racialised discourses present in Australia and, at times, contained some elements of 
the official multicultural debate as well as traces of colonialism and anti-Asian 
tendencies, expressed in a variety of ways in an every day social discourses. 
 
  I present my data in the following three chapters. The first of these chapters 
focuses on children’s construction of racialised difference. The second one looks at 
my participants verbally stated social preferences and the third one explores ways in 
which children ascribe value to the racialised difference between people and their 
social relations. While describing the data I selected those excerpts from the   158
interviews that illuminated best the themes and patterns identified during the content 
analysis. 
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Chapter 5 
 
CHILDREN’S CONSTRUCTION OF DIFFERENCE 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter looks at my findings in relation to how children who participated in 
the study perceived themselves and others. I provide thick description (Denzin, 
2001) of some parts of the interviews in the form of direct transcripts of what has 
been said as well as what has been expressed through body language. Some sections 
of the interviews, which have been quite repetitive have been summarised in order to 
make them more concise and easy to follow. Excerpts from interview transcripts 
have been enclosed in inverted comas or set aside from the main text for easy 
identification.  This solid descriptive data has been complemented by my analysis 
within the adopted theoretical framework. The recurring patterns that emerged for 
me in analysing children’s perception of difference are presented here in three 
sections under the following headings: 
 
•  What criteria do children use in constructing their understanding of difference? 
 
•  Do children talk readily about differences commonly associated with ‘race’? 
 
•  How do children draw lines in their racialisation of difference? 
 
Thus, the first section of this chapter relates to the criteria used by children in 
constructing their understanding of difference. I found that the participants used a 
number of characteristics, which included ‘race’, gender, as well as some more   161
transitory features such as hair length, clothing or jewellery. Although all children, 
including the youngest ones, categorised the photographs using criteria commonly 
associated with ‘race’, as they contrasted European-Australian children from non 
European-Australians, only some of them did so consistently. Others demonstrated 
flexibility in their ability to use a range of differentiating characteristics. Salience of 
‘race’ in children’s verbal responses appeared to increase with age. However, even in 
the three-year-old group, one of the participants consistently emphasised physical 
features typically associated with ‘race’ during the process of categorising self and 
other children. The first part of this chapter provides examples, which illustrate how 
children categorised the photographs presented to them in the triads, using the 
criteria of same/similar and different. It also demonstrates how children explained 
their choices. 
 
  The second part of this chapter, titled Do children talk readily about 
differences commonly associated with race? focuses on some discrepancies between 
children’s physical categorisation of photographs and their verbal responses. I 
noticed that although some children’s grouping of photographs suggested that they 
were frequently racialising difference, their verbal justification of choices did not 
always reflect this pattern. I also observed on a number of occasions that some 
children’s body language often contradicted their verbal statements. I explore this 
pattern by providing excerpts from the interview with Natalie, a five-year-old girl, as 
her responses and body language were most indicative of this tendency.  
 
  The third section, titled How do children draw lines in their racialisation of 
difference? focuses on some participants’ inclinations to disregard individual   162
differences between children in the photographs. I have observed that children who 
focused heavily on skin and hair colour characteristics, used a broad category of 
‘whiteness’ and ‘blackness’ in their verbal statements and often described all 
children from a non European-Australian background as being “all the same”, 
ignoring quite obvious variations in their skin tones. These participants often put the 
photographs of Chinese children with relatively light skin, Aboriginal children with 
light skin and blond hair and Indian and Aboriginal children with quite dark skin and 
dark brown or black hair in the same group and described them as “black” or “brown 
people”.  
 
Not all participants emphasised similarities/differences among children in the 
photographs along a simple ‘black’/‘white’ line. These participants’ perception of 
difference seemed to be more context specific, as they targeted certain groups, such 
as for example Aboriginal children and perceived them as being “all the same”. I 
provide a number of excerpts from the interview transcripts that most clearly 
illustrate all these trends. 
 
What criteria do children use in constructing their understanding of difference? 
 
Table 1.1 presented on the following page demonstrates participants’ 
perception of difference in relation to the photographs of children who represented 
three groups commonly defined in Australia as European-Australians, Asian-
Australians and Aboriginal-Australians. This table illustrates children’s verbal 
responses only. It does not tell us, however, what children said and how these 
responses related to their physical categorisation of photographs. In order to explore   163
these aspects in more detail I discuss them as part of the analysis of individual 
transcripts. 
 
 
Table 1.1 
 
Perception of difference – frequency of verbal responses in 
relation to different characteristics  
Characteristics commonly 
associated with ‘race’ 
Other characteristics  Do not 
know 
Age / name of 
child 
 
 
  Skin 
colour 
Facial 
characteri
ctics or   
expression 
Group 
belonging 
Hair 
colour  
 
Gender Hair 
length 
Clothing
/Jewelle
ry 
 
Ella 3yrs 9mths  xxxxx              x 
Cassie 3 yrs 
9mths 
xx       xxxx       
Patrick 3yrs 
6mths 
x     xxx     xx   
Dane 3 yrs  
4 mths 
     xx      xxxx 
 
Cleo 5 yrs  
5 mths 
x xx    x xxx     
Natalie 5 yrs  
0 mths 
xxx     xxx      xx   
Chris 5 yrs  
6 mths 
xx     x xxxxx
x 
    
George 5 yrs  
4 mths 
xxxxx
x 
           
 
Lisa 7 yrs  
4 mths 
xxx xx  x  xx xx    x   
Simone 7 yrs  
1 mth 
xxxx       xxxx      
Adam 7 yrs  
4 mths 
xxxxx
xx 
  xxxx     x   
Scott 7 yrs  
3 mths 
xx xxxxx  xx  xx    xx  xx  
 
 
 
The table reveals that children verbally referred to a number of differentiating 
criteria. The most common ones were those typically associated with ‘race’ as well 
as gender; others included more transitory characteristics. These criteria, however,   164
were emphasised by different children to a different degree. All the participants, 
including the youngest 3 year olds, verbally referred to physical ‘racial’ 
characteristics. However, some of them did it far more frequently than others. The 
most commonly used characteristic, which is typically associated with ‘race’, was 
skin colour. The transcripts of the interviews demonstrate that children referred to it 
as “face colour”, “colour of cheeks” or “colour of skin”. Another colour cue, on 
which some children focused, was hair colour. It can be argued that hair colour can 
be understood in ‘racialised’ terms as black hair is typically associated with ‘Asian 
background’ (for example Chinese or Indian), or with Aboriginal people, while 
blond/fair hair is linked with Anglo-Saxon or Slavic origin. Hair colour therefore has 
been categorised in this study as a common sense ‘racial’ cue. Some older children 
also used a category of group belonging (“they might be Aboriginal”), or made 
references to people’s place of origin (they might be “coming from another 
country”). Another characteristic, which was mentioned by a number of children, 
referred to facial features such as shape of the eyes or face. It was interesting to 
notice that for some children, regardless of age, ‘race’ was not more salient than 
gender or other less permanent attributes such as clothing, hair length or jewellery. 
However, those who consistently emphasised ‘race’ during categorising tasks rarely 
mentioned other differentiating criteria. This was particularly true for 3 year old Ella, 
5 year old Natalie and George and 7 year old Adam, Scot and Lisa.  
 
Although characteristics commonly associated with ‘race’ were used by 
participants of all ages, table 1.1 demonstrates that older participants verbally 
referred to these attributes more frequently. It is important to note here that the above 
table needs to be complemented by more descriptive analysis of the interviews, as   165
sometimes children’s verbal statements did not match their physical categorisation of 
photographs. Furthermore, in some cases, children’s verbal responses appeared to be 
contradicted by their body language. 
 
The following excerpts from a number of interviews describe in more depth 
and detail how the participants constructed differences and similarities among 
various children presented to them in the sets of photographs and how they viewed 
these children in relation to themselves. This is illustrated by the description of their 
physical categorisation of photographs as well as their verbal responses. The 
excerpts also provide descriptions of the children’s body language, which included 
gestures and facial expressions, and whether their responses were prompt or 
preceded by frequent hesitations. The following presentation of data has been 
organised to illuminate a number of general patterns within the research themes that 
emerged in individual cases, with the emphasis on some changes in dimensions and 
meanings that were observed in relation to age.  
 
Cassie (3 years 9 months old girl)  
 
During my interview with Cassie I observed that she predominantly used 
gender as a differentiating characteristic. In some cases, however, she also referred 
to features commonly associated with ‘race’. For example, this is what she stated 
when dealing with the photographs of a European-Australian girl with light hair, an 
Indian girl and an Aboriginal boy (both of them with quite dark skin): 
 
This one is different (a European-Australian girl), because she  
has white hair and white cheeks and neck. These two are the same    166
(an Indian girl and an Aboriginal boy), because they have black  
hair, black necks, ears and arms. 
I: How do you know that he (an Aboriginal boy) has  
black arms? He has a long sleeve jumper on? 
C: I know. He is black all over. 
 
Cassie seemed to have developed a clear understanding that skin colour is a 
feature of people’s physical appearance, which applies to their whole body, 
including those parts that are covered with clothes. Regardless of this understanding, 
however, skin colour did not seem to dominate Casie’s construction of difference, as 
during this part of the interview she only mentioned skin colour one more time. This 
happened when she contrasted a European-Australian boy with an Aboriginal boy 
and a Chinese girl: “He is different, because he has white cheeks and neck”.  
 
Similarly to the above, during the self-categorising tasks, Cassie also used 
characteristics associated with ‘race’ quite infrequently. Her perception of difference 
in relation to self and others seemed to be dominated by gender. She placed all the 
six photographs of boys on the ‘not like me circle’ and stated in relation to each of 
them that “he is not like me because he is a boy”. In relation to the photographs of 
girls, she placed four of them on the ‘like me’ circle. This set of photos included two 
European-Australian girls and two Aboriginal girls (one of them with blond hair and 
light skin and another with dark hair and skin). When justifying her choices in 
relation to these girls, along with gender, Cassie also used characteristics such as hair 
and skin colour. She stated that the European-Australian girl with dark hair was like 
her, because “she is a girl and has white arms and face” and the other three girls 
looked like her because they had “blond hair like me”. Interestingly, while one of the 
Aboriginal girls had dark hair, Cassie still classified her as being blond. She also did   167
not mention here the difference in skin complexion between herself and this 
Aboriginal girl, although she demonstrated her ability to notice such difference in 
relation to the Chinese as well as an Indian girl (the only two girls whom she 
classified as ‘not like me’). While dealing with the photographs of these two girls, 
Cassie stated that “They are not like me, because they’ve got black everything: black 
arms, black nose, hair and cheeks”. It is interesting that the skin and hair colour 
characteristics were not applied consistently during this part of the interview. As I 
stated before, Cassie neither mentioned them in relation to the Aboriginal girl with 
dark hair and complexion nor in relation to any of the boys during the self-
categorising tasks. It seemed that Cassie’s perception of difference was dominated 
by gender. Although ‘race’ was not salient in this process, it has to be noted that 
‘race’ related characteristics played some role during the categorisation of girls. 
Gender and skin colour were the only two characteristics Cassie used during this part 
of the interview.  
 
Patrick (3 years 6 months old boy) 
 
In a similar way to Cassie, Patrick also responded to gender  as well as ‘race’ 
related characteristics. However, unlike Cassie, who used them during both 
categorising tasks, Patrick used gender only during the self-categorising task. During 
the task of categorising other children, Patrick verbally referred mainly to hair 
colour, although he also mentioned twice some more transitory characteristics such 
as clothing. Skin colour was mentioned only once in relation to an Indian boy and an 
Aboriginal girl whom Patrick described as having “brown skin” and whom he 
contrasted with a European-Australian girl. This may suggest that skin colour did not   168
play an important role in Patrick’s construction of difference. His physical 
categorisation of the photographs during this task, however, may suggest otherwise, 
as six times out of six, he consistently contrasted European-Australian children with 
those of Indian, Aboriginal or Chinese origin. I found such strong consistency quite 
fascinating. It appeared to me that although not confirmed verbally, skin colour was 
for Patrick an important differentiating feature. I observed that, when possible, he 
mentioned hair colour differences, but when this criterion did not apply (as all 
children in a given triad had similar hair colour), he used colour of clothing.  In the 
last triad, Patrick was not able to use any of the above, as all children in these 
photographs had dark hair and the colours of clothes of the Indian boy and the 
Aboriginal girl (whom Patrick grouped together) did not match. In this particular 
case Patrick referred to a skin colour difference. As I stated before, Patrick’s verbal 
responses appeared to suggest that skin colour did not dominate his construction of 
difference. His physical categorisation of photos, however, seemed to indicate the 
opposite. This contradictory evidence makes it difficult to draw any conclusions. It is 
possible that Patrick was generally sensitive to colour cues and in each of the triads 
used that colour characteristic that was most apparent for him. Similarities in hair or 
colour of clothing could have been more apparent to him than resemblance in skin 
colour. However, it is also possible that Patrick used the skin colour characteristics 
much more often, but he did not express it verbally.  
 
Interestingly, during the self-categorising task, Patrick did not use any other 
differentiating features but gender. He placed all the boys on the ‘like me circle’ and 
stated that “All the girls are not like me, because they are girls”. One of the possible 
interpretations of this pattern is that Patrick started developing his gender awareness   169
and for that reason gender related characteristics dominated his construction of 
difference between self and others.  
    
Dane (3 years 4 months old boy) 
 
Dane, the youngest child in my study, appeared to consistently group the 
photographs of children on the basis of ‘race’ related characteristics, although his 
verbal responses did not clearly reflect this tendency. When categorizing the 
photographs presented to him in triads, he physically separated European-Australian 
children from Aboriginal-Australian or Asian-Australians five times out of six. 
However, most of the time, he was unable to clearly explain what differentiating 
characteristics he was using. When asked, he repeatedly responded “I do not know” 
or “I am not sure”. He referred to hair colour twice and unlike Patrick, he did not 
mention skin colour at all. The following example illustrates this tendency:  
 
Interviewer: Could you tell me which of these three children  
(a European-Australian girl with light hair, and two Chinese 
children, a girl and a boy) is different? 
Dane: This one (picks up a photo of a European-Australian girl). 
I: Why is that Dane? 
D: Because these two (Chinese children) have black hair. 
I: And this one? (points to the European-Australian girl) 
D: No, she has white hair. 
I: I see. So, this is the reason (Dane nods). 
I: Could you have a look at these photos now (presents photos of a  
European-Australian girl with dark hair, and a pair of Indian children)? 
Which of these three children is different?  
D: This one is different (points to the European-Australian girl 
with dark hair) 
I: Why is this child different?  
D: Because she has black hair? 
I: Yes, she does. But what about the other two children?  
What is the colour of their hair? 
D: They all have black hair. 
I: Do they?   170
D: Nods his head 
I: So which one is different?  
D: This one (points again to the European-Australian girl). 
I: Why is she different? 
D: I do not know. 
I: Don’t you? Never mind. 
 
 
Although Dane did not specifically refer to skin colour characteristics, I had a 
feeling that he was really using them, as in the above example he consistently 
pointed to European-Australian girls as being different to Chinese as well as to 
Indian children. He responded in a similar manner to all but one triad, presented to 
him during this part of the interview. It seemed that he used criteria commonly 
related to ‘race’ during the process of categorizing. However, most of the time, he 
appeared not to be able to verbalise it. It can be argued that Dane, like Patrick, was 
quite sensitive to skin colour cues, but he ‘felt’ these differences more than he 
understood them. For that reason, although he applied these cues time after time 
during the physical categorisation, such consistency was not matched by his verbal 
responses. 
 
Ella (3 years 9 months old girl) 
 
In contrast to Patrick and Dane, Ella consistently referred to ‘race’ related 
characteristics during her justification of choices. Her verbal responses matched her 
physical categorisation of photographs. Interestingly, she not only used 
characteristics commonly associated with ‘race’ to differentiate between the 
photographs, but also spontaneously stated her dislike towards children whom she 
perceived as being ‘racially’ different. The following example illustrates this 
tendency:   171
 
Interviewer: Could you tell me which one of these three children  
(a European-Australian girl with light hair and two Chinese children, 
 a girl and a boy) is different and which two are similar?  
Ella: I do not like this one (pointing to a Chinese girl and at the  
same time, placing the photographs of both Chinese children  on  
top of one another and turning them over, as if not wanting to see them). 
I: Oh, don’t you? (photographs turned over again). But tell me, which  
one of them is different? 
E: These two are different (pointing to the two Chinese children). 
I: These two are different or similar? 
E: They are different… They are not like me and I do not like to play 
with them (she places the two photos on top of each other again and  
pushes them away from herself ). 
I: Oh, I see (spreading the photographs in front of the participant).  
But tell me, are these two different from that one  
(pointing to the European-Australian girl)? 
E: Pauses, looks at the photographs closely for a while. Yeah… 
I: Yeah? And why is that? 
E: Looks at the photos, pauses, sticks her tongue out and says:  
wah, wah, wah while picking up the two photographs and placing them  
on top of each other again. 
I: You do not know?  
E: Shakes her head. 
I: That’s OK. 
 
It is interesting how Ella used the word ‘different’ in the above example. 
Although she was asked to point to the child who was different in relation to the 
other two in this triad, she appeared to make comparisons to herself. She also seemed 
to apply the term ‘different’ to the non European-Australian children. It seemed that 
the different ones were the ‘others’ and the same ones were ‘like me’. Ella used the 
word ‘different’ in a similar manner most of the time during this part of the 
interview. I also found it interesting that although not asked about her social 
preferences in relation to children presented to her in the photographs during this 
part of the interview, Ella voluntarily verbalised here her dislike towards the children 
from Chinese background and classified them as different not only to the European-
Australian child whose photograph was included in this triad, but also to herself.   172
Even though she did not explain here what differentiating characteristics she used, I 
felt that it was related either to skin or to hair colour.  Her next response in relation 
to the set of photographs of a European-Australian girl with dark hair and two Indian 
children (a girl and a boy) confirmed my prediction: 
 
Interviewer: Which of these children is different, which two are similar? 
Ella: I like this one (pointing to the European-Australian girl with  
dark hair). I do not like these two (pointing to the Indian children  
and pushing them away). 
I: Don’t you? But tell me, which of these children is different? 
E: These two are different (Indian children).  
I: Why are they different? 
E: Because I would like to play with her (pointing to the photo  
of the Euro-Australian girl, picking it up and starting playing with it  
by sliding across the table). 
I: Oh, would you? But tell me, why is this one not like the  
other two? 
E: Because see… (points to the photos) they have black skin. 
I: Oh, I see. And this one doesn’t? 
E: Nope. 
 
Ella responded in a similar way to the rest of the photographs that were 
presented to her in the sets of three. She consistently stated that she would not like to 
play with the children whom she perceived as having a different skin colour to hers 
and also used this characteristic to differentiate between children in each set. She did 
not mention any other characteristics during this part of the interview. It appeared 
that her construction of difference was heavily influenced by ‘race’. It is possible to 
conclude that this type of response was due to her immature cognition and inability 
to decentre or to coordinate more than one characteristic at the time during the 
process of categorisation. However, her spontaneously expressed dislike towards 
non-European children seemed to suggest that her focus on characteristics commonly 
associated with ‘race’ was a result of social influences rather than developmental 
factors.   173
George (5 years 4 months old boy) 
 
  Similar emphases on physical characteristics such as skin colour were also 
found amongst some of the older children. For example George consistently used 
these cues in all triads presented to him. He did not mention any other differentiating 
attributes including gender, despite the fact that each triad of the photographs 
included boys and girls. Unlike Dane and Patrick, George’s physical categorisation 
of photos was consistently matched by his verbal justification of choices. In every 
triad, he contrasted European-Australian children with those of Chinese, Aboriginal 
and Indian origin regardless of the combination of the photographs. In his verbal 
responses he referred in each case to skin colour differences. This is an example of 
those responses: 
 
  Interviewer: Could you tell me which of these photographs are similar 
 or  different  (presents photos of a European-Australin girl with dark skin 
  and a mixed gender pair of Indian children)? 
  Goeorge: This one is different (a European-Australian girl). These two  
are the same. They have dark skin. 
I: And what about these children (presents a European-Australian girl 
with blond hair and a mixed gender pair of Aboriginal children with  
dark hair and complexion)?  
G: They are the same (points to Aboriginal children) cause they have  
dark skin. 
I: Aha. And these ones (presents a triad of a European-Australian boy  
with dark hair and a pair of Chinese children of mixed gender)? 
G: This one is different (points to the European-Australian boy). He does  
not have dark skin. 
I: I see. And these ones (points to a European-Australian girl with dark 
hair, an Indian boy and an Aboriginal girl with dark hair and skin)? 
G: These ones are the same (points to the Aboriginal girl and an Indian  
boy). They have dark skin … black skin. 
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Chris (5 years 6 months old boy) 
 
  Unlike George, Chris used mainly gender during this process of 
categorisation. However, on occasions when some additional triads, from which 
gender was deliberately eliminated, were presented to Chris, he also referred to skin 
colour characteristics. I found it interesting that on these occasions, he seemed to 
ignore quite significant variations in skin tones and divided the photographs along a 
simple ‘black-white’ category. This tendency was observed in relation to some of the 
other participants of the study and will be discussed in more detail in the further 
section of this chapter. 
 
Cleo (5 years 5 months old girl) 
 
Like Chris, Cleo also seemed to focus on gender when differentiating among 
children presented to her in the photographs. In each of the six triads, she physically 
separated girls from boys. Unlike Chris, however, she also verbally responded to a 
number of other cues, such as hair length and style, or face expression. At the very 
beginning of the interview she also used skin colour as a differentiating feature.  
 
Interviewer: Could you tell me, which of these two go together  
and which one is different (presents photographs of a European-Australian  
girl with blond hair and blue eyes  and two Chinese children, a girl and a 
boy)?  
Cleo: That one (Cleo smiles and points to the photo of a European- 
Australian girl). 
I: That one is different?  Why is that? 
C: Because it hasn’t got a black face. 
I: Because she hasn’t got a black face? 
C: A brown face. 
I: A brown face?  Okay, so where are we going to put it?  
Are we going to put the different one on the circle with a flower?   175
C: Shakes her head and points to the plain circle.  
I: You would like to put the different one on the plain circle. I see. 
That’s OK. So this one is different because she hasn’t got a brown face.   
C: Nods. 
 
During the rest of this part of the interview Cleo did not mention skin colour 
again. Instead, she mainly used hair length and style as well as facial 
expression to justify her choices: 
 
Interviewer: Could you please look at these photographs  
(a European-Australian girl with dark hair and two Indian  
children, a girl and a boy )and tell me which of these two go  
together and which one is different?   
Cleo: These two go together because they’ve both got long hairs  
(points to the photographs of a European girl & an Indian 
girl). 
I: Because they’ve both got long hair.  Right. And this  
one (pointing to the photo of an Indian boy)? 
C: He has short hair. 
I: Yes he does. You are right. 
And if you looked at these three photos, which of these two go 
together and which one is different (presents photographs of a  
European-Australian girl with blond hair and two Aboriginal  
children with rather dark skin, a girl and a boy)?  
C: These two go together (puts the photos of a European- 
Australian girl and an Aboriginal girl together, laughs). 
I: Why do they go together, these two? 
C: ‘Cos … hesitates … this one has got short hair 
(points to the photo of the Aboriginal girl whose hair is  
similar in length to the other girl’s, she then looks 
at the photo of the Aboriginal boy whose hair is also short) 
Points to the photograph of an Aboriginal boy and says: 
He looks like he has an angry face (drops head slightly,  
stops smiling, wipes hair out of face). 
I: Mm, so this one is different?   
C: Nods  
I: I see? 
And you think he looks like he’s got an angry face? 
C: Yes (nods).   
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I found it interesting how Cleo justified her choice in the above example. As 
she could not use hair length as a differentiating feature here, because all children in 
this triad had short hair, she used another characteristic; she chose facial expression 
and described it in derogatory terms. The way she physically grouped the 
photographs here suggested at the first glance that, although not verbally stated, 
Cleo’s perception of difference was dominated by gender. At the same time, 
however, when separating the Aboriginal boy from the girls, her face changed. She 
stopped smiling and stated that he “had an angry face”. This happened every time 
Cleo came across the photograph of this Aboriginal boy. 
 
Interviewer: Now which of these three children (a European-Australian girl, 
a Chinese girl and an Aboriginal boy with dark skin) go together  
and which one is different?  
Cleo: These two go together (points to a European-Australian girl  
and a Chinese girl; looks at the interviewer and smiles).  
I: Those two go together. And why is that? 
C: He’s got short hair (looks at the photo of an Aboriginal  
boy, stops smiling and points to it). 
I: Because he’s got short hair? 
C: Cleo nods without a smile and says: And an angry face again. 
And that’s why (emphatically points to the photo). 
 
  I had a feeling that, although not clearly articulated, Cleo perceived this boy 
in racialised terms. The consistent change in her facial expression every time she 
looked at his photo may suggest that she was feeling uneasy about discussing it. It is 
difficult to draw a conclusion here about the nature of such uneasiness. As another 
child, Natalie, also appeared apprehensive when talking about certain choices, I will 
discuss this further in the later part of this chapter. 
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Adam (7 years 4 months old boy) 
 
  Unlike Cleo, Adam appeared relaxed when discussing differences amongst 
children. The salience of ‘race’ was quite evident in Adam’s case, as he applied skin 
colour cues, both verbally as well as during the physical categorisation, to every triad 
of photographs presented to him. On a few occasions he also commented on hair and 
eye colour as well as clothing. These characteristics, however, were always 
accompanied by comments about differences in skin complexion. For example, when 
presented with the photographs of two Chinese children, a girl and a boy, and a 
European-Australian girl with light hair, Adam responded in the following way: 
 
Adam: These two children go together (putting the photographs of 
two Chinese children aside), because they have brownish colour,  
and this one hasn’t (pointing to the European-Australian girl).  
Interviewer: These two have brownish…? 
A: Face, and these two have black hair and this one has white. 
Interviewer: OK, and this one (points to the European-Australian  
girl) has got…? 
A: White face. 
 
When dealing with the photographs of a Kurdish girl, an Aboriginal boy with 
dark skin and a European-Australian girl with light hair, he also used skin colour as a 
categorising feature. This is what he stated: 
 
These two go together (pointing to the Aboriginal boy with dark  
skin and a Kurdish girl with similar skin complexion) and this one  
doesn’t (the European-Australian girl) , because they have the same  
colour T-shirts and they both have the same skin and hair and this is  
‘brownish colour’ and this one has got a different T-shirt and white 
hair and skin. 
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Similarly, in relation to the photographs of the European-Australian girl with 
light hair and two Aboriginal children (a girl and a boy) with rather dark skin, Adam 
noted: 
 
This one is different (pointing to the European-Australian girl).  
And these two go together (points to Aboriginal children). 
Interviewer: And why is that? 
A: Because these two (Aboriginal children) have brownish colour 
and this one has white (European-Australian girl). These two have  
brown hair and faces and this one has white face and hair. These two  
have the same hair and the same face and this one has a white face and  
white hair. 
 
 
  The above excerpts demonstrate that Adam constructed difference between 
children in racialised terms. Interestingly, however, the next part of the interview 
revealed that this construction was rather idiosyncratic. This was particularly clear 
when he compared children in the photographs to himself. The first two photographs 
that Adam selected from all of them presented to him at the same time were those of 
an Aboriginal boy with light skin and a European-Australian boy. The latter looked 
very much like Adam. Interestingly however, the first photo was placed on the ‘like 
me’ circle while the second, on the ‘not like me’ circle. I was puzzled. To make sure 
that Adam understood me correctly I pointed to the photos selected by him and 
repeated my question. Adam looked at the photographs again, nodded and confirmed 
his initial choice. I found this quite fascinating, as the European-Australian boy 
looked almost like Adam’s mirror image. Interestingly, it was the same child whom 
Adam classified at the beginning of our interview as someone who did not look like 
anybody he had ever seen before. When asked why these children looked/did not 
look like him, Adam explained: 
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He (an Aboriginal boy with light skin) has brown eyes and he  
has the same colour of skin as me and this one is not like me  
(a European-Australian boy, who looked very much like Adam)  
because he has freckles and I don’t (Adam did have freckles) he’s 
got whitish hair, I have blond (both boys had very similar hair  
colour), and he’s got whitish…(looks at his arm, hesitates)… 
he’s got dark whitish face… and I have brownish white (in  
reality there was hardly any difference between their skin tone).  
 
It is interesting to see how Adam justified his choice. It appeared that his way 
of constructing difference was idiosyncratic, as it did not reflect quite a striking 
resemblance between the European-Australian boy and Adam. He seemed to see 
what he wanted to see and for that reason he amplified some of the nearly non-
existent differences, while at the same time ignored other differentiating features. As 
Adam believed that the boy in the photograph was not like him, he perceived his 
skin as having a different colour to his own, although in reality they were very 
similar. At the same time he dismissed the resemblance in their hair colour and the 
fact that they both had quite apparent freckles. In order to justify his position he used 
some very sophisticated words such as “dark whitish” and “brownish white” to 
describe the subtle, nearly non-existent differences between their hair colour and 
skin complexion.  
 
The other photographs that Adam chose as looking like him were those of 
another Aboriginal boy, a dark hair European-Australian boy and a Kurdish boy. I 
asked Adam to explain his selection to me. He looked at the photographs for quite a 
while. He then changed his mind and classified the Aboriginal and Kurdish boys as 
different from him. When I asked him to explain his decision, he stated that the two 
boys had different colour skin and hair than he had. After that, he also placed a 
photograph of the Chinese boy on the ‘not like me’ circle, mentioning that his hair   180
and “brownish face” were different to his own. I had a sense that Adam originally 
linked the perception of who was like him and who was not to his playmate 
preferences and my prediction was confirmed in the second part of the interview, 
which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 
Adam has picked up all the photographs of girls as looking different from 
him. When asked to justify his choices, he used gender characteristics. He explained 
that they had “girl faces”. However, he also made comments about differences in 
skin, hair and eye colour in comparison to his own. Similar to his remarks about skin 
colour during the first part of the interview, he classified all girls from Aboriginal-
Australian and Asian-Australian background as having “brown” or “brownish” skin.  
 
It is interesting to note that while gender was not used as a category for 
classifying other children during the first part of the interview, during this self-
categorising task it became quite a distinct feature. It appeared that Adam’s 
perception of difference during this self-categorising task was dominated by his own 
gender identity. I noticed a similar pattern during the interviews with some of the 
three and five year old children. I had a strong sense that Adam would also use 
gender as a category for his social preferences. My data only partially supported my 
prediction, for while gender cues had a strong impact on Adam’s playmate 
preferences, characteristics typically associated with ‘race’ (for example skin colour) 
and Adam’s personal previous experiences appeared equally important. A detailed 
description of Adam’s playmate preferences will be provided in the next chapter. 
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Simone (7 years 1 month old girl) 
 
Simone emphasised both gender and ‘racial’ characteristics during self-
categorising as well as in the categorising others task. The criteria that she used in 
relation to the same children presented in different sets of photographs, however, 
were not always consistent. For example, when discussing a set of three photographs 
(a European-Australian girl with blond hair and two Chinese children, a girl and a 
boy), she stated the following: 
 
This one is different (pointing to the photo of a Chinese boy).  
Interviewer: Why is this one different?  
S: Because these two are girls and this one is a boy. 
 
However, when presented with the photographs of the same Chinese children 
and a European-Australian girl with dark hair, Simone stated: 
 
  These two go together (points to two Chinese children). 
  Interviewer: Why do these two go together? 
  S: They look a bit like the same.  
  I: Do they? Why? 
  S: The skin… 
  I: The skin? What about it? 
  S: It is a bit darker than this one (points to a European- 
Australian girl with dark hair). 
I: I see.  
 
It seemed interesting how in the first case Simone focused on gender cues 
and in the second one her attention shifted to skin colour. I also observed an 
interesting pattern in relation to Simone’s perception of Aboriginal children: 
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I: What could you tell me about these photos (a European-Australian  
girl with blond hair, a Kurdish girl and an Aboriginal boy with dark skin)? 
S: These two photos go together (selects a Kurdish girl and European-
Australian girl). 
I: Why do they go together? 
S: Because they are both girls and because this boy’s skin is a bit  
darker than the girls’. 
I: I see. So these girls have lighter skin than this boy (points to the  
photos; the Kurdish girl and the Aboriginal boy have very similar skin  
complexion) right? 
S: Looks at the photograph of Aboriginal boy for a while, then looks  
at the camera. She then nods and says: Yes. 
I: So these two girls are similar (points to the European-Australian  
girl with blond hair and the Kurdish girl with dark hair and skin). 
S: Looks at the camera for a while; smiles and says: Yes. 
I: And these children? What can you tell me about those three (presents 
photos of a European-Australian girl with dark hair, a Kurdish boy with 
rather dark skin and hair and an Aboriginal girl with dark hair and skin). 
S: These two go together (a European-Australian girl and a Kurdish boy) 
and this one is different (an Aboriginal girl). 
I: Why? 
S: Because her skin is darker. 
I: Is it? So this one is different, because her skin is darker (Aboriginal girl).  
S: Mhm (looks away). 
I: And these two (points to the European-Australian girl with light  
complexion and the Kurdish boy  whose skin is quite dark) are similar? 
S: Looks a the photos again, hesitates, starts nodding, looks again and says: 
This one (Kurdish boy) is a little bit darker. 
 
 
It appeared that Simone constructed her image of Aboriginal children as 
belonging to a separate category and for that reason she experienced difficulty in 
noticing any similarities between them and children whom she perceived as not 
belonging to this group. Such construction of difference led Simone to dismissing 
some quite apparent similarities and differences in skin complexion among the 
Kurdish, Aboriginal and European-Australian children. Like Adam, whom I 
discussed previously, Simone tended to magnify or dismiss certain features, to fit 
them into her understanding of difference, which appeared idiosyncratic. 
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Scot (7 years 3 months old boy) 
 
Another child, Scot, used a number of characteristics commonly associated 
with ‘race’ during the categorising tasks. These included hair colour, group 
belonging, facial expression and skin complexion. However, he only referred to the 
latter in relation to Aboriginal children. For example, this is what he said in relation 
to a European-Australian girl with blond hair and two Aboriginal children (a girl and 
a boy with quite dark skin): 
 
Scot: These two go together (points to the Aboriginal children). 
Interviewer: Could you tell me why? 
S: Because they look like they both are … (hesitates) Aboriginals. 
I: Aha! How do you know that? 
S: Because of the colour of their skin 
I: I see. And what colour is it? 
S: Brown. 
I: Mm… 
S: … and this one’s white (points to the blond European-Australian  
girl). 
I: OK.  
S: She has white skin. 
I: Aha. Is there anything else that makes her different? 
S: No. 
 
Scot responded in the same manner when he was presented with another 
triad, which included two Aboriginal boys (one with significantly lighter skin than 
the other) and a European-Australian girl with dark hair. He grouped the two 
Aboriginal boys together regardless of the quite obvious difference in their skin tone. 
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Scot did not mention skin colour characteristics in relation to any other 
children in the photographs, but referred to a number of other characteristics 
typically associated with ‘race’: 
Interviewer: Could you please tell me which of these three  
children in the photographs (a European-Australian girl with  
blond hair, and a mixed gender pair of Chinese children)  
is different and which of them go together? 
Scot: These two go together (points to the photographs of  
Chinese children). 
I: These two? 
S: Nods. 
I: Why do they go together? 
S: Because they look like brother & sister. 
I: Aha! Why do they look like brother and sister? 
What makes them look like that? 
S: Their faces and their hair. 
I: What about their faces? 
S: They look very similar. They um … their eyes … 
And they are happy looking …(both of these children did 
not smile, while the European-Australian girl had a broad smile). 
I: Right! So what makes this girl (European-Australian) look  
different.  
S: It’s [she has] … blond hair. 
 
It appeared that although Scot did not use any specific labels this time, he 
perceived the two Chinese children and the European-Australian child as belonging 
to two different groups. Later on, his response to the same Chinese children and a 
European-Australian girl with dark hair seemed to confirm this: 
 
Interviewer: Which of these three children go together? 
Scot: These two (points to Chinese children), because they have black  
eyes and hair. And they are not smiling. 
I: OK. But have a look at this child (European-Australian girl). Have  
a look at her hair and eyes.  
S: They are black. (moves his eyes from one photograph to  
another). Those are black [as well]… (hesitates)… But it’s [she is] 
smiling (points to European-Australian girl). Those two aren’t. 
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It is interesting to see how Scot justified his choice. First he used the hair and 
eye colour criteria. As in this case, all the children had black eyes and hair, he looked 
for another characteristic. Although earlier on Scot described the Chinese children as 
‘happy looking’, this time he stated that the lack of a broad smile differentiated them 
from the European-Australian girl. It appeared that to him, the Chinese children had 
some distinct characteristics, which made them different from the other child in this 
triad. As he was not able to clearly explain what he meant, he used some transitory 
features such as subtle differences in facial expression. It seemed that being unable 
to apply hair and eye colour criteria created an obstacle for Scot that was not easy to 
overcome. 
 
Other parts of this interview also demonstrated that Scot found some of the 
categorising tasks more challenging than others. In such cases he hesitated frequently 
and, like in the example above, emphasised some less permanent characteristics such 
as facial expression, or length of hair to justify his choices. The following examples 
illustrate this tendency: 
 
Interviewer: What about these three children (presents photographs  
of a European-Australian girl with blond hair, a Kurdish girl and  
an Aboriginal boy with dark skin). 
Scot: Mm … (hesitates for quite a while) 
I: Decisions, decisions… 
S: These two go together (a European and a Kurdish girl). 
I: Why do you think they go together? 
S: Because they have longer hair than that one (points to an Aboriginal  
boy). 
I: OK. That’s right; he has short hair.  
Is there anything else apart from the hair? 
S: Mm (hesitates)… 
These two also go together (points to the Kurdish girl and  
an Aboriginal boy). 
I: I see. Could you tell me why do you think so? 
S: They are not smiling   186
I: Yes you are right. 
… 
I: And could you tell me about these three children 
(presents photos of a European-Australian girl with dark  
hair; a Kurdish boy and an Aboriginal girl with dark skin)? 
S: Looks for a while moving his eyes backwards and forwards 
from one photo to another. These two go together  
(a Kurdish boy and an Aboriginal girl) because they are smiling. 
S: And this one (points to the European-Australian girl who is 
also smiling … hesitates for a while). She is smiling, but not  
showing any teeth. These two are smiling and showing teeth. 
 
It was obvious to me that Scot was experiencing some difficulties during the 
above categorising tasks. Perhaps his problem was linked to the fact that the above 
triads did not allow him to categorise the children into clearly defined groups such as 
the Aboriginal or Chinese children who earlier on were presented to him in sets with 
European-Australian children. When faced with the challenge of comparing children 
from more than two groups, he repeatedly used characteristics such as hair length or 
facial expression. These features did not always fit neatly in different combinations 
of photographs and hence the difficulty expressed through hesitation and change of 
criteria. I observed that in these situations he demonstrated some flexibility in his 
ability to categorise the children in more than one way. Perhaps the challenge of not 
being able to use the criterion of group belonging required looking for other options. 
This, however, has proven not to be easy for Scot. This example seems to point to 
the importance of presenting children with sets of photographs that include a variety 
of characteristics to avoid rigid choices that are made as a result of lack of any other 
possibilities. 
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Natalie (5 years old girl) 
 
Like Scot, Natalie, also experienced difficulties during some parts of the 
categorising tasks.  Her problems, however, seemed to have a slightly different 
focus. During the physical categorisation of photographs Natalie consistently 
contrasted European-Australian children with those of an Asian or Aboriginal 
background, regardless of the combination of the photographs. When presented with 
a set of photographs of three children, an Indian boy and two Aboriginal children (a 
girl and a boy), who all had relatively dark skin, she had difficulty with grouping 
them: 
 
Natalie: These two children go together (an Indian boy and  
an Aboriginal boy). They both got the same skin.   
Interviewer: What about this one  (points to the photograph of  
an Aboriginal girl, whom Natalie categorised before as having  
‘black skin’ similar to the Aboriginal boy). Is she similar to these two? 
N: No, because she’s got a bit of um … like brown there. 
I: Oh, and these two? 
N: Nods her head. 
I: As well? 
N: Nods her head. 
I: Oh, I see. So, which one is different, which two go together? 
N: This one is different (points to the photograph of an Aboriginal girl).  
And these two go together (points to the photographs of the two boys  
and pushes them away). 
I: Why is that? 
N: Because (uses high pitch, baby-like voice; laughs 
and covers her mouth with fists). 
 
Natalie’s body language, her tone of voice and a lack of a clear answer, 
indicated that she experienced difficulty here. In other parts of the interview, she 
used such high pitch, baby-like voice in situations when she was unable to clearly 
explain her choices. In such cases she also hesitated quite frequently and covered her   188
mouth with fists. I felt that the difficulty which Natalie had with explaining her way 
of categorising the above three children, was due to the similarity in their skin 
colour. It is possible that she accentuated this characteristic so much that she was 
unable to see other differentiating features among these children. Perhaps her focus 
on white versus black skin colour made it too difficult to group these children in any 
other way. As I mentioned before, this focus was quite apparent in her physical 
categorisation of the photographs. However, verbally Natalie referred to skin colour 
only in situations when other characteristics (eg. hair colour or hair length or 
clothing) were difficult, or impossible to apply. I had a feeling that this reluctance to 
openly talk about skin colour differences was related to Natalie’s understanding of 
social desirability.  
 
Do children readily talk about differences commonly associated with ‘race’? 
 
Natalie’s unwillingness to discuss skin colour surfaced a number of times 
during the interview. For example, when presented with a triad that included a 
European-Australian girl with light hair and two Chinese children (a girl and a boy) 
Natalie stated the following:  
 
These two go together (pointing to Chinese children). 
Because they’ve got … (hesitates)… both got dark hair. 
 
However, when asked about the same two children in relation to a European-
Australian girl who also had dark hair, this is what she said: 
 
   These two go together (pointing to the Chinese children). 
… They have already been going together.   189
I: That’s right. Why do they go together? 
N: Because they have black hair ….(looks at the photo of the  
European-Australian girl who also had dark hair, hesitates)  
 … and black skin (covers her mouth with fists). 
  
  When dealing with the photographs of a European-Australian girl with light 
hair and two Aboriginal children (a girl and a boy) with rather dark skin, Natalie 
stated: 
  
  These two go together (Aboriginal children), because they  
both have dark blue tops. 
I: Is there anything else that is similar about them? 
N: No (at the same time nods her head[sic], looking at the photos) 
I: No? I see. They have blue tops on… 
N: (keeps looking at photographs)… and they have black skin  
(covers her mouth with fists; looks at the interviewer, as  
if looking for approval). 
I: As well? I see. And why is this one different (pointing  
to the photograph of a European-Australian girl)? 
N: umm …hesitates … it’s got white skin and … um … light hair. 
 
It is important to state here again that Natalie consistently contrasted 
European-Australian children with Asian-Australians or Aboriginal-Australians in 
every set presented to her, regardless of the combination of the photographs. 
However, apart from the above example, she verbally referred to the skin colour 
characteristic only when not being able to use other criteria, such as hair colour or 
type of clothing. Even in the above case, she initially used some transitory 
characteristics such as the colour of clothing. When asked whether there was any 
other difference between these children, Natalie initially said “no”, but nodded at the 
same time. She finally mentioned skin colour, but her body language suggested 
apprehension. During another part of this interview, when dealing with a set of 
photographs of a European-Australian girl with light hair, an Indian girl and an   190
Aboriginal boy, Natalie’s body language seemed to contradict her verbal statement 
again; this time, however, she did not change her initial response: 
 
Natalie: These two go together (pointing to an Indian girl and an  
Aboriginal boy). They both have black hair. 
Interviewer: Is there anything else that makes these two looking  
different from this one (interviewer points to the photograph of a  
European-Australian girl with blond hair)? 
Natalie: No (she nods her head at the same time [sic] and covers her 
mouth with fists while looking at the interviewer). 
 
The above examples indicate that Natalie used physical characteristics 
commonly associated with ‘race’ during the process of categorising others. However, 
her body language, which sometimes contradicted her verbal statements as well as 
the way she answered some of the questions indicated that she was not always at 
ease in talking about them.  
 
This uneasiness was also quite apparent during the initial stage of the 
interview, when Natalie was presented with all the photographs and asked whether 
any of the children looked familiar to her or looked like someone she knew. Natalie 
selected a number of photographs: 
 
N: Points to the photograph of an Aboriginal girl with quite  
dark complexion and says: I know someone who looks like this. 
I: Do you? And what is it that reminds you of that person? 
N: umm … (hesitates for a while) … because they’ve got … 
I: Because they have got … ? 
N: Black skin (covers her mouth with both fists; speaks quite softly).  
‘Cos of her black skin (hangs her head down). 
I: I see. And you also said that you know someone like that (points  
to the photo of a Chinese boy). 
N: Yes, I know someone who looks like that. They both have … 
(hesitates) ) black … (hesitates) hair ( covers her mouth with  
both hands and looks at the interviewer as if seeking approval).   191
I: I see. He has black hair, just like that person that you know. 
N: Nods. 
I: And what about this child (points to the photo of an Indian girl). 
N: Hesitates for a while, looks at interviewer, smiles and says:  
Because it’s got a necklace. 
I: Oh, so you know someone who wears a necklace like that. 
N: Yes (smiles). 
 
  Natalie further selected three more photographs (two of them of European-
Australian children and one of them of an Aboriginal girl with dark skin). As in the 
previous example, when Natalie used a necklace as a categorising feature, in relation 
to the last three, she also applied transitory characteristics such as hair length or 
colour and type of clothing. When talking about these four children Natalie smiled 
and answered quite promptly. Natalie’s body language and lack of hesitation in 
relation to these last photographs seemed to indicate that she found talking about 
such fleeting characteristics quite easy. This was quite in contrast with her earlier 
responses, which related to characteristics such as skin or hair colour. While talking 
about these latter characteristics, Natalie, similarly to her responses in other parts of 
the interview, hesitated frequently and covered her mouth with her fists. This 
suggested to me that discussing openly characteristics that are typically associated 
with ‘race’ was something that Natalie tried to avoid.  
 
Interestingly, during the later part of the interview, when asked to compare 
the children in the photographs to herself, Natalie seemed to use mainly gender as a 
differentiating characteristic, as she classified all boys as looking “not like her”. 
When justifying her choices in relation to the photographs of boys, she spoke with 
confidence and answered questions with no hesitation, stating consistently that they   192
did not look like her, as they were boys. No other differentiating characteristics were 
mentioned in relation to boys: 
 
Interviewer: Does this child look like you (points to a  
photo of a Chinese boy)? 
Natalie: Umm … No (shakes head). 
I: Why not?  
N: He is a boy (smiles). 
I: How about this one? (points to an Indian boy). 
N: No (answers very quickly). 
I: Why not? 
N: It’s a boy (smiles). 
I: Oh, OK. How about this one? (points to European- 
Australian boy with light hair). 
N: No, it’s a boy (answers very quickly, appears confident). 
I: That’s quite definite. How about this one (points to a 
European-Australian boy with dark hair)? 
N: No …. It’s a boy (quick answer again). 
I: How about this one (points to a European-Australian girl)? 
N: Yes, she is a girl, she is like me. 
  
Natalie’s perception of difference during this categorising-self task was 
definitely dominated by gender. She used it consistently in relation to all boys. In 
relation to the photographs of girls, she also used gender; however, she also noticed 
other attributes such as hair length and style. Although she mentioned skin colour in 
the earlier part of the interview in relation to an Indian, an Aboriginal and Chinese 
children, this time she referred to skin colour only once in relation to a Chinese girl. 
It appeared that during this task, gender was more salient than ‘race’. It is possible 
that the difference in characteristics used during self categorising and categorising 
others tasks was a result of Natalie’s gender identity. It is also possible, however, 
that she was more willing to discuss gender than ‘racial’ differences due to her 
awareness of social expectations. It seemed to me sometimes that Natalie did not 
want to engage in the conversation about her reasons for making certain choices. In   193
relation to all the boys she answered questions very quickly, as if the answers were 
obvious and did not require any further explanation. In relation to the girls, she 
initially hesitated, but once a common characteristic was identified (such as the 
length of hair) it was used in a similar manner as gender with boys.  
 
Natalie’s reluctance to talk about her reasons for making certain choices was 
similar to that of Cleo, a 5 year old girl whom I discussed earlier. One of the possible 
explanations of this behaviour could be these girls perception of what is socially 
desirable. Their uneasiness seemed to be confirmed by the data collected in relation 
to their playmate preferences. Such a tendency was also identified in relation to some 
other children’s social preferences. I will discuss it in more detail in the next chapter. 
 
How do children draw lines in their racialisation of difference? 
 
Another pattern that I noticed during the interviews related to some 
children’s tendency to construct those whom they perceived as ‘racially’ different to 
them, as being all the same. This pattern was observed in relation to the younger as 
well as some older participants regardless of their gender. However, I also noticed 
that some older children targeted only certain groups and constructed them as being 
distinctly different from others. It seemed that these children often disregarded some 
obvious similarities/differences between individuals as such process allowed them to 
confirm their own ideas of group belonging and understanding of these groups. All 
these patterns are explored in the following part of this chapter. 
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Cassie and Ella (3 years 9 months old girls) 
 
Cassie, for example, when referring to an Aboriginal boy with a rather dark 
skin and a Chinese girl whose skin was quite fair, stated: “These two are the same 
because they have black cheeks and neck”. Although the Chinese girl’s skin colour 
was far more similar to the European-Australian boy’s whose photograph was 
presented to Cassie in this triad, she still paired her up with the Aboriginal boy, 
despite quite apparent differences in their complexion.  Similarly, when comparing 
herself with an Indian girl with quite dark skin and with a Chinese girl, Cassie stated 
“They are not like me, because they’ve got black everything; black arms, black nose, 
hair and cheeks”. Another girl Ella, who like Cassie was also three years of age, also 
did not seem to notice some significant differences between skin tones and referred 
to all children from non European-Australian background as having black skin and 
for that reason being “all the same”. 
 
  One of the possible ways of explaining this phenomenon could be 
these children’s immature cognition, which resulted in their inability to notice 
differences in skin tones. However, I also observed similar patterns in relation to 
some older participants such as five year old Chris and George. 
 
Chris (5 years 6 months old boy) 
 
Although Chris mainly focused on gender differences, when presented with 
triads which have only children of same gender, he responded differently.  In these 
cases his physical categorisation of photographs as well as his verbal responses   195
seemed to indicate that he did not notice quite obvious differences in skin tones. He 
referred to children from Chinese, Aboriginal and Indian background as having the 
same ‘brown’ or ‘brownish’ skin. For example, in relation to a triad of three girls (a 
blond European-Australian girl and a Chinese girl with quite fair complexion and an 
Indian girl with a rather dark skin, he stated: 
  
  This one is different (points to a European-Australian girl). 
  Interviewer: Why is this child different? 
  C: Because she has light skin. Like mine. 
  And these two (a Chinese and an Indian girl) have brown skin, 
  …. same skin.  
 
Chris also ignored quite obvious differences in skin colour in another case. 
For example, when presented with a set of photos of three boys (a European-
Australian boy with blond hair, an Aboriginal boy with dark skin and a Chinese 
boy), he responded in a similar way:  
 
These two are … go together, ‘cause they have brownish skin 
  (picks up photos of an Aboriginal boy with dark skin and a  
Chinese boy with quite light complexion). 
  Interviewer: And this one (a European-Australian boy)? 
  C: He has different skin… Light skin. 
 
George (5 years 4 months old boy) 
 
Like Chris, George seemed to disregard differences in skin tones in relation 
to children from backgrounds other than European-Australian. For example, when 
presented with a set of photographs of two Aboriginal children, a girl and a boy and 
an Indian boy, all of whom had relatively dark skin, he stated: “There is no   196
difference ... They are the same …. Same dark skin”. I asked him a prompting 
question and he responded in the following way: 
 
Interviewer: Oh, so they are the same, are they? 
George: Yep? 
I: I see. Is there no difference between them? 
G: Mmm …(hesitates) no, they are not the same. They  
have different clothes on. 
R: Aha, so which one of them is different, and which two  
go together: 
George: Mmm ….  I am not sure. 
 
George seemed to experience some difficulty in the above example. The only 
difference that he seemed to notice among these children was their clothing. His 
categorisation of photographs earlier on indicated that his construction of difference 
was heavily racialised, as he physically separated European-Australian children from 
the non European-Australians in every triad presented to him. His justification of 
choices seemed to indicate that in his construction of difference he drew a line along 
the skin colour and perceived children as belonging to two different groups: those 
with light skin and those who were ‘dark’ skinned. The latter group appeared ‘all the 
same’. It seemed that he accentuated this physical feature to the extend that he was 
unable to see any other individual differences.  
 
Lisa (7 years 4 months old girl) 
 
I observed a similar pattern of emphasising similarities between the ‘racial’ 
Others during my interview with Lisa. However, instead of dividing the photographs 
along the lines of whiteness and blackness, Lisa seemed to focus on more 
specifically defined groups. For example, when dealing with the photographs of a   197
mixed gender pair of Aboriginal-Australian children with fairly dark skin and a 
European-Australian girl, Lisa stated: 
 
Lisa: These two go together (Aboriginal girl and a boy) because 
 … mmm, because of their hair… 
Interviewer: Because of their hair? 
L: … and the look. They look, kind of different people. 
I: Do these children (pointing to Aboriginal children in the photos)  
look like different people in comparison to this one? (European- 
Australian girl with black hair) Why is that Lisa? 
L: Because she could be an Aboriginal 
….. and so could he. 
I: How do you know that Lisa? 
L: Because they look like it. 
I: They look like it? So what makes them look Aboriginal?  
Could you tell me? 
L: The colour of their skin. And their smile. (only the Aboriginal  
girl, not the boy, was smiling). 
I: Their smile? But this girl (points to the photo of the  
European-Australian child) smiles as well. 
L: Yes, but it is different. 
I: Why is it different Lisa, tell me? 
L: Because… (firm answer; it seems that Lisa is not going to answer 
   this question)  
I: Because? What do you mean? 
L: Because … (looks at the photo, hesitates moves her face closer to  
it )… her teeth (points to the Aboriginal girl) are a bit different to  
hers (points to the photo of the European-Australian girl). 
 
 
It appeared that Lisa constructed her understanding of Aboriginal children as 
being similar to each other on the basis of skin colour and some other physical 
characteristics (“the way they look”). However, as she was unable to explain clearly 
what was this other feature that made Aboriginal children “look like different 
people”, she commented on differences in “their smile”. I was fascinated to notice 
that Lisa’s perception of the “difference in their smile” was rather idiosyncratic, as in 
these photographs only the Aboriginal girl, but not the boy was smiling. Despite that, 
Lisa still put them in the same ‘smiling’ category. It seemed that her emphasis on   198
similarities between Aboriginal children was so strong that she did not notice quite 
obvious differences in their facial expression. This focus also prevented her from 
noticing that both girls in this triad (an Aboriginal-Australian and a European-
Australian) smiled. This was not the only similarity that Lisa ignored here. She also 
overlooked gender, although, later on, she used it on several occasions.  
 
In a similar vein, Lisa also perceived an Aboriginal boy with dark skin as 
being different from the European-Australian girl with blond hair and a Kurdish girl. 
When presented with their photos, Lisa placed the two girls together. This was the 
first time Lisa used gender as a differentiating category. I had a sense that grouping 
these children was difficult for Lisa as she constructed them as belonging to different 
racialised categories. I asked her therefore if gender was the only difference between 
these children. Lisa responded: “These two also go together (an Aboriginal boy and a 
Kurdish girl) because they have blue T-shirts on”. Despite the fact that these two 
children had very similar, dark skin, Lisa did not use skin colour as a basis for 
classification here (even though she has been consistently doing it until this part of 
the interview). I had a feeling that her understanding of Aboriginality made her think 
that members of this group could not belong to any other category.  
 
This seemed to be borne out in light of her next response. When asked to 
classify the set of photographs, which this time involved a European-Australian girl 
with dark hair and fair complexion and a Kurdish boy and an Aboriginal girl with 
dark skin and hair, Lisa stated the following: 
 
Interviewer: Which of these photographs go together? 
Lisa: Mm .. (hesistates for quite a while).   199
I: Is this one a bit tricky? 
L: Nods her head. 
I: Why is that? Could you tell me? 
L: Looks at the photos again … mm 
I: Which of these photos go together? 
L: Those two (points to the photos of a Kurdish boy and  
a European-Australian girl). 
I: Those two go together? I see. Why is that so? 
L: ‘Cos they have a leafy background. 
I: Because they have a leafy background? I see. 
L: Looks at me, perhaps seeking approval. 
I: Aha. 
L: Mm …Looks away; no smile; sign of concentration on  
her face. 
I: But if you looked at these children only, not at the background  
of the photos, would you be able to tell me which of these  
children go together? 
L: mm … uh (hesitates, looks from one photo to another;  
perhaps she is confused) no. 
I: No? 
L: That one looks different (points to the photo of the Kurdish boy). 
I: Why is this one different? 
L: Because they are both gir…. (shakes her head). Because he is  
a boy. 
 
Lisa initially justified her decision about grouping the photographs of the two 
girls together by stating that they both had a “leafy background”. After stating that, 
she looked at me for a while, as if seeking my approval. It almost felt as if she has 
been asking me: ‘Did I say the right thing’? She then looked away without a smile, 
with a sign of concentration on her face. Her body language seemed to indicate that 
like me, she also felt that her explanation was not convincing enough. I was puzzled 
why she did not use gender as a categorising feature this time, even though she had 
used it in the example immediately preceding it, or a skin colour, which she 
mentioned many times when dealing with the previous sets of photographs. After a 
while she applied gender, but it almost felt that she still felt uncomfortable about it. 
It seemed to me that like in the previous example, she felt that she should not group   200
this Aboriginal child with anybody else. Perhaps in her perception the Aboriginal 
‘Other’ was too distinctly different from everybody else. 
 
I also observed Lisa’s tendency to emphasise similarities among children 
whom she perceived as belonging to the same group on other occasions. For 
example, this is what she stated in relation to the photographs of two Chinese 
children and a European-Australian girl with dark hair: 
 
Interviewer: Have a look at these three photographs. Which one  
of them is different and which two go together? 
Lisa: These two go together (points to the two Chinese children). 
I: I see. So this one is different (points to the European-Australian girl). 
L: Yep. 
I: Why is this one different? 
L: Because of the colour of her skin. 
I: Because of the colour of her skin. Mm… So the colour of her skin 
is different. 
L: And maybe their eyes (pointing to the photographs of Chinese  
children). 
I: Their eyes? What about their eyes? 
L: Like … they got different kind of colour eyes. 
I: Do they?  Have a good look (all children presented in this  
triad had very similar brown eyes). Do these children have  
different colour eyes? 
L: The girl (points to the European-Australian girl) and this boy  
(points to the Chinese boy) do. 
I: Is their eye colour different? 
L: Yes. That one’s got a bit of brown (points to the Chinese boy)  
and that one is bluey (points to European-Australian girl whose 
 eyes are also brown) 
I: Her eyes are ‘bluey’, are they? Ah, that’s interesting.  
What about this girl (points to the Chinese girl)? 
L: She has brown eyes. 
I: She has  … 
L: Brown … 
I: I see. 
 
Lisa appeared to find it hard to identify another (apart from the skin colour) 
characteristic to differentiate between the European-Australian girl and the two   201
Chinese children. As she could not clearly explain what she meant by “their eyes”, 
she decided to focus on the eye colour. This has proven to be a hard task as all these 
three children had nearly identical brown eyes. Despite that Lisa stated that the 
European-Australian girl had “bluey” eyes. It seemed that she perceived the two 
Chinese children as belonging to the same category, and therefore could not identify 
any common characteristics among these children and the European-Australian girl. 
She seemed to perceive even their eye colour as being different. 
 
Lisa’s perception of difference appeared to be dominated by characteristics 
commonly associated with ‘race’. She made some explicit references to skin/hair 
colour (“They both have dark skin/hair”, “Her skin is lighter”), group belonging 
(“She might be Aboriginal and so could he”), and facial characteristics (“Their eyes 
are different”). However, on the few occasions, she also resorted to some other 
characteristics, such as gender, shape of teeth, or clothing. It appeared that 
sometimes Lisa found her tasks challenging, due to what I believe were her 
assumptions, that European-Australians, Aboriginal or Chinese people all belong to 
separate groups and that this group belonging makes them significantly different 
from each other.  
 
Scot (7 years 3 months old boy) 
 
I observed a similar tendency to overemphasize similarities among 
Aboriginal children during the interview with Scot. Every time Aboriginal children 
were presented in sets of photographs, Scot seemed to put them in the same category, 
regardless of their individual differences. The following example illustrates this:   202
 
Interviewer: Could you look at these photos now (presents a set of 
 a European-Australian girl and two Aboriginal boys;  
one of the Aboriginal boys has  quite dark complexion and another 
has light skin, quite similar to the European-Australian girl).  
Which of these children is different? 
Scot: This one is different (points to the European-Australian girl) 
and these two are the same (Aboriginal boys). 
I: Why is that Scot? 
S: Because they are both mad looking [sic] and they are both Aborigines. 
I: Mad looking? I see. And why is this one different? 
S: Because (points to the European-Australian girl) it’s [she has] 
got white skin and these two (points to Aboriginal boys) have got  
brown skin. 
I: Do they? Are you sure about that? Have a good look. 
S: Quickly scans the three photos in front of him. 
Yes. 
 
It seemed that like Lisa and Simone (whom I discussed earlier), Scot viewed 
Aboriginal children as belonging to a separate group. For that reason, he perceived 
these children as being “the same”, not only in their complexion, but also in their 
facial expression, which he described in derogatory terms. I felt, that in this case the 
Aboriginal ‘Other’ was constructed as being not only physically distinct from the 
European-Australians, but also as being a threat. Similar perception of an Aboriginal 
boy was also demonstrated by a five year old Cleo, whom I discussed earlier. 
Interestingly, Cleo and Scot did not refer to the same Aboriginal boys as, because of 
their age difference, they were presented with two different sets of photographs. This 
may suggest that their perception was not linked to a particular facial expression 
labelled by Scot as “mad” and by Cleo as “angry”, but to their more general ideas of 
Aboriginality.  
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Adam (7 years 4 months old boy) 
 
I also observed a strong focus on similarities among Aboriginal children 
during the interview with Adam. However, Adam seemed to do that only in relation 
to Aboriginal girls. For example, this is what he said in relation to the photographs of 
a Kurdish girl with quite dark skin and two Aboriginal girls, whose complexion as 
well as their eye and hair colour differed quite significantly: 
 
Interviewer: Have a look at these photos. Which two of them  
go together. 
Adam: Quickly glances over the photographs. These two go 
together (pointing to two Aboriginal girls) and this one (Kurdish 
girl) doesn’t. Because these two look like sister and sister. And they 
all have similar hair, except for this one (points to the Aboriginal  
girl with blond hair), because her hair is sort of greyish. 
I: Aha, so why do these two (Aboriginal girls) look like sisters? 
A: Because they both have the same colour hair (he has just stated  
that one of the girls had different colour hair), they both have darker colour  
faces  and the same colour eyes. 
I: Do they? Do they have the same colour of eyes and faces? Have a  
good look! 
A: No. 
I: No? But they still look alike, do they? 
A: Nods. 
I: So, why is this one different (points to the photo of the Kurdish girl  
whose skin, eyes and hair colour resembles very much one of the  
Aboriginal girls)?  
A: Because she has got different skin than both of them (Aboriginal  
girls). Because they (Aboriginal girls) have darker one and she (Kurdish  
girl) has lighter brown. 
I: Really? Have a good look. 
A: Looks at the photos and nods his head. 
 
I felt that Adam really perceived the Kurdish girl as having “lighter brown 
skin” than the Aboriginal girls. He also stated that the Aboriginal girls looked similar 
“like sister and sister” because they both had “darker colour faces” and the same 
colour eyes and hair. In reality, one of the Aboriginal girls had much lighter   204
complexion than the other one and the Kurdish girl’s skin was very similar to that of 
the other Aboriginal girl. When prompted about the colour of their eyes, Adam 
stated that they were not the same. In fact, one of the girls had really light green 
eyes, when the other had dark brown. He also appeared to be quite confused about 
the colour of their hair. Although, he initially recognised differences in hair colour, 
later on he used this attribute to justify the girls’ likeness. It seemed that despite all 
the differences in these two Aboriginal girls’ appearance, Adam constructed them as 
looking the same and as being significantly different from the Kurdish girl. 
 
The way Adam saw the Aboriginal girls as being different from the Kurdish 
girl may suggest that he made assumptions about the children in the photographs to 
confirm certain aspects of his existing understanding of Aboriginality. Even though 
he did not call them Aboriginal, it appeared that he identified some features that 
allowed him to classify these girls as belonging to the same social group. It is 
possible that in Adam’s perception, someone who did not belong to this group had a 
different colour of skin in comparison to a member of this group, although in reality 
their complexion has been very similar. It seemed that in this respect, his perception 
of the racial Other was quite similar to that of Scot, Simone and Lisa. 
 
However, as I stated at the beginning of this section, Adam seemed to 
strongly emphasise similarities only between the Aboriginal girls.  When presented 
with a different triad consisting of the same Kurdish girl discussed in the last 
example, an Aboriginal boy with dark skin and a European-Australian girl with light 
hair and complexion, he grouped together the first two children. It seemed that his 
perception of Aboriginal girls and boys varied. This was confirmed by Adam’s   205
verbally stated playmate preferences in relation to Aboriginal girls and boys as well 
as by the way he ascribed value to these children during the second interview. I will 
discuss these differences in detail in my next two chapters. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The important cues in children’s construction of difference 
 
In this chapter, I discussed how some of my study participants constructed 
difference among various children presented to them in sets of photographs and how 
they viewed themselves in relation to those children. I found that when physically 
grouping the photographs, all participants often, if not all the time, contrasted 
European-Australians with non European-Australians. I also found that with 
exception of one child, all children verbally referred to characteristics which are 
typically associated with ‘race’. The most common one was skin colour, which along 
with hair colour was mentioned by children of all ages. Older participants also used a 
category of group belonging, referred to place of origin or facial characteristics, such 
as shape of the eyes or face. Other commonly used differentiating attributes included 
gender as well as some transitory features, such as hair length and style, type of 
clothing and jewellery.  
 
Some of the children demonstrated flexibility in using a range of 
characteristics during the categorising process. Others, however, emphasised 
characteristics commonly associated with ‘race’ so much that they excluded other 
differentiating features. Children’s preoccupation with ‘race’ was especially evident   206
in relation to the 3 year old Ella, 5 year old Natalie and George and seven year old 
Adam, Scot and Lisa.  
 
This seems to demonstrate that although all of my participants noticed 
physical characteristics such as skin colour, only for some such features seemed to 
dominate their understanding of difference. Whether it happened or not did not 
appear to be directly linked to developmental factors. For example, three-year-old 
Cassie demonstrated her awareness of skin colour differences, as she commented on 
them on two occasions during the process of categorising photographs. She even 
demonstrated her understanding that skin colour applies to the whole body including 
those parts that are covered with clothes. Regardless of this knowledge, however, 
these characteristics did not dominate Cassie’s construction of difference as she 
frequently demonstrated her ability to coordinate a number of attributes.  
 
On the other hand, Ella’s example shows that for some children of 
approximately the same age as Cassie, skin colour may become so important that it 
is used as the only differentiating feature. Using a developmental framework, it 
could be argued that Ella’s focus on skin colour resulted from her immature 
cognition, which demonstrated itself in her inability to coordinate more than one 
differentiating characteristic at a time. However, her spontaneously expressed dislike 
towards children from non-European background, as well as the way she was often 
turning over and pushing away photographs of these children, suggests that her 
emphasis on skin colour was due to environmental rather than developmental factors. 
It is possible that unlike Cassie, Ella has been ‘sensitised’ to characteristics 
commonly associated with ‘race’ so heavily that her ability to see other individual   207
differences became limited. This issue will be discussed in more detail in the next 
chapter. 
  
Other evidence from my study also seems to suggest that my participants’ 
heavy focus on race was not directly related to the level of their cognitive maturity. 
According to Piaget’s framework of cognitive development, children’s ability to 
focus on a number of characteristics rather than to centre on the most obvious visual 
features (such as skin colour) should increase with age. However, my study shows 
that a strong focus on ‘racial’ characteristics was quite common among some five- as 
well as seven-year-olds, despite their growing cognitive capability to decentre and 
perceive more than one aspect of an object or a task at the time. Furthermore, I also 
observed that some of my participants, regardless of their age and gender, 
demonstrated their flexibility in the use of a range of differentiating characteristics.  
This seems to show that at least in relation to the children who participated in my 
study, the potential role of cognitive factors in their racialisation of difference needs 
to be considered in the context of complex environmental influences.  
  
  Some children’s strong focus on ‘racial’ characteristics during physical 
categorisation of photographs was not always matched by their verbal responses. 
Three-year-old Patrick and Dane, for example, quite consistently contrasted non 
European-Australian children with European-Australians by putting their 
photographs in separate piles, which may suggest salience of ‘race’ in their 
understanding of difference. In their verbal statements, however, Patrick referred to 
skin colour only once and Dane did not mention it at all. Patrick often talked about 
hair colour differences, but Dane most of the time was not able to justify his choices.   208
Dane and Patrick’s physical categorisation of photographs suggested that both of 
them perceived the European-Australians and non-European-Australians as 
belonging to different categories. At the same time it appeared that this 
categorisation based on skin or hair colour differences was almost automatic and was 
not accompanied by their ability to reflect upon this process.  
 
Similarly, five year old George appeared to consistently use skin colour in his 
categorisation process. In his case, however, this emphasis on ‘racial’ characteristics 
was evident in both his physical categorisation of photographs as well as his 
justification for his choices. George talked about these differences in a matter of fact 
manner. It seemed that for Dane, Patrick and George, skin colour characteristics 
were a mere difference in pigmentation, which did not carry any special meaning.  
 
Children’s perception of social desirability of discussing ‘racial’ differences 
 
This was not the case with two other children, five-year-old Natalie and Cleo, 
who appeared to demonstrate some uneasiness when talking about characteristics 
commonly associated with race. Cleo’s apprehension seemed to surface every time 
she dealt with the photograph of an Aboriginal boy with dark skin. Although 
generally she focused on gender, when differentiating between this Aboriginal boy 
and other children presented to her in triads, her body language was indicating that 
she also perceived him in racialised terms.  The consistent change in her facial 
expression seemed to show that she was feeling uneasy about discussing it.  
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Like Cleo, Natalie also appeared uneasy when talking about ‘racial’ differences. 
Although during the physical categorisation of the photographs Natalie consistently 
separated European-Australian children from the non-European-Australians, when 
asked to justify her choices, she seemed to avoid references to skin colour. Her 
frequent hesitation and body language, which often contradicted her verbal 
responses, suggested to me that she felt apprehensive to talk about her choices. It is 
possible that Natalie’s and Cleo’s uneasiness was linked to their perception of social 
expectations.  
 
How do children draw lines in their racialisation of difference? 
 
Some participants in my study appeared to be unable to notice individual 
differences between the non European-Australian children in the photographs. For 
example Cassie (3 years 9 months) referred to an Aboriginal boy with rather dark 
complexion and a Chinese girl with quite fair skin as being the same and having 
“black cheeks and neck’”. She also stated that the same Chinese girl and an Indian 
girl with rather dark skin were not like her as “they had black everything…”. 
Similarly to Cassie, three year old Ella described all non European-Australian 
children as “having black skin” and “being all the same”. It is possible to argue that 
the youngest children’s inability to see differences in skin tones could be linked to 
their immature cognition. However, as older children demonstrated a similar 
tendency, this conclusion seems not valid. Rather, I would like to suggest that even 
at an early age some children start classifying people into two categories: those who 
have white skin, and those who have not. These children seem to construct the 
second category as being all the same.   210
 
George and Chris, both five years of age, also ignored quite obvious 
differences in relation to children from Chinese, Indian and Aboriginal-Australian 
background. They seemed to put all these children in the same category, separate 
from European-Australians. This was quite evident in George’s response to a triad 
that did not include any European-Australian children as he stated:  “There is no 
difference  ... They are all the same … Same dark skin”. Like Cassie and Ella, 
George and Chris appeared to divide people along black-white skin categories. It 
seemed that their strong focus on skin colour made it difficult for them to see 
individual differences. Aboud & Skerry (1984) reported comparable findings. 
 
Parallel emphasis on similarities among children who were perceived as 
belonging to the same socially constructed groups were found during my work with 
seven year old children Lisa, Simone, Scot and Adam. However their perceptions, in 
comparison to the younger participants, appeared to be more context specific.  For 
example, Simone, Scot, Lisa and Adam focused on Aboriginal children and often 
constructed them as being distinctly different from other children presented in the 
triads, regardless of the similarities in their skin, hair or eye colour. Scot and Adam 
also often disregarded individual differences among Aboriginal children and 
described them as being all the same. It seemed that the way these children 
constructed their images of Aboriginality made them believe that the Aboriginal 
‘Other’ could belong to one category only and that all members of this category have 
exactly the same characteristics. Lisa and Scot demonstrated a similar perception in 
relation to Chinese people.  
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Such perceptions seem to fit well into the common image of various social 
groups, typically defined as ‘ethnic’ in our society, which are often constructed and 
maintained by the media and by the everyday discourses as being homogenous and 
distinctly different from each other. However, some responses of Adam or Scot also 
indicate, that their racialised perception of Aboriginal children was different in 
relation to boys than to girls. This may indicate that children do not simply absorb 
received messages, but actively strive to make sense of them in order to understand 
their social world. These issues in relation to children’s perception of the ‘racial’ 
Other will be further explored in the following two chapters. 
 
Final notes 
 
  Analysing these parts of the interviews made me realise how important it is 
to interpret children’s physical categorisation of photographs along with what they 
say about it, as using only one or the other can be quite misleading. Contrasting 
photographs of European-Australians with non European-Australians may be 
indicative of children’s salience of ‘race’ in their understanding of difference. 
However, we have to be very careful how we draw our conclusions, as children can 
make their choices for a variety of reasons. In some cases they may focus on skin 
colour, but see it simply as the most obvious physical differentiating characteristic, 
which did not have any further connotations. On other occasions, such differences 
can carry for children certain social meanings related to various discourses to which 
they may be exposed to in their different Microsystems. In order to understand how 
children construct differences between people we need provide them with   212
opportunities to freely talk and listen carefully to what they say or, sometimes, to 
what they try to avoid saying.   213
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Chapter 6 
 
CHILDREN’S PLAYMATE PREFERENCES 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter focuses on children’s verbally stated playmate preferences. It 
also explores whether there is a link between such preferences and the criteria 
children use in their construction of difference. Logically, in order to develop certain 
preference, one must first notice difference for which the like or dislike is to be 
developed. There is a common belief that children are inherently “colour blind” 
(Downey, 1998, p.2) and do not notice differences in skin colour until they are 
pointed out to them. However, there is also some classical and more up to date 
research (Kircher & Furby, 1971; Katz, 1982; Katz, 1987; Milner, 1983; Davey, 
1983; Ramsey, 1991; Troyna & Hatcher, 1992; Wright, 1992; Black-Gutman and 
Hickson; 1996; Downey, 1998), which challenges this belief by showing that 
physical characteristics such as skin colour or facial features play an important role 
in young children’s construction of difference. Downey refers to evidence that even 
a few months old babies notice skin colour differences. Studies also show (Rizvi, 
1993; Connolly, 1996; MacNaughton and Davis, 2001; Wright, 1998) that such 
differences carry specific social meanings for some children.  It seems that children’s 
‘colour blindness’ may be simply a myth.  
 
My study also shows that children are not ‘colour blind’. As I demonstrated 
in my previous chapter, all the participants of my study used criteria commonly   215
associated with ‘race’ during self-categorising and categorising-others tasks. This 
was quite evident in their physical categorisation of photographs and in their verbal 
responses, as they often commented on skin and hair colour differences as well as 
variations in facial features. Although all children in my study used some of these 
characteristics during the categorising tasks, only some of them seemed to think of 
their potential friendship choices in racialised terms. This suggests that for some 
children, classification based on skin and hair colour characteristics does not go 
beyond noticing a mere difference in pigmentation.  
 
However, some participants also quite consistently used criteria typically 
associated with ‘race’ in their selection of potential playmates. Some of the seven- 
and five-year old children as well as one three-year-old made negative potential 
friendship choices in relation to photographs of children whom they perceived as 
‘racially’ different to themselves. Their verbal responses seemed to suggest that for 
these children differences in skin or hair colour, facial characteristics and, in some 
cases, belonging to certain socially constructed groups carried specific meanings. 
 
The following excerpts from the interviews with twelve European-Australian 
children involved in my study illustrate their verbally expressed preferences in 
relation to potential playmates. The responses, which I present here, were selected on 
the basis of demonstrating certain trends and patterns. To explore their preferences 
for potential playmates, all the participants were presented with the same twelve 
photographs that were showed to them in triads in the first part of the interview. To 
avoid forced choices, instead of presenting the photographs in pairs, all of them were 
placed in front of each child. Children were then asked to select any number of   216
photographs they liked and to physically place them on the ‘I would like to play with 
/ have as a friend’ or ‘I would not like to play with / have as a friend’ circle. After all 
the photographs were sorted into these groups, I asked the participants to explain 
their choices. This gave me an opportunity to freely talk and listen to children’s ideas 
and, at the same time, to observe their body language and listen to their silences. 
Being able to juxtapose children’s physical categorisation of photographs, their body 
language, silences and verbal explanations provided me with an opportunity to 
explore different aspects of children’s racialised thinking in relation to their potential 
playmates, including a possibility of socially desirable answers. This was especially 
important when some children’s verbal responses were contradicted by their body 
language and when they avoided clear verbal responses to some of the questions. 
 
Children’s potential playmate choices 
  
Ella (3 years 9 months old girl) 
 
As I stated in the previous chapter, Ella consistently used skin colour criteria 
during the categorising tasks. She also spontaneously expressed her dislike towards 
children from a non-European background, whom she described as having “black 
skin”.  
 
Ella’s choices of potential playmates, also demonstrated that she thought of 
them in racialised terms. Although her selection of photographs appeared to suggest 
that in addition to ‘race’ she was also using gender as a differentiating characteristic, 
it was never verbally stated. Instead she consistently referred to skin colour. At first   217
she selected photographs of four girls and placed them on the ‘I would like to play 
with’ circle. Two of them were from a European-Australian background and the 
other two were Aboriginal-Australians. The Aboriginal-Australian girls varied 
considerably in their hair, eyes and skin colour. One of them was blond with blue 
eyes and fair complexion while the other had brown eyes and quite dark skin and 
hair. When asked to clarify her choices, Ella stated that she would like to play with 
these four girls because they had the “same skin like me”. In relation to the 
European-Australian girl with light hair Ella also stated that she would like to play 
with her because of the “purple top” she was wearing.  Although one of the 
Aboriginal girl’s complexion was much darker than Ella’s, she still classified her as 
having “the same skin” as her. It is possible that her perception of the Aboriginal 
girl’s skin colour was influenced by her positioning in the photograph, as part of her 
face looked quite light, due to the sun shining on it. It may be, that for that reason 
Ella perceived this girl’s skin colour as similar to her own and therefore chose her as 
a potential “friend” along with the other three. 
 
When dealing with the rest of the photographs in relation to potential 
playmates, Ella made negative choices. Skin colour was used here quite consistently 
in relation to the boys from Chinese and Indian backgrounds as well an Aboriginal 
boy with dark complexion. When dealing with their photographs Ella repeatedly 
stated: “I do not want to play with him because he has got black skin”. 
 
When justifying her choices in relation to the two European-Australian boys 
and an Aboriginal boy with a very light complexion and blond hair, whom she also 
rejected as potential playmates, her verbal responses were not very clear:   218
 
Interviewer: Why wouldn’t you like to play with this child  
(pointing to a photo of a European - Australian boy with dark hair)? 
Ella: I do not know. I just do not want to. 
I: Aha. And this one (pointing to the Aboriginal  
boy with light complexion)? 
E: (hastily) I don’t know. I just don’t want to. 
I: And what about this one (pointing to a European 
-Australian boy with light hair)? 
E: (hesitates) He has got short hair. 
 
Although it seemed quite clear that Ella’s social preferences were influenced 
not only by ‘racial’ characteristics but also by gender (all pictures of boys were 
placed on the ‘I would not like to play with’ circle), when justifying her choices she 
never mentioned gender. Perhaps she only felt, rather than understood clearly that 
she preferred girls rather than boys as her playmates. Children’s understanding of 
gender roles may be quite stereotyped from an early age. As soon as they start 
categorising themselves as girls or boys, they also develop beliefs about what is and 
what is not appropriate for different genders (Berk, 2002). These stereotyped beliefs, 
which are often positively reinforced by society, become stronger over the pre-
school years. It has been suggested that children’s early beliefs in relation to gender 
roles “operate like blanket rules rather than flexible guidelines” (Biernat, 1991, cited 
in Berk, 2002, p.391). Although children might not be able to verbalise it, their 
behaviour is guided by these newly developed rules. According to Davies (1989), 
who explores the issues of gender from the perspective of feminist theory, “sex and 
gender are … the elements of the social structure … created by individuals and 
within individuals as they learn the discursive practices through which that social 
structure is created and maintained” (p.12). Davies further argues that in order to be 
perceived as a competent member of society “Each child must get its gender right, 
not only for itself to be seen as normal and acceptable within the term of the culture,   219
but [also] … for others who will be interpreting themselves in relation to it as other” 
(p.20). As Davies’s research demonstrates children’s understanding of gender roles 
and their play behaviours follow the socially constructed dichotomy of what is 
perceived right for males and females within social structures of the society in which 
they live. The supposed “facticity of two opposite genders renders those behaviours, 
thoughts and emotions which are” (p.20) perceived as not fitting in the society’s 
understanding of male and female roles as incompetent or even immoral. From an 
early age, girls and boys often develop different play preferences and interact freely 
mainly within gender segregated groups. These could have been the reasons for 
Ella’s tendency to place all the boys on the ‘I would not like to play with’ circle. 
However, she also divided the whole category of boys into two groups and 
consistently referred to skin colour differences in relation to boys from the Chinese, 
Indian and Aboriginal background, whom she labeled as being “black”. The skin 
colour criterion was also applied to girls. 
 
Although Ella generally preferred girls to boys as potential friends, she 
further applied the skin colour attribute to reject an Indian and a Chinese girl: 
 
Interviewer: Could you tell me why you would not like to play  
with this child (points to an Indian girl) ? 
Ella: Cause … (moves her face closer to the photograph and looks 
at it) … she has black skin … ‘not got’ skin like me. 
I: Aha! And this one (points to the photo of a Chinese  
girl)? 
E: She is not like me. She has black skin. I do not like her. 
 
Ella’s example demonstrated that she started perceiving her potential 
playmates in racialised terms. She verbally expressed dislike towards children with 
“black” skin and her potential friendship choices, quite consistently based on skin   220
colour differences, suggested that to her, variations in complexion were not just a 
matter of pigmentation. It seemed that to her black skin had a clear negative 
connotation. Being so ‘skin colour conscious’ and using this characteristic so 
consistently in relation to potential playmates was not observed in relation to the 
other three-year old children who participated in my study. Ella’s strong dislike 
towards children whom she perceived as ‘racially’ different can be interpreted in a 
number of ways. Some researchers maintain that such a tendency is a result of young 
children’s attempts to understand their social world and to establish their own 
identities. The supporters of ‘new’ racism suggest that people have a ‘natural’ 
tendency to prefer ‘those who are like me’. However, my findings seem to show that 
some of my participants’ tendency to prefer ‘their own kind’ was not necessarily 
related to their developmental stage. Four of my study participants of similar age 
used characteristics typically associated with ‘race’ during the categorizing tasks, but 
only one of them demonstrated quite clearly negative playmate preferences on the 
basis of such differences. It is possible therefore, to make a tentative claim that this 
child’s development of racialised thinking was influenced by some social factors 
rather than her ‘natural’ tendency to dislike those who are not like her, or to establish 
her own identity.  
 
Ella’s verbally expressed dislike toward all children whom she perceived as 
having different skin colour to her own, suggests to me that she already started 
dividing people into two groups: those who are like ‘us’ and those who belong to the 
‘other’ category. Wright (1998) maintains that young children may become 
sensitised by the important people in their life to the social meaning of certain 
physical characteristics such as skin colour. In such cases their understanding of   221
groups that share such attributes may become quite stereotyped. She argues that if 
pre-schoolers hear negative messages about people who look differently to them (for 
example have different colour of skin), or see that they are treated less favourably 
than others, they may develop an understanding that such people need to be viewed 
as a potential threat or treated with lack of respect. Receiving consistent negative 
messages in different Microsystems and observing interactions which indicate power 
imbalance between different groups may for some children reinforce the idea that 
physical features are indicative of other characteristics. However, if such messages 
are positive, ‘black’ or ‘white’ skin may remain just a matter of pigmentation. 
Although differences will be noticed, they will not necessarily carry any specific 
meanings.  
 
Dane (3 years 4 months old boy) 
 
My interview with Dane illuminated this latter tendency. Dane’s physical 
categorisation of photographs in relation to self and others suggested that he was 
using characteristics commonly associated with race, as in five out of six triads 
presented to him, he consistently contrasted European-Australian children with 
Asian-Australians and Aboriginal-Australians. However, verbally he never used skin 
colour as a differentiating characteristic. Instead, he commented on hair colour and 
when it was not possible to apply this attribute, he was unable to provide any 
explanation. It seemed that Dane was focussing on colour cues, both skin and hair 
colour, during the categorising tasks. Perhaps for him, they were the most obvious 
differentiating physical features. However, unlike Ella, Dane appeared to use these   222
characteristics as a mere difference in colour that did not carry any social meaning. 
His potential playmate preferences seemed to support this.  
 
Dane initially chose four photographs of children with whom he would like 
to play. All of them were boys, which indicated that Dane’s playmate preferences 
were related to gender. The selection of photographs seemed to demonstrate that he 
did not consider his potential playmates in racialised terms, as he chose photographs 
of a Chinese, an Indian, and two European-Australian boys. When questioned about 
his reasons for such selection, Dane smiled, shrugged his shoulders and answered “I 
do not know”. When asked again to look at the remaining photographs to decide 
whether there was anybody else, with whom he would like to play, Dane smiled 
again and said “I do not know; I would like to play with them all”. It appeared that 
apart from his growing same-gender orientation, Dane did not have any other 
specific preferences in relation to his potential playmates. Although he demonstrated 
his awareness of skin colour differences during the physical categorisation of 
photographs in the first part of the interview, he did not seem to think of his potential 
playmates in racialised terms. 
 
Patrick (3 years 6 months old boy) 
 
Patrick displayed even stronger gender orientation than Dane in his selection 
of potential playmates. When presented with all the photographs, he looked at them 
and without any hesitation, he placed all boys on the ‘I would like to play with’ 
circle. Unlike Dane, Patrick provided verbal explanations for his playmate choices. 
When asked about it, he stated in the matter of fact manner: “they are boys and I like   223
playing with boys”. He made negative choices in relation to all girls, by physically 
placing their photos on the ‘I would not like to play with’ circle, but he was not able 
to verbally justify his decisions. Although earlier on, skin colour seemed to be used 
by him as a differentiating characteristic, as he consistently contrasted European-
Australians with the non-European-Australian children in all six triads during the 
physical categorisation of photographs, Patrick referred to it verbally only once. 
During the task of selecting his potential playmates he did not refer to skin colour at 
all. Similarly to Dane, Patrick’s awareness of skin colour differences did not seem to 
affect his social preferences. I felt that as for Dane, for Patrick skin colour did not 
carry any special meanings. 
   
Cassie (3 years 9 months old girl) 
 
Like Dane and Patrick, Cassie also used gender cues when selecting potential 
friends. Initially, she made positive choices in relation to all girls and rejected all 
boys. Cassie explained that she wanted to play with the girls because they “looked 
nice”. The ‘nice look’ was linked most of the time to some transitory characteristics 
such as clothing. After looking at the photographs more closely, Cassie made some 
further classification and chose two European-Australian and two Aboriginal-
Australian girls as her “favourite” future playmates. Although she described the 
Chinese and Indian girls as not “very favourite”, she was not able to explain her 
reasons for such description and she left their photographs on the ‘I would like to 
play with’ circle. In relation to the boys, however, Cassie quite clearly expressed and 
justified her dislike: 
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Cassie: I would not like to play with them. 
Interviewer: Why not Cassie? 
C: I do not like boys. My cousin would like to play with them but I don’t.  
My cousin is a boy. He likes boys and likes playing with them. I do not like 
playing with them, because they hurt me. 
 
Although in the first part of the interview, Cassie demonstrated her awareness 
of skin colour differences, she did not seem to use this characteristic when selecting 
potential playmates. Her decisions appeared to be influenced by gender and this 
orientation was in Cassie’s case quite clearly linked to previous experience. 
However, it can be assumed that Cassie’s description of the Chinese and Indian girls 
as not being her “favourite” may suggest some importance of characteristics 
commonly associated with race in her social preferences. The fact that in the first 
part of the interview, Cassie described the same two girls as having “black nose, 
arms, cheeks and hair” lends weight to this assumption. It is possible, that although 
gender was a dominating factor in Cassie’s selection of potential playmates she also 
thought of them in racialised terms. However, she did not do this in a consistent 
manner. 
 
George (5 years 4 months old boy) 
 
George’s physical categorization of photographs and his frequent references 
to characteristics such as skin colour during the first part of the interview did not 
match his playmate choices. Like Dane and Patrick, George’s playmate preferences 
suggested that he did not think about them in racialised terms. From a selection of 
twelve, he chose five quite diverse photographs. The selection included two Chinese   225
children, a girl and a boy; two Aboriginal children with dark skin, a girl and a boy 
and an Indian boy. This is how he justified his choices: 
 
 
Interviewer: Why would you like to play with this child  
(points to a Chinese boy)? 
George: I would like to play with him because he is a boy. 
I: Any other reason? 
G: Looks at the photograph …No. 
I: And why would you play with this child (points to  
a photograph of an Aboriginal girl with dark hair and skin)? 
G: I would like to play ‘Hide and seek’ with her, because I know  
her (earlier on, George commented on this photograph stating  
that this child looked like someone he knew). I  forgot   
the name, but she looks just like that; same hair and clothes. 
I: Really? 
G: Yep (smiles broadly) 
I: Could you tell me now why you would like to play with this child 
(points to the photo of an Aboriginal boy with dark hair and skin)? 
G: Because he is a boy. 
I: Oh, I see. And this one (points to the photo of an Indian boy)? 
G: He has a hair cut like my Dad, so I would like to play with him. 
I: And this one (points to a photo of a Chinese girl)? 
G: That’s hard. I would like to play with her…. but… 
I: Why would you like to play with her? 
G: I really do not know. 
 
In relation to the negative friendship choices, George was not able to explain 
his reasons. He repeatedly stated that he was not sure or that he did not know why he 
would not like to play with the children he had selected. It appeared that although 
George’s construction of difference during the first part of the interview was quite 
heavily dominated by skin colour differences, he was not attaching any value 
judgement to it. Instead, his selection of potential playmates seemed to be influenced 
by both gender as well as individual characteristics of children in the photographs, 
which were often linked to different aspects of similarity to people he knew and 
perhaps regarded in a positive way. The fact that he chose children with different   226
physical characteristics including a variety of skin colour as his potential playmates 
appeared to demonstrate that such features did not have a negative meaning for 
George.  
 
Chris (5 years 6 months old boy) 
 
Like George, Chris displayed a similar tendency in his potential playmate 
choices. Although he demonstrated same-gender orientation stronger than that 
expressed by George, as he only selected photographs of boys, these photos 
represented three different groups.  George chose a European-Australian boy with 
dark hair, an Indian-Australian boy and an Aboriginal-Australian boy with dark hair 
and skin. This is how he justified his choices: 
 
Interviewer: You have chosen this child (a European-Australian  
boy with dark hair)  as someone with whom you would like to play. 
Could you tell me why you would like to play with him? 
Chris: Because he looks friendly. He has a happy face. 
And he has a ‘stripy’ top. He looks like me. I have a ‘stripy’ top like  
that. 
I: I see. And this one (points to an Indian boy)? 
C: He looks friendly and has a happy face. He looks like 
Shalif. 
I: Does he? Who is Shalif? 
C: Shalif is my friend and he is really nice. 
I: Oh! So this child looks like Shalif? And this is why you would 
like to play with him? 
C: nods his head … Yep, he is really nice. 
I: And what about this child (points to the photo of an Aboriginal 
boy with dark hair and skin). Why would you like to play with him? 
C: Because he looks friendly. 
I: Does he? 
C: Ya, and he has a blue top like me. 
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As Chris selected only boys for his potential playmates we can argue that his 
social preferences were influenced by gender. However, he also chose these children 
earlier on, as well as now as being similar to him or as to someone he knew. This 
may suggest that although gender appeared to be an important factor, Chris was not 
simply selecting all boys for his future playmates.  Instead, he identified in them 
some characteristics that were familiar to him and therefore would make him feel 
comfortable around these children. It seemed that characteristics typically associated 
with ‘race’ were not taken into consideration during this selection process. Chris 
rarely used such characteristics during the categorising tasks in the earlier part of the 
interview. It appeared that although he was aware of differences in skin colour, this 
attribute did not influence his playmate preferences. As for George, for Chris skin 
colour did not seem to carry any special meaning. 
 
Scot (7 years 3 months old boy) 
 
Unlike Chris, Scot used characteristics commonly associated with ‘race’ 
quite consistently during the categorizing tasks in the first part of the interview. 
However, despite this earlier strong emphasis, his selection of potential playmates 
seemed initially to be dominated by gender. Scot rejected the photographs of all girls 
and chose four boys as his potential playmates. In relation to the girls, he 
consistently stated that it was too hard to explain why he did not want to play with 
them.  Although he did not refer to gender, it seemed that this was the reason for 
making his negative choices. Neither his verbal responses nor his body language 
suggested otherwise. His justification of his positive playmate choices also appeared   228
to suggest that like Chris and George, Scot did not link them to attributes commonly 
associated with ‘race’: 
 
I: Why would you like to play with this child (points to the photo of a  
European-Australian boy with dark hair)? 
S: Because he looks … he looks friendly. 
I: Does he?  
S: Nods 
I: And why do you think you would like to have this boy as  
a friend (points to the Kurdish boy)?  
 S: ahhhh.. ‘cause he looks playful. He looks playful and happy. 
 
Scot described the remaining two photos of the Aboriginal boy with light 
skin and hair and a European-Australian boy with light hair in a similar manner. It 
seemed that his choices here were influenced by gender cues only.  
 
It was not until Scot justified his negative choices that I realised that ‘race’ 
also played an important role in his playmate preferences. Scot rejected only two 
boys as his potential playmates. One of them was Aboriginal-Australian with dark 
hair and skin and the other was Chinese-Australian. This is what he said in relation 
to their photographs: 
 
Interviewer: Why wouldn’t you like to play with this boy 
(points to the photo of an Aboriginal boy with dark skin and hair)? 
Scot: mm … Because he looks … angry. 
I: Does he? Why? What makes him look like that? 
S: mm … not sure; he just does. 
I: Really? I cannot see that. 
S: looks at me, no response 
I: And what about this child (points to a photo of a Chinese boy)? 
S: No, I would not like to play with him. He looks too smart for me. 
I: What do you mean? 
S: He would not like to play with me. He would not like to do things  
with me. 
I: Why do you think so? 
S: This is hard. I am not sure. I just do. 
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It seems that although Scot’s negative choices in relation to these two 
potential playmates were made on racialised grounds, they were qualitatively 
different. He rejected the photo of Aboriginal-Australian boy as he perceived him as 
a potential threat. During the earlier tasks, discussed in the previous chapter, Scot 
described the same child as “mad looking”. I will discuss the issue of the Other being 
perceived as threat in more detail in the later part of this chapter. Here, I would like 
to comment on Scot’s reaction to the photo of the Chinese boy. It is difficult to 
conclude whether Scot’s decision about rejecting this boy as a potential playmate 
was linked to ‘racial’ characteristics, as he did not say anything about it. However, as 
he repeatedly emphasised similarities in relation to the way these Chinese children 
looked during the earlier categorisation tasks, I felt that in this instance he was 
referring to some attributes, which he was not able to verbalize. As earlier on Scot 
did not identify this boy as looking like someone he knew, it is difficult to establish 
where his remark about this child being “too smart for him” came from. One 
possibility is that it was linked to his general opinion about Chinese children. Some 
Australian research demonstrates that European-Australian  children view Asian-
Australians quite favourably. For example, based on their study conducted with 122 
children, Black-Gutman & Hickson (1996) reported that European-Australian 
children were more positive toward Asian-Australians than toward Aboriginal 
people. I felt that Scot’s positive comment could have been influenced by the general 
attitude within some school communities toward Chinese-Australian children, who 
are often perceived as high academic achievers. Anecdotal evidence from my 
informal conversations with some of the teachers from Scot’s school confirms this 
general positive perception. I found it interesting that despite Scot’s positive remark 
about the Chinese boy, he still rejected him as a potential friend and stated that this   230
boy would not like to play with him, as he was “too smart”. It almost felt that in 
order to justify his negative choice, Scot tried to shift the responsibility for it onto 
the other child.  
  
Adam (7 years 4 months old boy) 
 
Adam’s physical selection of photographs and his verbal responses during 
the categorising tasks suggested that his construction of difference was heavily 
racialised. However, his playmate preferences initially appeared to be dominated 
only by gender, as Adam chose four boys and only one girl as his potential 
playmates. Two of these children were Aboriginal-Australian boys; there were also 
two Kurdish children (a girl and a boy) and a dark haired European-Australian boy. 
Adam stated that he would like all these children to take part in his favourite 
activities. For example, this is what he said when dealing with the photo of an 
Aboriginal boy with light skin: 
 
I would like to have him as a friend because we could play 
soccer together… 
Interviewer: Ah, I see. He looks like a soccer player to you, does he? 
A: Because he looks like … hmm… Andrew and Andrew plays soccer  
with me.  
I: I see. Who is Andrew? 
A: Andrew is a boy in my class 
In relation to the other children whom he selected as potential playmates, 
Adam justified his choices in the following way: 
 
  I would like to play with this child (points to the photo of an Aboriginal 
   boy with dark skin) because he would always laugh when I tell him a joke. 
  I: Do you think so? Ha, ha. Does he look like he has a sense of humour? 
A: Nods his head mm …   231
I: Right. And what about this child (points to the photo of a Kurdish boy). 
Why would you like him as a friend? 
A: Because he would go push-bike riding with me. 
I: Really? (Adam nods his head) Why do you think he would do that? 
A: Because he looks like he had a lot of exercise. 
I: I see. And you placed this photo (points to the Kurdish girl) on the  
‘I would like to play with’ circle. Could you tell me why? 
A: Because mm (hesitates) because mm mm she would like to 
play with me.  
I: Really? How do you know that?  
A: Because she would play footy with me. 
I: Aha. So she looks like a good football player to you, does she? 
A: Yes (nods his head).  
 
These children, whom Adam chose as being good candidates for a friend, 
were also those whom he, at the beginning of the interview, selected as being similar 
to him or as looking as someone he knew and with whom he had some positive 
experiences. For example, he found the Kurdish girl in the photograph as being 
similar to a neighbour’s daughter, who was a high school student and occasionally 
babysat Adam. During the informal conversation after the interview Adam told me 
that sometimes they played football together. It appeared that Adam did not think 
about his potential playmates in racialised terms. However, his further responses in 
relation to negative choices suggested something else. 
 
Adam rejected the other five girls and two boys as his potential playmates. I 
asked him about the reason he would not like to play with some of them: 
 
Interivewer: Why would not you like to play with this child  
(points to the photograph of the Aboriginal girl with dark skin)? 
Adam: Because she would not like to play with me. 
I: Why do you think she would not like to play with you? 
A: Because brown people don’t sort of like playing with  
‘whitish’ people. 
I: Oh, is that so? Because brown people don’t play with who? 
A: ‘Whitish’ skin people.   232
I: I see. And this girl (points to the European-Australian girl with 
blond hair)? Why wouldn’t you like to play with her? 
A: Because she will always chase me. 
I: He he. Do you think so? Why would she chase you? 
A: mm mm (hesitates) Because she just looks like that. 
I: And you would not like to play chasey? 
A: No. 
I: Aha. Any other reason? 
A: No (shakes his head). 
I: No? Alright. So tell me about this one (points to the Aboriginal girl with 
light hair and quite light skin).  Why wouldn’t you like to play with her? 
A: Because she wouldn’t. She looks like she wouldn’t play with me. 
I: Why wouldn’t she play with you? 
A: Because she looks um … because she ‘cos she looks  …’cos she  
feels like us that we don’t like playing with brownish people. 
I: Because she feels …? Could you please say it again? She feels … 
A: She feels like us not playing with brownish people, ‘cause um um um 
‘brownish’ people do not play with ‘whitish’ people. 
I: Oh, is that so? I see. And this girl (points to a photo of a Chinese girl). 
Why wouldn’t you like to play with her? 
A: Because she’d always bully me. 
I: She would bully you. I see. Why would she do that? 
A: Because she is too big for me. 
I: So you think she would bully you because she is bigger than you. 
How do you know that she is bigger than you? 
A: I just think so. 
I: And what about this child (points to a European-Australian girl  
with dark hair)? 
A: No, I would not like to play with her. 
I: Why not. 
A: Because she looks like she would not be much fun. 
I: Why not. 
A: I am not sure. 
 
It is important to reflect on the way Adam tried to justify his choices. It 
seemed that he rejected the two European-Australian girls on the basis of their play 
style. I felt that he assumed they would not engage in play that was attractive enough 
for him. However, in relation to the Aboriginal girls his reasoning seemed to be 
different. He said that he would not like to play with them, but when asked to justify 
his decision he seemed to shift the responsibility for his choice and suggested that it 
would be the girls who would not want to play with him. Unlike his comments in   233
relation to European-Australian girls, this time he did not refer to play style. Instead, 
he made a generalised statement about “people with brown skin”, who do not like 
playing with people with “whitish skin”. It almost felt that in order to justify his 
unwillingness to play with these girls he was blaming the Other.  
 
In relation to the Chinese girl, whom he also rejected as a potential playmate, 
Adam justified his choice in a different way. He talked about her as a potential threat 
(“she would bully me”), and described her as “too big for him”. As all the children in 
the photographs were approximately of the same age, they were all similarly built 
and had only their head and shoulders showing, there were hardly any cues, which 
could suggest to Adam that this girl was much ‘bigger’ than him. One possible 
interpretation might be that, Adam perceived people of certain physical 
characteristics as a possible threat. As he dealt with the photograph of a Chinese boy, 
one of the two boys whom he rejected as his potential playmate in a parallel manner, 
such suggestion appears quite possible: 
 
I: Why wouldn’t you like to play with this boy (points to the photo 
of a Chinese boy)? 
A: I would not like to play with him because he’s brown and he’s got  
blackish hair….Because he would…. (hesitates)…  
because he is too big for me . He would want to play with his own size and 
bully me. 
 
I was not sure what the real reason was for Adam not wanting to play with 
this child as he referred to his skin colour, hair colour as well as the body size. 
Therefore, I started prompting him by repeating the first part of his initial response: 
   234
Oh, I see. So tell me again, you would not like to play with him because he 
is…?  
A: Brown …mm, and he is too big for me. 
I: And he is too big for you. So what is the reason you wouldn’t like to 
play with him? 
A: Because I do not like playing with brown people, they are too brown  
for me….  
I: They are too brown for you. Why is that? Why does it make you 
not want to play with them? 
A: Um … Because they come from a different country. 
I: Oh, so that’s the reason? So, if they come from a different country  
… , why wouldn’t you like to play with them? 
Adam: ‘cause um um  brown country um they have spears.  
I: Ah, because they have spears in the ‘brown’ country … 
A: Yes. 
I: Ah, and what do you think could happen then? 
A: He could chuck it at me? 
I: Who could ‘chuck’ it at you? 
A: He could (Adam points at the photo of the Chinese boy). 
I: Oh, do you think he might have a spear? 
A: nods 
I: But people usually do not walk with spears here, do they? 
A: No. 
I: No, but you think he might have one. 
A: mm (nods his head). 
I: And that he might ‘chuck’ it at you. Do you really think so? 
A: mm My dad had um … a spear in his hand. 
I: Your dad has got a spear?  
A: Um … no,  he um … got a spear stuck in his hand. 
I: Did he? When was that? 
A: Um … when he went up to India. 
I: Oh, really? 
A: Yep, because he works up there. 
I: Oh does he?  
A: mm 
I: And what happened? 
A: And someone threw a spear at him. 
I: Really? 
A: But he put his hand up like that (demonstrates by lifting his arm) 
and it just went straight through him. 
I: Through his hand? 
A: mm and they um … and he was in hospital. 
I: Really? Why did it happen? Why did someone throw a spear at him? 
A: Cause he is… um… white. 
I: Oh, is that so? And is your Dad’s hand OK now? 
A: Yep, he is fine. 
I: Do you think he will go back to work there? 
A: I do not know.  
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I spoke to Adam’s teacher afterwards and asked her whether his father 
worked overseas. She was not aware of this. It is difficult to establish whether Adam 
invented his story about his Dad or whether he really heard it from him. It seems 
quite obvious, however, that he heard some negative comments about “people with 
dark skin” and this influenced his prejudiced views about them and his playmate 
preferences. His views, however, were not u n i f o r m .  I t  s e e m e d  t h a t  A d a m  w a s  
struggling to make sense of his social world. For example, he chose Aboriginal boys 
as his potential playmates, but rejected Aboriginal girls on the basis of their “brown 
skin”. Although the Kurdish children had quite a dark complexion, Adam made 
positive choices in relation to both of them. However, he rejected Chinese children. 
He referred to them as “brown people” and described them as a potential threat. This 
inconsistency may be a result of receiving different, perhaps conflicting messages 
from various Microsystems, such as school, home and peers.  
 
Adam’s comments about some of the photographs at the beginning of the 
interview appeared to suggest that his positive choices could have also been 
influenced by his direct interactions with children from a variety of groups. For 
example, the only girl he had chosen, as someone whom he would like to have as a 
friend, was a Kurdish girl. According to Adam, this girl looked like his neighbour’s 
daughter who sometimes looked after him. Similarly, his positive verbal choices 
made in relation to Aboriginal boys, despite his derogatory comments about “people 
with brown skin” could have been influenced by his experiences with his Aboriginal 
playmate Andrew. Interestingly, however, this positive experience did not impact on 
his attitude toward Aboriginal girls. There is no clear evidence which would explain 
Adam’s choices and, at times, contradictory points of view. However, it is possible   236
to make a tentative claim that Adam seemed to be caught between his sympathetic 
feelings towards the Aboriginal boy in his class and a girl from his neighbourhood, 
who looked like the Kurdish girl in the picture presented to him, and whose company 
he enjoyed, and at the same time, the need to express his negative opinion about the 
“people with brown skin”, possibly as a sign of loyalty to his father who seemed to 
hold negative views in relation to the ‘racial other’. It appeared that he started 
developing not only racist views but also gender bias. This emerging bias seemed to 
become clearer during the second interview with Adam and will be reported in the 
next chapter. 
 
Is it acceptable to discuss ‘racial’ preferences in relation to potential     
playmates? 
 
Not all children were as open as Adam in discussing their playmate 
preferences. Similarly to the classification tasks during the first part of the interview, 
some children seemed reluctant to openly talk about their potential playmate choices. 
In some cases their preferences were consistently made along basic ‘white skin – 
black skin’ categories. In others, they were applied to only one group. However, 
regardless of this some children tried to avoid direct references to racial 
characteristics as a reason for their choices. This seemed interesting to me, as these 
children were often quite happy to discus their gender preferences. 
 
Cleo (5 years 5 months old girl) 
 
This was the case for Cleo who appeared to use gender rather than ‘race’ 
when selecting potential playmates.  She made negative choices in relation to all   237
boys presented to her in the photographs. In relation to girls, Cleo initially rejected 
an Aboriginal girl with light hair and skin and a Chinese girl. When asked to justify 
her choices, Cleo changed her mind and added the photograph of a Chinese girl to 
the ‘I would like to play with’ pile. She justified her potential playmate choices like 
this: 
 
Cleo: I would like to play with these children (points to a European- 
Australian girl with blond hair and an Aboriginal girl with dark hair 
and skin) because they look nice. 
Interviewer: And this one (points to the photograph of an Indian girl)? 
C: I just want to. 
I: But why? Why would you like to play with her? 
C: Because she looks friendly. 
I: Oh, I see. And this one (points to the photo of a European- 
Australian girl with dark hair)? 
C: Nods and smiles … Yes I would like to play with her, but I do not  
really know why. 
I: Don’t you? That’s OK. What about this one (points to the photo of an  
Aboriginal girl with light hair and skin)? 
C: No. I do not want to play with her (slides down in chair, no smile). 
I: Why is that? 
C: Because she looks funny. 
I: Does she? Why does she look funny? 
C: Because she has squishy hair all over. 
I: You said before that you would not like to play with this girl  
(points to the photo of a Chinese girl). Why is that? 
C: No, I do want to play with her (leans back in chair, smiles). 
I: Oh, do you? Could you tell me why? 
C: Shrugs her shoulders… I do not know why. 
 
In relation to the boys Cleo said: 
 
Interviewer: Why would you not like to play with this child (points 
to a European-Australian boy with blond hair)? 
Cleo: No reason (shrugs her shoulders, smiles). 
I: I see. And this one (points to an Aboriginal boy with dark hair and 
 skin)?  
C: No. 
I: Why wouldn’t you like to play with him? Could you tell me please? 
C: Because he looks like he is angry.   238
I: Does he? 
C: Yes (nods her head; no smile). 
I: What makes him look like that? 
C: His face. He’s got an angry face. 
I: Aha. And what about this one (points to a photo of a European- 
Australian boy with blond hair)? Why wouldn’t you like to play  
with him? 
C: (Shrugs and shakes her head; smiles) 
I: Could you tell me why? 
C: No reason. 
I: I see. And this one (points to the photo of an Aboriginal boy with  
blond hair and light skin)? 
C: No  
I: Why not? 
C: Shrugs her shoulders and smiles. 
I: And what about this one (points to the photo of and Indian boy)? 
C: No. He looks quite silly. 
I: What makes him look silly?  
C: I don’t know (twirls piece of hair with her hand; looks away; no smile). 
I: And this one (points to a European-Australian boy with dark hair)? 
C: No reason (looks at interviewer; shrugs and smiles). 
I: I see. And this one (points to a photo of a Chinese boy)? Why  
wouldn’t you like to play with him? 
C: Because he looks a bit funny? 
I: Does he? 
C: Nods her head; places head between hands; no smile. 
 
It is interesting to note that during the earlier categorising tasks, when she 
consistently used gender to differentiate between herself and other children, Cleo 
also seemed to refer to gender in relation to her potential playmates. She chose five 
girls (two European-Australians, an Indian, a Chinese and an Aboriginal girl with 
dark skin). When justifying her choices in relation to those girls, she stated that they 
had a “nice and friendly look”. The only girl, whom she did not choose as a potential 
playmate, was an Aboriginal girl with light skin and blond hair. Cleo described this 
girl as funny looking because of her “squishy hair” and used this attribute as a reason 
for rejection. Given this, it seemed that she did not think of her female playmates in 
racialised terms. This was not the case in relation to the boys. Although she rejected 
all of them during the physical categorisation of the photographs, which might have   239
suggested that her choices were influenced by same-gender orientation, her verbal 
justification and her body language provided me with information, which brought 
another dimension to the reasons for making her choices.  
 
When asked to explain her choices in relation to the boys from European-
Australian background, Cleo smiled, shrugged her shoulders and said that there was 
no particular reason. She also responded in a similar manner in relation to the 
photograph of an Aboriginal-Australian boy with light skin and hair. She appeared to 
be relaxed and maintained eye contact with me. However, in relation to the 
Aboriginal boy with dark complexion and to the boys from Indian and Chinese 
background Cleo described them as being angry, silly and funny respectively. Her 
body language was also different here. I observed her frowning, looking away, and 
sometimes twirling her hair, which could have been indicative of some uneasiness. 
Cleo reacted in a similar way during the earlier categorisation tasks, when she 
frowned every time she saw the photograph of the Aboriginal boy with dark skin and 
described him as having an “angry face”. It appeared that like Scot, Cleo’s 
understanding of Aboriginality was linked to feelings of a potential threat. This may 
suggest that although gender played an important role in Cleo’s verbally stated 
playmate preferences, they were also influenced by her perception of the ‘racial’ 
Other. However, discussing her reasons for making negative playmate choices 
seemed to make Cleo uneasy.  
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Natalie (5 years old girl) 
 
Like Cleo, Natalie also appeared to be uncomfortable in discussing race in 
relation to her playmate preferences. I observed earlier on, that during the 
categorising tasks Natalie seemed apprehensive about discussing skin colour 
differences. This uneasiness became even more evident in relation to potential 
playmate choices. Initially, when presented with a set of all photographs and asked 
to choose those children with whom Natalie would like to play/have as a friend, she 
appeared to use gender as a differentiating category. Like Cleo, she rejected all boys 
and clearly stated that the reason for not wanting to play with them was that they 
were boys. However, the choice of girls suggested that gender was not the only 
characteristic that Natalie used during this task. The only girls that she selected as 
potential friends from a choice of six were two European-Australians. The girls 
whom she rejected as potential playmates were from Indian, Chinese and Aboriginal 
backgrounds. The way she justified her choices was quite interesting. For example, 
when asked why she would like to play with the two European-Australian girls, she 
said: 
 
Because they both have short hair. 
I: Is that the reason? Because they have short hair? 
N: mmm (nods her head). 
I: But this one has got much longer hair than that one, hasn’t she?  
(interviewer points to the relevant photographs of the European- 
Australian girls; one of them had her hair in a bob, in line with  
her jaw; the other had her hair about 10 cm past her shoulders).  
N: It doesn’t matter. 
I: It doesn’t matter? You still would like to play with these two girls? 
N: Mhm (nods her head). 
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When asked to justify her rejection of the photograph of the Aboriginal girl 
with light skin Natalie said: 
 
I would not like to play with her because … (hesitates) I will  
play with my friends. 
I: But if your friends went away, on holidays, would you like  
to play with this one? 
N: I would play with myself…. (hesitates) and with my little sister. 
I: But if this girl (pointing to the photo of an Aboriginal girl) 
came to you and said: ‘Natalie, would you like to play with me?’  
What would you say? 
N: I do not know. 
I: Would you say ‘Yes’ or ‘No’? 
N: ‘No’. I would play with my little sister or my bigger sister. 
 
  When asked about the photograph of an Indian girl and an Aboriginal girl 
with dark skin, Natalie responded in a similar way: 
 
No. I would not play with this girl (looking at the photograph of  
an Indian girl). 
I: Why not? 
N: Because I would play with my little sister. 
 
I: What about this one (pointing to the photograph of an Aboriginal  
girl). 
N: No. 
I: Why is that? 
N: ‘cos. 
I: You can’t tell me, or you do not know. 
N: I do not know (emphatically). 
 
Listening to Natalie’s responses and observing her physical selection of 
photographs, made me realise how important it was to consider not only what 
Natalie said, but also what she chose not to say. Initially, in a similar manner to 
Cleo, her playmate preferences seemed to be influenced by gender, as she rejected 
all boys as her potential friends. There were a number of cues during the selection of   242
girls, however, which indicated that although she did not state it verbally, her 
preferences were also influenced by ‘race’. These cues included Natalie’s choice of 
only European-Australian girls as potential friends, her frequent hesitation before she 
answered some of the questions, as well as the way she justified her choices. For 
example, her explanation for selecting the European-Australian girls as her potential 
playmates on the basis of their hair length did not seem convincing as these girls had 
hair which varied greatly in both colour as well as in length. If this criterion was to 
be used, these two girls could have been easily matched with the photographs of the 
Aboriginal-Australian girls, as one of them had light hair past her shoulders and the 
other had dark, short hair reaching to her jaw line. Their hair resembled very much 
the hairstyles of the European-Australian girls. Natalie, however, did not comment 
on these similarities. It appeared that there must have been other reasons for her 
classification, which Natalie did not want to reveal or was unable to explain. It is 
possible that these were related to ‘race’.   
 
Natalie clearly admitted her unwillingness to play with boys on the basis of 
their gender. However, she appeared uncomfortable to talk about other reasons for 
rejecting her potential female playmates. This could have been linked to her 
perception of social expectations. Talking openly about gender differences and 
choosing same gender playmates is socially acceptable and even encouraged in our 
society. However, openly admitting one’s unwillingness to associate with the ‘racial’ 
Other is not accepted since multiculturalism has been declared an official policy in 
Australia. According to Brown (1995), surveys of ethnic attitudes indicate decline in 
prejudice in the last thirty years, observed in various countries such as USA, 
Australia and Great Britain. However, some new, less reactive behavioural measures   243
show that this decline seems to be a result of changing social desirability norms 
rather than internalised non-prejudiced beliefs. Although the dominant group 
members do not overtly express prejudice towards various ethnic groups, such 
prejudice still exists.  
 
As Brown (1995) suggests, prejudice has not declined, it only changed its 
form from open hostility to some indirect, subtle ways. An example of such covert 
racist discourse is what Gaertner and Dovidio (1986) call an ideology of aversive 
prejudice. Such discourse, according to Brown (1995), who refers to Dijker (1987) is 
characterized by discrete avoidance of ethnic minorities in private contexts justified 
by the “feelings of anxiety, irritation and concern” of the members of dominant 
culture in the presence of people who are ‘not like them’ (p.231). As Bronfenbrenner 
(1979) argues, children develop their thoughts and feelings in the context of their 
Microsystem interactions. Therefore, it can be put forward that their unwillingness to 
openly discuss their playmate preferences in relation to the ‘racial’ Other may be 
influenced by their participation, either active or passive in discourses characterized 
by aversive prejudice in their Microsystems such home, school or neighbourhood. 
This could be one possible interpretation of Natalie’s negative playmate preferences 
and her reluctance to discuss them openly.  
 
Lisa (7 year 4 months old girl) 
 
Like Natalie and Cleo, Lisa’s potential playmate choices initially suggested 
same gender-orientation. During the physical categorisation of photos, Lisa 
consistently rejected all boys and made positive choices in relation to all girls.   244
However, her verbal justification of these choices made me aware that like Natalie 
and Cleo, she also perceived her potential playmates in racialised terms. For 
example, when asked to justify her choices in relation to girls Lisa often responded 
“because she is a girl”. However, when asked to explain why she would like to play 
with an Aboriginal girl with dark skin, Lisa’s response was different: 
 
I would play with her because she is Aboriginal and she might not have 
enough food. 
  I: Oh, so how would that help her? 
L: Because it might help her not to be shy. 
 
While saying that, Lisa had a serious expression on her face and spoke in a 
very soft voice. On other occasions she usually smiled while providing her answers. 
It almost felt as if Lisa made a positive potential choice in relation to the Aboriginal 
girl, not because she really wanted to play with her, but because she believed that it 
was the right thing to do and say. The following example of Lisa’s dealing with a 
photo of a European-Australian girl, whose physical appearance might have possibly 
suggested to Lisa her non-English speaking background, seems to follow a similar 
pattern: 
 
  Lisa: I would like to play with her because she might come  
from a different country. 
Interviewer: Oh, she might come from a different country? 
L: mhm, (nods her head) she…mmm…she might not know any language.  
It would be good for her. She might learn a language. 
I: Oh, I see. So you would be helping her. 
Lisa: mhm (serious expression, nods her head). Yes (empathically).  
 
Lisa perceived the Aboriginal girl, as well as another child whom she 
believed came from “a different country”, as requiring her help and support. It   245
almost felt that the reason she stated her readiness to play with them was that she felt 
pity for them. Furthermore, she considered the second child as “not knowing any 
language” as if a language other than English was not of the same importance. Based 
on the literature, I would like to suggest that such understanding could have been a 
result of information Lisa received from various Microsystems, such as her school, 
neighbourhood, or family. English is a national language in Australia and, until 
recently, other languages have not been considered as important in an official 
language policy (see Kalantzis, Cope and Slade, 1989; Lo Bianco, 1990). Despite a 
slow rise in the public status of learning Languages Other Than English (LOTE) in 
the last two decades more effort on behalf of governments, policy makers and 
practitioners is required to bring the importance of teaching LOTE to the level of 
teaching English. According to Australian Secondary Principals’ Association (2002), 
the current delivery of LOTE across Australia is fragmented and often based on 
school based decisions. There is a need to advocate the teaching of LOTE as a 
valued part of the curriculum as well as to raise awareness about the importance of 
languages other than English within Australian communities, “some of whom have 
difficulty seeing the wider educational and social benefits that knowledge of a 
second language and culture can provide” (ASPA, 2002, p.2).  
 
I would like to suggest that Lisa’s comments appeared to exemplify the 
above. I felt that she perceived English as an important language, but did not seem to 
value other languages to the same extent. Furthermore, her statements about some of 
the children from culturally and linguistically diverse background showed that she 
perceived ‘them’ as needing ‘our’ help. It is possible to infer that due to her   246
perception of what is socially expected to do and say she chose these children as her 
potential playmates. 
 
Lisa’s perception of social desirability seemed to be also illustrated by her 
difficulty to justify her decision of why she would like to play with a girl from a 
Chinese background. This is what she said: 
 
  Interviewer: Could you tell me, why you would like to play with her. 
  Lisa: Because … mm … 
  I: Decisions, decisions… 
  L: I do not know. 
  I: You do not know? But what comes to your mind? 
  L: Because… mm…I am not sure. 
 
As I stated before, Lisa’s social preferences initially appeared to be 
dominated by gender, as she selected all boys as children with whom she would not 
like to play. When asked to explain why she would not like to play with the 
European-Australian boys, Lisa very quickly and firmly stated that “they are boys 
and I do not like boys”. She laughed and also added that unfortunately she had “to 
like her three brothers sometimes”. This statement suggested that her negative 
evaluation of the male gender could have been influenced by the experiences with 
her brothers. However, when it came to the photograph of the Chinese boy, Lisa 
stopped smiling. She hesitated for quite a while before answering and finally said 
quite slowly “because he is a boy, maybe ….” Her intonation seemed to suggest that 
she was asking rather than stating it. It appeared that she was not sure how to answer 
my question. When justifying her choices of not wanting to play with the Kurdish 
boy who had rather dark skin as well as with the two Aboriginal boys, Lisa provided 
the following explanation:   247
 
  Interviewer: Tell me please why you would not like to play with this child 
  (Aboriginal boy with dark skin)? 
Lisa: … hesitates Because he is a boy as well. 
I: Oh, I see. Any other reason? 
L: Um … He might not be like us [sic] (hangs her head, no smile). 
I: He might not be like us? What do you mean? 
L: … hesitates He might not speak nice with us [sic]. 
I: Oh? Why do you think so? 
L: Because … he is an Aboriginal (looks at interviewer as if seeking  
approval). 
I: I see. Is there anything else you would like to tell me? 
L: Uh Uh…(shakes her head). 
 
Lisa made similar comments in relation to the Kurdish boy: 
 
  He might not be nice to me. 
  I: Oh, why do you think so? 
  L: Because … I just think that he … (hesitates). 
  I: Is there a special reason that you think he might not be nice to you? 
  L: Because … the way he looks. 
  I: The way he looks? So how, would you say, he looks? 
  L: Like he… (hesitates) Because he … 
  I: …because he? 
 L:  …(hesitates)… I can’t describe it. 
  I: You can’t describe it. You just think he might not be nice to you,  
   but you do not know why. 
Lisa: mmm (nods her head) 
 
In relation to the Aboriginal boy with light skin Lisa stated: 
 
  I would not like to play with him because … (hesitates). 
 I:  Because? 
  L: Because he might not be nice to me. The way he looks … 
  I: Ah, how does he look? 
  L: Because he is not smiling. 
While Lisa did not clearly explain her reasons, she made explicit negative 
comments about the last two boys’ possible behaviour on the basis of their “looks”.   248
It was quite surprising, as these comments were made even in relation to the Kurdish 
boy who, in the photograph, had a very friendly, broad smile. She did not mention 
his smile, but used this criterion to reject the photo of an Aboriginal boy with light 
skin. Although Lisa rejected all boys, she seemed to be unsure how to justify her 
rejection in relation to the Chinese boy and expressed her apprehension in relation to 
the behaviour of two Aboriginal boys and a Kurdish boy.  
 
Her negative remarks in relation to these children and the ambiguity during 
the process of justifying her choices suggested to me that like Adam, Lisa started 
developing not only gender, but also ‘racial’ bias. She spontaneously expressed this 
bias when rejecting the photo of the Aboriginal boy with dark skin by clearly stating 
that the reason for not willing to play with him was his Aboriginality. She also made 
an interesting comment about the possibility of this boy “not being like us and not 
speaking nice to us”. It seemed to me that Lisa started making a division between 
‘us’ and ‘them’ and constructing the ‘other’ as a potential threat. Lisa’s body 
language also suggested that talking about these three boys as well as the Chinese 
boy and explaining her negative choices was not easy for her. She frequently 
hesitated, spoke without a smile and sometimes looked at me as if trying to make 
sure whether she said what she thought I expected of her. The second interview, 
during which Lisa was asked to describe the children in the photographs by a set of 
adjectives, provided further information about Lisa’s racialised thinking in relation 
to these children.  
 
As for girls, Lisa made positive potential friendship choices in relation to all 
of them. However, her verbal justification in relation to the Chinese, an Aboriginal   249
girl with dark skin and the European-Australian girl, whom Lisa constructed as 
“coming from a different country”, suggested to me that her verbally expressed 
willingness to play with these children was linked to her perception of what she was 
expected to say.  
 
Lisa seemed to struggle with the contradictory nature of various racialised 
discourses that are present in Australia. On the one hand she had a desire to say the 
right things, as in the discourse of multiculturalism, to which children often are 
exposed in their formal contexts such as school for example (Rizvi, 1993a), we are 
‘all the same’ and should be treated with respect. On the other hand she expressed 
her apprehension in relation to some of the children being her potential playmates, as  
in some other racialised discourses in Australia, which I discussed in Chapter 3, the 
‘racial’ Other is often portrayed as being distinctly different from ‘us’ and sometimes 
also as a threat.  
 
Simone (7 years 1 month old girl) 
 
In a similar way to Lisa, Simone also used gender in her selection of the 
potential playmates. However, at times it appeared that she also thought of them in 
racialised terms. The sequence of her selection, her body language, hesitation and 
some of her verbal statements seemed to also suggest that her perception of social 
expectations influenced some of her responses: 
 
Simone: Looks at the photographs placed on the table in front of her.  
She  quickly picks up a photo of an European- Australian girl with blond  
hair and places it on the ‘I would like to play with’ circle. She then picks  
up a photo of another European-Australian girl with dark hair and places    250
it on the same circle. She continues with the photograph of a Chinese girl  
in the same manner and then stops. 
Interviewer: So these are the children you would like to play with? 
S: Nods. Looks again, hesitates, sighs and then picks up a photo of 
an Aboriginal girl with dark skin and says: And that one (Places it on 
the ‘I would like to play circle’). 
I: And that one? OK. 
S: Looks at the photographs for a while and picks up a photo of  
an Aboriginal  girl with light skin and places it on the same circle.  
Hesitates again… Picks up a photo of an Aboriginal boy with dark  
skin and places it on the ‘I do not want to play with circle’. 
She then picks up a photo of a Kurdish girl and places it on the ‘Yes’ 
circle.  
Simone looks again at the remaining photos (only boys left) and places  
them on the ‘No’ circle in the following sequence: a Kurdish boy,  
an Aboriginal boy with light skin, a Chinese boy and two  
European-Australian boys. 
 
After selecting all the photographs Simone justified her choices: 
  
Interviewer: Why would you like to play with this girl? (pointing to  
the photo of a Kurdish girl). 
Simone: Because she looks like she would be a nice girl and she would  
not hurt anybody … hesitates …and she looks nice. 
I: Oh, I see. And this one? (points to the photo of an Aboriginal girl with  
light skin). 
S: She has got a nice smile and she looks friendly. 
I: I see. And this one? (pointing to the photo of a Chinese girl). 
S: Because she looks friendly and has got a nice smile. (the girl in  
this photograph does not smile). 
 
Simone justified her choices in relation to the rest of the girls in the similar 
manner. It seemed that her choice of all the girls as potential playmates had been 
influenced by her same-gender orientation, which becomes quite apparent in middle 
childhood (Berk, 2002). However, it can be also noticed that the European-
Australian girls as well as the Chinese girl have been selected almost automatically, 
while the Aboriginal and Kurdish girls have been ‘added on’ after a considerable 
period of hesitation. It needs also to be noted that although all the girls have been   251
labelled as being friendly and ‘nicely’ looking, Simone’s responses did not always 
sound convincing. At times it almost felt that she was repeating the same phrase 
without really meaning it, like when she described the Chinese girl as friendly 
because of her smile, while in fact she did not smile at all. 
 
Simone’s responses in relation to the boys were as follows: 
 
Interviewer: Now tell me why you wouldn’t like to play with this child  
(points to the photo of a European-Australian boy with dark hair).   
S: Looks at the photo; smiles; laughs; Because he is a boy … 
He does not look that nice. 
I: Does not look that nice. I see. 
S: Laughs. 
I: Why doesn’t he look nice? 
S: I do not know (giggles) 
Just the look of him … (looks at me recording her responses; looks at  
the camera). 
I: I see. And this one (pointing to the photo of a Chinese boy)? 
S: Because he is the same. He is a boy and he does not look nice (smiles  
and then giggles). She then picks up a photo of an Aboriginal boy with 
light skin and says: No. I would not like to play with him because  
he is a boy and he looks tough (her face  expression changes; she  
stops smiling). 
I: OK. And this one (points to the photo of a European-Australian boy 
 with blond hair)? 
S: Because he is a boy (giggles for quite a while). He does not look  
that friendly. 
I: And what can you tell me about this one (pointing to the photo of  
an Aboriginal boy with dark skin)? 
S: He does not look nice (face expression changes again;  
she stops smiling and sighs; she did that before in relation to  
the other Aboriginal boy). He looks like he is going to hurt somebody. 
I: Does he? Why does he look like he is going to hurt somebody? 
S: Sighs again; Because he looks a bit cross (Simone tightens her lips  
and looks at the camera). 
I: Does he? 
S: Yes (nods). 
I: And this child ? Why would you not like to play with this one (pointing  
to the Kurdish boy)? 
S: Because he does not look that friendly. 
I: Is there any other reason? 
S: No. 
I: Is it because he is a boy?   252
S: Probably. 
I: Or is it because he does not look friendly? 
S: Because he does not look friendly  (the child in the photograph has  
 a beaming smile on his face). 
 
Simone, like Lisa, rejected all boys, but appeared to react differently towards 
the Aboriginal boys and a Kurdish boy in comparison to the other three. She 
dismissed the European-Australian boys and a Chinese boy with a giggle. She stated 
in relation to all of them that they were boys and did not look that nice and friendly. 
When she spoke about the Kurdish boy, her smile disappeared. As I mentioned 
before, this boy had a very friendly smile. Despite that Simone, like Lisa, still put 
him in the ‘unfriendly category’. It can be argued that she did this on the basis of 
gender. However, her change in expression when she referred to this boy, as well as 
the fact that she rejected him for his ‘unfriendliness’ rather than for ‘being a boy’ 
may suggest that gender was not the only reason. When dealing with the 
photographs of the Aboriginal boys Lisa’s body language was similar. She also 
looked at them without a smile. However, rather than describing them as unfriendly, 
she talked about one of them as being “tough” and the other as “cross” looking. Like 
Lisa, Simone also made a comment about a potential aggressive behaviour of the 
Aboriginal boy with dark skin. 
 
 Simone rejected all boys and made positive choices in relation to all girls, 
which may suggest same-gender orientation in her selection of potential friends. 
However, the sequence in which she selected the photographs of children and her 
remarks in relation to the Aboriginal boys as well as the Kurdish boy demonstrated 
that she also perceived her potential playmates in racialised terms. Her rejection of 
these three boys could be interpreted in a number of ways. It is possible that she   253
linked it to her negative personal experience. However, in the earlier part of the 
interview she did not identify any of these children as looking as someone she knew. 
It is possible that despite the lack of direct experience Simone developed a 
stereotyped image of the ‘racial’ Other and for that reason perceived these boys as a 
potential threat. Rizvi (1993a) maintains that children who enter primary schools 
have already been exposed to racially constructed images of social relations. Based 
on his study conducted in two primary schools in Victoria, Australia, Rizvi argues 
that young children “engage in certain ideological practices of popular racism, which 
inform their engagement in the learning tasks performed at school” (Rizvi, p. 131). 
When asked to draw pictures about crime, more than fifty percent of grade one 
students represented robbers as black and the police and the robbed as white. These 
racialised images were based on the taken-for-granted assumptions, which as Rizvi 
argues further, are located in a wider context of social relations. The children who 
participated in this task had very few direct social relations with a black person and 
therefore their imagery, as Rizvi suggests, has been developed mainly through 
television and other mass media. It is possible to make a tentative claim, that 
Simone’s negative image of the three boys was also based on the taken-for-granted 
assumptions, which she developed despite the lack of close relations with children 
who looked like that. This theme of the ‘racial’ Other being perceived as a potential 
threat was also present in the earlier presented responses of Lisa, Scot, Cleo and 
Adam.  
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Conclusion 
 
Is there a link between children’s categorization based on characteristics 
commonly associated with ‘race’ and their verbally stated playmate 
preferences? 
 
My study demonstrates that physical characteristics commonly associated 
with ‘race’ played an important role in my participants’ construction of difference. 
All of them spontaneously responded to differences in physical characteristics and 
often categorised people on the basis of skin, hair and eye colour, or facial features. 
For some children, their consistent emphasis on such characteristics was linked to 
their playmate choices. It seemed that for them, these differences carried specific 
connotations. Other children, however, regardless of how frequently they used race 
related characteristics during categorizing tasks, did not seem to think of their 
potential playmates in racialised terms. As the tendency of perceiving potential 
playmates in racialised terms did not seem to decrease with age, it can be argued that 
how my participants view difference and how they select their potential playmates 
was linked to environmental, rather than to developmental factors.  
 
Salience of race in relation to potential playmates appeared to be more 
context specific in the older participants. Some younger children made their 
playmate choices along the basic ‘us-white’ and ‘them-black’ categories, while some 
older ones were often more selective and targeted certain groups, be it Aboriginal or 
Asian-Australians. In some cases, older children’s ‘race’ related preferences were 
even more specific and influenced by factors such as gender. Although several 
children spoke of family or school experiences that could be described as eliciting 
their racist responses, there was no evidence that children’s negative race related   255
playmate choices were linked to their direct experiences with their peers. Therefore, 
it is possible to argue that these choices were related to the racialised images of 
difference and social relations that these children developed as a result of discourses 
to which they were exposed in their various Microsystems such family, school or 
neighbourhood or through the media. Some of the older participants seemed to 
struggle with the meaning of these discourses in order to make sense of their own 
social experiences. Similar findings in relation to five- and six-year-old children 
were reported by Connolly (1996, 1998b). 
 
An interesting pattern in relation to the perception of difference and potential 
playmate choices was observed during my interviews with Ella and Adam.  It 
seemed that at the age of 3 years 9 months she was aware of a social meaning of 
difference. Ella frequently responded to skin colour cues during the categorisation 
tasks and referred to these characteristics when making her playmate choices. She 
consistently rejected as her potential playmates all children whom she constructed as 
having skin colour different to her. A similar preoccupation with ‘race’ was also 
observed during the interviews with Adam (7 years 4 months). He responded to skin 
colour cues in relation to every triad of photographs presented to him. His playmate 
preferences were also clearly linked to characteristics commonly associated with 
‘race’, although they were not made along basic ‘white-black’ skin categories.   
Adam selected two Aboriginal boys, a Kurdish boy and a girl and a European-
Australian boy as his potential playmates, but at the same time rejected two Chinese 
children (a girl and a boy) and two Aboriginal girls on the basis of their skin colour. 
His justification of the negative choices demonstrated that for him skin colour 
carried specific meaning. His comments in relation to some of the photographs   256
demonstrated his prejudiced racialised thinking. Adam’s responses as well as Ella’s 
seemed to suggest a clear link between a consistent categorization of people on the 
basis of characteristics typically associated with ‘race’ and racialised playmate 
choices.    
 
However, data obtained from my interviews with Dane (3 years 4 months), 
Patrick (3 years 6 months) and George (5 years 4 months) showed that even frequent 
use of ‘racial’ characteristics during the categorisation tasks does not necessarily 
mean that children construct their potential playmates in racialised terms. Dane, for 
example, consistently separated the photographs of European-Australian children 
from the non European-Australians in five out of six triads of photographs presented 
to him. This suggested to me that he responded to skin colour cues. George and 
Patrick responded to skin colour differences even more consistently, as they 
separated all the photographs along the basic white-black skin categories. George’s 
verbal responses also focused, time after time, on skin colour.  Despite these strong 
emphases on racial characteristics during the categorisation tasks, Dane, Patrick and 
George did not seem to use these characteristics when selecting their potential 
playmates. It seemed that for them the meaning of skin colour did not go beyond the 
mere difference in the level of pigmentation.  
 
Furthermore, it has to be also noted that that the frequency of choices did not 
seem to provide meaningful information about children’s racialisation of potential 
playmates, as children’s choices varied quite often from one context to the next. It 
was important therefore to listen to how children justified their preferences rather 
than to focus on how often they rejected the ‘racial’ Others. For example Scot   257
rejected only two boys from a choice of six, but the way he explained his decisions 
clearly demonstrated that he perceived his potential playmates in racialised terms. 
 
Children’s construction of the rejected potential playmates 
  
“Brown people do not like playing with whitish people” 
 
Some patterns were identified in the participants’ construction of children 
whom they rejected as potential playmates on the basis of ‘race’. One of these 
patterns included the ‘othering’ of the children who were perceived as being not like 
‘us’. For example seven year old Adam explained his negative playmate choices in 
relation to two Aboriginal girls by stating that: “brown people did not sort of like 
playing with ‘whitish’ people” and that one of the girls “felt like us not playing with 
brownish people”. Adam’s division between ‘them’ and ‘us’, seems to echo the 
discourse of ‘new racism’ (Barker, 1981) in which people ‘naturally’ prefer and feel 
comfortable in the company of their ‘own’ kind. His responses as well as Lisa’s (7 
years 4 months), who justified her rejection of an Aboriginal boy with dark skin by 
saying that “He might not be like us” seem to be good examples of such discourses. 
 
“He might not be nice to us” 
 
The racial Other was also perceived by several children as a potential threat. 
Adam (7 years 4 months) for example, stated that a Chinese boy was “too big for 
me” and that “he would want to play with his own size and bully me”. Adam made 
very similar comments in relation to the Chinese girl and made some references to   258
people with brown skin who might “hurt us with spears” because of “our white 
skin”. 
 
Lisa (7 years 4 months) constructed the Other in a similar way. She expressed 
her concern about an Aboriginal boy with dark skin as possibly not speaking “nice 
with us” because “he was an Aboriginal”. Lisa verbalised similar worry in relation to 
another Aboriginal boy with light skin and a Kurdish boy, whom she described as 
possibly being “not nice” to her and justified this fear by making clear references to 
“their looks”. 
 
Simone (7 years 1month) expressed similar concerns in relation to the two 
Aboriginal boys whom she rejected as potential playmates. She described them as 
“tough” and “cross” looking and stated in relation to the boy with dark skin that “he 
looked like he was going to hurt somebody”. Like Simone, Cleo and Scot justified 
their rejection of an Aboriginal boy, by describing him as looking “angry”. 
 
It appeared that these children’s understanding of the Other was not linked to 
their direct negative experience. At the beginning of the interview they did not 
identify any of the children, later rejected, as looking like someone they knew. 
Therefore, it can be suggested that their understanding of difference was related to 
how they reconciled various messages received from different Microsystems such as 
school, home or neighbourhood. This seemed to be exemplified by Adam’s story 
about people “from brown countries” and can be related to Wright’s (1998) 
argument that young children may develop negative images of people and regard 
them as enemies without ever having any personal experience with them.    259
“He looks too smart for me” 
 
It is also worth noticing that some of my participants rejected the ‘racial’ 
Other as their potential playmate, but justified it by describing them in positive 
terms. An example of this phenomenon is Scot, a 7 year old child, who made a 
negative choice in relation to a Chinese boy and explained it by stating: “He is too 
smart for me. […] He would not like to play with me. He would not like to do things 
with me”. Although on the surface a comment about someone who is “too smart” 
appears to be positive, it may be also interpreted as a form of racism. Cole (1998) 
proposes a reformulation of the concept of racism to include, along with the 
traditional negative characteristics of the Other also those, which can be considered 
as seemingly positively evaluated characteristics. He argues that the latter serve to 
stereotype the ‘racial’ Other in the similar way as the obvious negative 
characteristics. Cole provides a number of examples of such racist discourses, one of 
them being the portrayal of people of Asian origin in contemporary Britain, who 
“tend to be stereotyped as having a strong culture”. The racist implication of such 
seemingly positive description is that people of Asian origin “are failing to integrate” 
and may become “a threat to ‘our way of life’” (p. 40). In Australia, there is also a 
common stereotype in relation to students of Asian origin, who are perceived as 
‘smart’ and high achievers (Black-Gutman & Hickson, 1996), but who also tend to 
‘stick with each other’. I became aware of such opinions during my professional 
encounters with students, and also with my own children, who often share with me 
their anecdotes in relation to their school experiences. One of the possible 
interpretations of Scot’s comments is that he expressed this taken for granted opinion   260
about students of Asian origin, which in my experience, prevail in Australian 
schools. 
 
Do children wish to discuss their ‘race’ related playmate preferences with 
adults? 
 
  Some children such as Adam or Ella were quite relaxed and open 
when talking about their race related playmate preferences. Others, however, seemed 
quite reluctant to openly discuss their reasons for their playmate choices. Natalie, 
Cleo, Lisa and Simone were happy to provide gender explanations for their 
preferences; however, they often avoided direct references to characteristics 
commonly associated with race. Their hesitation to answer some of the questions and 
the tendency to avoid eye contact as well as their body language, at times 
contradicting their verbal statements, suggested to me that ‘race’ played quite an 
important role in these girls’ selection of potential playmates, but they often did not 
wish to talk about it. It seemed that their reluctance to openly express their racialised 
thoughts was due to their perception of what is and what is not socially desirable. 
One possible interpretation of this may be that children in Australia are exposed to 
the official discourse of multiculturalism and are taught to celebrate the principles of 
cultural tolerance and ‘racial’ harmony.  Therefore, openly expressing views that 
contradict such principles may be perceived by children as not appropriate. For that 
reason, it seems very important to not only analyse what children say, but also 
observe their body language and listen to their silences. This will allow for a better 
understanding of the complexity of children’s racialised thinking. 
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Final thought 
 
 As all my participants noticed a number of physical characteristics including 
those that are typically associated with ‘race’, but only some of them reacted to the 
latter in a negative way, it appears important to stop treating such differences as 
something unspeakable (Downey, 1998) and start shifting emphasis from whether to 
how such differences should be discussed with children. Providing children with 
frequent opportunities to engage in critical reflection about difference might 
contribute to the development of a culture where racist frames of reference are 
questioned and challenged. 
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Chapter 7 
 
ASCRIBING VALUE TO RACIALISED IDEAS OF DIFFERENCE 
 
Introduction 
 
In the preceding two chapters I presented data obtained during the first 
interview which explored how the study participants perceived difference and 
whether they signified characteristics commonly associated with ‘race’ more than 
other differentiating features. That interview also explored whether children thought 
of their potential playmates in racialised terms.  As all the interviews were 
videotaped, I was able to observe how children physically selected the photographs, 
listen to their verbal justification of choices and compare this with their body 
language. This made me realize how complex children’s racialised thinking is. I 
became aware that although many children emphasized ‘racial’ characteristics during 
the categorizing tasks, such differences carried a specific social meaning only for 
some of them. I observed these patterns regardless of children’s age. This suggested 
to me the importance of environmental rather than developmental factors in 
children’s construction of ‘race’. I also realized that some children felt 
uncomfortable to discuss their ‘race’ related potential playmate choices, which might 
suggest that from an early age children start becoming aware of what, in their view, 
is or is not socially desirable.  
 
  In this chapter I discuss data obtained from the second interview, which 
explored ways in which the participants of my study ascribed value to racial 
differences and their possible links to racist assumptions. As I stated in chapter two,   264
in this dissertation racism is understood as an ideology based on the process of 
racialisation, in which certain physical and/or genetic characteristics of human 
beings become signified and used as criteria for dividing people into groups, which 
are represented as having natural unchanging origins and status.  In racist discourse 
such categories are further attributed with additional biological or cultural 
characteristics, which become the basis for constructing the Other as supposedly 
having inherent negative characteristics, and contrasting with the positively 
evaluated Self (Miles, 1989).  In such discourses the Other is defined as a problem 
and is often represented as a threat to the Self. Depending on the historical and 
political context, this threat can be represented as physical or, as a threat to ‘our’ 
tradition and culture, as evident in the relatively current discourses of new racism. 
What I would like to further emphasise here is that I adopt a view on racism as a 
dynamic process rather than a static and fixed set of beliefs that uniformly influences 
the way that individuals think and behave regardless of context (Connolly, 1996). As 
children’s racist assumptions develop within a specific context of their “everyday 
experiences”, which are “socially organised, determined by social processes that 
extend beyond the scope of their everyday experience” (Rizvi, 1993a, p. 126), these 
assumptions are not necessarily going to be coherent. Rather, they might reflect the 
contingent and often contradictory nature of racialised discourses to which children 
are exposed in the context of their different social settings. For that reason we need 
to be mindful that children’s racist views might not be consistent and therefore they 
might be difficult to measure.  
 
In this chapter I explore whether children demonstrated a tendency to 
negatively describe people on the basis of their skin colour or other physical   265
characteristics commonly associated with ‘race’ and use this pattern as a possible 
indicator of their racist views. However, I am careful not to draw my conclusions 
simply in relation to the frequency of either positive or negative descriptions. During 
the interviews I used children’s initial responses as a starting point to open up further 
conversations. This less formal approach provided me with an opportunity to follow 
up what children said and to probe their answers with questions and was conducive 
to the unearthing of some of the complexities of their assumptions.  
  
  Before I present my data I would like to briefly recall the method used for my 
exploration. I started by reading each child a story called The slumber party by 
Margaret Wild, which in a humorous way described the preparation for and the 
events during a sleepover  birthday party of  a five year old girl called Jane. Jane’s 
guests were quite different in their likes, temperaments and interests as well as in 
their age and gender. The illustrations in the book showed all the children but one, 
with brown hair and a similar pale skin. This uniformity of physical features was 
useful as I tried to avoid here any references to physical differences typically 
associated with ‘race’.  After the story was read, I asked each child to describe its 
characters and then to come up with words of opposite meaning. In order to establish 
the shared meanings between myself and the children, the understanding of all terms 
was discussed during informal conversations. Before I started the second interview 
each child had a set of descriptive words with their matching opposites.  
 
  During the interview, the participants were presented with the photographs, 
which were  used during earlier categorising tasks and asked to describe them one by 
one with the adjectives obtained in the story reading session. As each participant   266
came up with their own descriptive words, they varied slightly from child to child. I 
believed that it was more important for children to use clearly understood terms, 
rather than to have a uniformed set of words, for which each child could have a 
different meaning. The interview aimed to look at how the participants ascribed 
value to the children in the photographs, and whether there were any patterns in the 
use of positive and negative adjectives in relation to children representing different 
groups. After selecting the descriptive terms in relation to the photographs, each 
child was asked to explain their choices. This part of the interview offered children 
the space to express themselves more freely. The comparison of the two sections of 
the interview made me realise how important it is to allow children to follow their 
own lines of thought during the interviews and how complex racialised thinking can 
be. The complexity and the contradictory nature of racialised thought also became 
quite apparent to me when I compared what some children said, with their gestures, 
facial expression and hesitations during the analysis of the transcripts of the 
videotaped interviews.  
  
  As I stated in my methodology chapter, my pilot study revealed that the 
second interview proved to be too difficult for the three year old children. For that 
reason only the five- and seven-year old children were interviewed for the second 
time.  
  
Ascribing value to physical differences commonly associated with ‘race’ 
 
I found that the majority of participants generally tended to be more positive 
towards same gender children and more negative in relation to the opposite sex.   267
Studies of gender understandings among children (Bem, 1989; Thorne, 1993) 
suggest that young children start behaving in gender specific ways and are able to 
describe and explain gender categorizing and positioning in quite a precise way. 
Their early same gender preferences become firmly established in middle childhood 
years if children are not provided with opportunities to actively challenge the 
socially constructed male/female dualism (Davies, 1993). Thus the reaction of some 
of my participants to the opposite sex was not surprising. 
 
However, some participants also demonstrated a tendency to frequently use 
negative terms when describing the photographs of children whom they perceived as 
‘racially’ different to themselves. For example when having a choice of adjectives 
such as ‘neat’, ‘beautiful’, ‘clean’, ‘clever’, ‘kind’ and ‘being fun’, or their 
antonyms, some participants targeted certain children in the photographs and 
described them in quite a consistent negative way as being ‘messy’, ‘ugly’, ‘dirty’, 
‘silly’, ‘mean’ and ‘boring’. Others however, tended to choose a mixture of both 
positive and negative descriptors regardless of the photos with which they were 
presented. This was true in relation to both some five- as well as some seven-year-
old participants, which suggests to me that the stereotyped thinking in relation to the 
‘racial’ Other is not simply linked to cognitive maturity, but rather results from 
complex environmental influences.  
 
I do not present all transcripts here as some of them were quite repetitive, 
since some of the participants did not engage in a more open ended discussion.  I 
chose excerpts from the interviews with three children only as their responses most 
clearly illustrate certain patterns in children’s way of ascribing value to physical   268
characteristics typically associated with ‘race’. These patterns seemed to reconfirm 
and extend my findings from the previous interview. The first child, Adam, 
demonstrated that children take an active role in their construction of racialised 
knowledge as they are not only able to reproduce prejudiced discourses, but also 
reassess and reconstruct these in order to make sense of their own social context. The 
second child, Lisa, is an example of how children try to reconcile different, often 
contradictory messages about the ‘racially’ different Other, which stem on the one 
hand from the multicultural sentiments and on the other, from Australia’s colonial 
legacy. The third child, Cleo seemed to show that young children are quite aware of 
adult-child power relations and therefore they may not always be willing to openly 
share their racialised thoughts.  
 
Adam (7 years 4 months boy) 
 
As I showed in chapters five and six, Adam’s preoccupation with physical 
characteristics commonly associated with ‘race’ was quite evident during the first 
interview. This was particularly clear during the ‘same - different’ categorizing task, 
as he referred to skin colour characteristics in relation to every triad of photographs 
presented to him. He also used skin clour criteria during the self categorizing task. 
Although his playmate preferences initially suggested same gender orientation, his 
verbal justification of negative choices demonstrated that ‘race’ also played an 
important role. This was especially evident in relation to the two Chinese children as 
well as two Aboriginal girls. In relation to the Chinese children he explained his 
negative choice by referring to their skin colour and to their body size. He said that 
they were “brown” and that they were “too big for him and would bully him”. It   269
seemed that he constructed them as a potential threat. As the photographs of all 
children only showed their heads and shoulders and they were all similarly built, 
Adam did not really have any cues that might suggest size differences. As he also did 
not identify these children as looking like someone he knew earlier on, it can be 
argued that his negative choice was not linked to his direct experience.   
 
  Adam justified his rejection of the two Aboriginal girls by saying that 
“brown people do not like to play with ‘whitish’ people”. His response seemed to 
represent a discourse that has been identified as new racism, in which the talk of ‘us’ 
and ‘them’ takes a central position and is practically manifested in the patterns of 
friendship formed around ethnic differentiation (see Rizvi, 1993a, p. 135). Adam 
made this statement despite his positive play experiences with a boy who, according 
to him, looked like one of the Aboriginal boys in the photographs. It seemed to me 
that Adam was struggling to reconcile information that he was receiving from 
different sources. The second interview allowed me to explore this further. 
 
During the second interview Adam was presented with the photographs and 
asked to describe them with the use of adjectives or their antonyms, with which he 
came up during the storytelling session. Adam chose positive terms in relation to the 
majority of photographs. However on three occasions, he consistently used only 
negative adjectives. In relation to the Chinese boy Adam said that he was “mean”, 
“messy”, “dirty”, “boring” and ‘naughty”. I questioned him about that: 
 
I: Aha! Could you tell me why do you think that this boy is 
‘mean’, ‘messy’, ‘dirty’, and ‘boring’, and ‘naughty’? 
A: Because … he has got this face … 
I: What is it about his face?   270
A: Because of his eyes. 
I: What about them? 
A: They’re closing sort of like … 
I: I see. Is there anything else that makes him look like that to you? 
A: No, not really. 
 
 
Adam described this child in only derogatory terms and justified it by 
referring to the shape of his eyes. During the first interview, he justified his negative 
playmate choice in relation to this same child, by commenting on his “brown” skin 
and his size. It seemed that Adam’s tendency to ascribe negative values to this boy 
was linked to his perception of people who look like the child in this photograph. 
Adam demonstrated a similar tendency when presented with a photo of an 
Aboriginal girl with light skin. He described her as “mean”, “messy”, “dirty”, 
“boring” and “naughty”. I asked him to explain his description: 
 
I see. But could you tell me, what makes her look like that to you?  
Why do you think she is ‘mean’? 
A: Um … because she is brown and brown girls are mean. 
I: Aha. Anything else?  
A: No. 
I: No? I see. So you think that’s why she is ‘mean’. 
A: Nods his head, looks away from photo. 
I: Why do you think she’s messy? 
A: Because she looks like she doesn’t pick up her stuff. 
I: Aha. What makes her look like that? What is it? 
A: Because … um … she… 
I: What do you think? 
A: Because she is brown. And I saw someone who was brown  
and she was messy. 
I: Really?  
A: Yep. 
I: And why do you think she is ‘dirty’? 
A: Because … um … she looks dirty. 
I: Does she look dirty to you? What is it that looks dirty? 
A: Looks at the photo. Covers his face with his hand.  
Begins to fidget in his chair. 
I: Could you tell me why she looks ‘dirty’ to you? 
A: Her mouth. 
I: Her mouth? What about her mouth. 
A: Because she looks like she’s got food on her mouth.   271
I: Does she? Where about? I cannot see it? 
A: All across there (points to the girl’s mouth on photo, 
then covers his own mouth). 
I: Really?  I can’t see anything. 
 
Adam appeared to be able to see some things in this photo that I could not 
see. One possible interpretation of this could be that he had developed a negative 
image of people with “brown” skin, which became almost like a definition. In order 
to confirm this image, he was choosing only the negative adjectives to describe the 
girl in the photograph. When challenged about some of his statements, his body 
language seemed to show that he found it a bit difficult to justify his description. 
However when it came to the description of the other Aboriginal girl who had quite 
dark skin, he ascribed value to her, in a similar negative way: 
 
  She is naughty because she is brown…brown people    
  are sometimes naughty ... and she is mean.  
  Brown people do not like to play with me.  
  I: Aha, anything else? Do you think she is ‘tidy’ or ‘messy’? 
  A: She is messy. She looks messy because of her face. I know  
  someone like that… that is brown and she is messy. 
  And she is dirty. She looks like that girl… when she eats, food  
  goes on her mouth … 
 
 
In the above examples Adam’s consistently made negative value judgments 
about the Aboriginal girls on the basis of their skin colour. He did that in relation to 
both Aboriginal girls and called them “brown” even though their complexions varied 
significantly. However, in relation to the Aboriginal boys, whom he earlier also 
described as having brown skin, Adam used only positive adjectives. I questioned 
him about that: 
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  I: Adam, you told me earlier that these children (points to 
the photographs of two Aboriginal boys, one with quite dark 
skin and the other with light skin)  had ‘brown’ skin. 
A: Yes, they are brown. 
I: You also told me that people with ‘brown’ skin are ‘mean’,  
and ‘messy’, and ‘boring’ and ‘dirty’. 
A: Yep 
I: Now, do these two boys look ‘brown’ to you? 
A: Yeah. 
I: But you said that these boys looked ‘nice’, and ‘tidy’, and were ‘well  
behaved’, and ‘kind’. So …? 
A: I mean that boys are… brown boys are nice. Brown boys in my class  
are nice. 
I: Aha. And what about girls? 
A: They are not nice. Brown girls are not nice. 
I: Do you know any ‘brown’ girls who are ‘not nice’? 
A: No. 
I: So how do you know that ‘brown’ girls are like that? 
You told me earlier that they were ‘dirty’ and ‘mean’ and  
‘naughty’. How do you know that? 
A: ‘Cos my dad went um … looking for dynamite and he  
saw a brown girl that was being naughty. 
I: Oh I see. So could you look at these two photos again (points 
to a European-Australian girl and an Aboriginal-Australian girl,  
who  both have blond hair and relatively light skin)? You said  
earlier on that this one (Aboriginal girl) is ‘naughty’ and this one  
(European-Australian girl) is not. Why is that? 
A: Because that one (Aboriginal girl with fair skin) got brown  
skin. 
I: And this one? 
A: And that one has got white. 
I: Really, have a good look. 
A: Looks at the photos for a while and says:  Yep. 
 
In this conversation Adam demonstrated his competence in reformulating his 
racialised thinking in order to make sense of his social world. Although he stated 
earlier his negative opinion about “brown people”, which was possibly influenced by 
his father’s views, when this view did not fit his positive experiences with 
Aboriginal boys, he resisted it and changed his description from “brown people” to 
“brown girls”. At the same time he was quite persistent in his understanding that 
“brown girls” were different from those with “white” skin. Using the criterion of   273
skin colour, he ascribed value to the Aboriginal girl and the European-Australian girl 
quite differently, although in reality their complexion was very similar. It seemed to 
me that his judgment was linked more to his construction of Aboriginal girls 
(although he did not call them Aboriginal) than to the real differences in skin colour. 
His comments in relation to a Kurdish girl with relatively dark skin, whom he earlier 
described by using only positive adjectives, seemed to confirm that the real 
difference or similarity in complexion was not that important to Adam. 
 
I: Oh, I see. So tell me again, why do you think this girl (Aboriginal girl  
with light skin) looks to you ‘naughty’ and ‘not nice’? 
A: Because she is brown. 
I: And this one (pointing to the Kurdish girl with quite dark skin)? 
A: She is nice. I like her. I like her because she’s um … [like] my  
friend, she has got that kind of skin … 
I: What do you mean? 
A: She is different? She babysits me. 
I: Oh, I see. 
A: She is pretty cool.  
 
It is important to comment here on Adam’s high level of sophistication in his 
argument. He appeared to be able to engage with his prejudice and reformulate it, or 
even resist it to satisfy his own needs and to make sense of his contradictory 
experiences in different Microsystems such as school, home and neighbourhood. 
Some relatively recent research findings (for example Rizvi, 1993a; Connolly, 1996) 
show that young children’s racialised thinking is not fixed or static and it may vary 
from one context to the next. Based on his ethnographic study of five- and six-year-
old children in an English multi-ethnic, inner-city primary school, Connolly claims 
that young children are socially competent and need to be viewed as “active, 
strategic agents who are able to successfully process discourses on ‘race’ and 
appropriate, rework and reproduce them in specific contexts in ways that help them   274
to come to understand their social world and successfully intervene in it” (Connolly, 
1996, p. 175). It seemed to me that Adam was able to actively process a number of 
messages in relation to ‘race’. He referred to stories heard from his father as well as 
to his direct experiences with children from different ethnic backgrounds. As a 
result, although he clearly expressed his racist views towards people with “brown” 
skin, he applied it differently to different contexts and genders. For example, 
although he was quite negative about the Aboriginal girls (school context), he was 
not like that in relation to the Kurdish girl (neighbourhood context). Similarly, his 
‘racialised’ thinking was quite different in relation to the Aboriginal boys and girls.  
 
Furthermore, he was also inconsistent in the way he ascribed value to the two 
Chinese children. He used positive adjectives in relation to the girl, but described the 
boy in only negative terms, although during the first interview he described both 
Chinese children as a potential threat to him and rejected them as potential 
playmates. There are not enough clues to arrive at any conclusions about the reason 
for which Adam ascribed value to these last two children so differently. However, 
one possible interpretation might be that he associated the Chinese boy with the story 
his father told him about ‘brown people who throw spears at white people’, to which 
he referred during the first interview. What became quite obvious to me after 
listening to Adam’s responses was that for him “brown” people appeared to have 
different categories. Some of them he seemed to like and value. Toward some others, 
such the Aboriginal girls or the Chinese boy, he demonstrated quite obvious 
prejudice. Adam’s contradictory responses seem to fit into what Cochrane & Billig 
(1984, cited in Troyna & Hatcher, 1992, p.26) have termed the ‘Leroy syndrome’.   275
Although he liked some individuals, he had quite prejudiced views about groups 
these individuals came from.  
 
Lisa (7 years 4 months girl) 
 
Another child, whom I chose to discuss in this chapter, is Lisa. Like Adam, 
Lisa’s construction of difference was dominated by physical characteristics 
commonly associated with ‘race’. During the ‘same - different’ categorizing task, 
she frequently referred to facial characteristics, skin colour, or on some occasions, to 
group belonging. In some cases she emphasized similarities between children whom 
she perceived as belonging to the same group so strongly that she disregarded 
obvious physical differences among those children. Lisa’s playmate preferences 
initially suggested same gender orientation; however, her verbal justification of 
choices made me aware that she also perceived them in racialised terms. For 
example, although she rejected all boys as her potential playmates, in relation to two 
Aboriginal boys and a Kurdish boy, she expressed her apprehension about their 
possible negative behaviour, which she clearly linked to their “looks”, skin colour or 
group belonging. Lisa also demonstrated her awareness of what, in her perception, 
was appropriate to say in front of adults. For example when selecting girls as her 
potential playmates, most of the time she justified her choices by simply stating that 
they “looked nice”. However, in relation to the Aboriginal girl with dark skin and a 
European-Australian girl, whom she described as “coming from a different country”, 
Lisa justified her positive choices by stating that they needed her help and support. 
During the interview her body language often indicated that she was feeling uneasy 
when talking about some of the children in the photographs.   276
This suggested to me that some of her responses could have been influenced 
by what she felt was expected of her to say. Rizvi (1993a) discusses a similar 
tendency of school aged children who participated in his research conducted in 
Victoria in the early 1990s. He maintains that children who grow up in Australia 
often face contradictory images of ‘race’ relations. They are taught to celebrate 
Australian multicultural society that values harmony and tolerance among different 
‘ethnic’ groups. At the same time they are exposed to stereotyped images of 
Aboriginal Australians or other minority groups, who are often depicted as “objects 
of paternalistic concern, or as aliens whose presence threatens the cultural identity 
and the economic well-being of the majority community” (Rizvi, p. 126). As a result 
of these contradictory images, children often officially subscribe to multiculturalist 
sentiments, but are able to recognize a distinction between those beliefs that can be 
made public and those that are confidential. Lisa’s responses during the first 
interview seemed at times to fit into this framework. 
 
During the second interview I noticed that Lisa generally used positive 
adjectives more frequently in relation to girls than boys. This seemed consistent with 
her initial same gender orientation observed in relation to potential playmate choices. 
However, a closer analysis of her responses demonstrated again that ‘race’ also 
played an important role in Lisa’s way of ascribing value to different children in the 
photographs. When presented with the photographs of girls, Lisa described them 
most of the time as “good”, “nice and kind’, “well organized”, “clean” and “not 
annoying”. However, when it came to the photograph of the Aboriginal girl with 
dark skin, Lisa was unsure whether to describe her as “clean” or “dirty” and 
therefore I asked her to clarify:   277
  
  I: So you think that she looks ‘clean’ or ‘dirty’? 
  L: Um … clean … No … um … both. 
  I: What do you mean? 
L: Um… because of skin (very soft voice, no smile). 
I: What about it? 
L: The colour of her skin. Does not look that clean. 
I: Oh, really… ? Would you like to tell me anything else? 
L: No (fingers in mouth). 
I: What makes her look clean? 
L: mm….(fingers in mouth, no reply) 
   I: You said she is a bit of both… 
 L:  mm…  (nods her head), not sure. 
I: I see. 
 
When dealing with the photograph of the Aboriginal boy with dark skin, Lisa 
made a similar remark about his skin. This comment, however, was only one of the 
many negative adjectives that she used in relation to him. She described him as being 
“naughty and silly”, both “mean” and “nice and kind”, “annoying”, “messy” and a 
“bit of dirty” and a “bit of clean”. I asked her to explain this to me:  
  
I: What makes him look ‘naughty and silly’? 
L: The ah… (hesitates) expression on his face. 
I: I see… and what is it like? 
I: mmm…It looks silly and umm.. (hesitates) just looks silly. 
I: Oh, I see… And why do you think he looks ‘mean’? 
L: Because he is not smiling 
I: Aha, so what is it about him that makes him look  
‘nice and kind’ at the same time? 
L: Um..(hesitates) because he just looks nice and kind  
stating that Lisa shakes her head [sic]. 
I: And at the same time he looks ‘mean’, does he? 
L: Nods her head. 
I: I see. Anything else? 
L: mmm… he looks annoying. 
I: What is it that makes him look ‘annoying’? 
L: The expression on his face. 
I: I see, and why do you think that he is ‘messy’? 
L: Because his shirt is all dirty. 
I: And why is he ‘dirty and clean’? 
L: Because he is a bit dirty and a bit clean.   278
I: What is it that makes him look ‘clean’? 
L: Not sure. 
I: And what makes him look a bit dirty? 
L: Looks at the photo, pauses for a long time and  
answers: Um… skin colour (no smile, lips tightly 
together). 
 
 
It is important to reflect on the way Lisa described this child. Although at 
times she chose both positive and negative adjectives, she was able to justify only 
the latter. I almost felt that she chose the positive descriptors because she thought 
that it was socially expected of her to do so. Her body language, which contradicted 
her statement about the boy’s “nice and kind” look, seemed to confirm that. Lisa’s 
comments about this boy’s facial expression and his skin colour suggested that she 
ascribed negative value to him on the basis of these characteristics. Her responses in 
relation to the Aboriginal boy with light skin seemed to have a similar pattern.  
 
I: Could you please tell me, why do you think he is ‘naughty and silly’? 
L: mmm (rubs her eyes; covers her face; no smile). 
I: What makes him look like that? 
L: He looks naughty and silly. 
I: Does he? Why? 
L: The way on his face … the expression …. 
I: The expression on his face? What sort of expression is it? 
L: Mm … Like um … silly face. 
I: ‘Silly face’? Why is it a ‘silly face’ to you? 
L: ‘cos ha … um … the nose is poking out. 
I: The nose is poking out? That’s an interesting description.  
Is there anything else that makes him look like that? 
L: No … no (shakes her head; looks at me recording what she said;  
she then looks away). 
I: No. I see, but you told me before that he looked both ‘nice and kind’ 
and ‘mean’. Why is that? What makes him look like that? 
L: Mm … his mouth and the eyes. They are mean. 
I: The eyes? What else did you say? What was the first thing  
you said? I did not hear. 
L: The eyes. 
I: The eyes? What about them? 
L: They um … they are um … really kind of scrunched up. 
I: What does it mean? 
L: They sort of … (scrunches up her face) it’s hard to explain.   279
I: Hard to explain, is it? 
L: Nods her head. 
I: Is there anything else that makes him look like that? 
L: The mouth. 
I: The mouth? 
L: mm … 
I: What about it? 
L: It’s the lips … they look mean. 
I: And why does he also ‘look nice and kind’? 
L: Um … don’t know (looks down, no eye contact). 
 
Lisa’s comments in relation to these two Aboriginal boys indicated to me that 
talking about them made her feel uncomfortable. She referred to both of them as 
being “mean”, “silly”, “naughty” and “messy”. She also chose positive adjectives, 
but in these cases she was unable to justify her choices. Lisa’s comments about these 
boys’ expression and other facial characteristics appeared to suggest that she thought 
of them in racialised terms and that she represented them in a stereotyped, negative 
way. These statements as well as her comments during the first interview about these 
Aboriginal boys being a potential threat to “us” on the basis of their “looks”, 
suggested to me that Lisa perceived them as a threat to her , that is she constructed 
them as the ‘radical other’ (Rizvi, 1993a; MacNaughton, 2001).  
 
The other two boys whom Lisa described as being “mean” were from 
Chinese and Kurdish background respectively. When asked for an explanation, this 
is what she said in relation to the Chinese boy: 
 
Lisa: Because his mouth … maybe…(tone of voice suggests 
that she is asking rather than stating it). 
I: Because of his mouth? 
L: mm … 
I: What is it like? 
L: mmm … it looks mean & his eyebrows? 
I: His eyebrows?   280
L: Nods 
I: Do they look ‘mean’ to you? What sort of eyebrows are ‘mean’? 
L: um … when they … when they …(uses gestures; fingers  
imitating eyebrows just above the eyes). 
I: Not sure what you mean. 
L: I think it’s the eyes. 
It’s the eyes? 
L: Yes. 
I: What about them? 
L: It’s … all scrunched up. 
I: The eyes are scrunched up, are they? 
L: Yes, they sort of look like mean … and his mouth … 
His mouth is not smiling that much. 
 
When talking about the Kurdish boy, Lisa described him like this: 
 
L: He is a bit ‘naughty and silly’ and he is a bit ‘good’. 
I: Is he. 
L: Nods, looks at the photo for a while.  
I: Why does he look like that to you? 
L: Because … um … um … um …. (stops looking at photo; 
looks away). 
I: What makes him look like that to you? 
L: Looks at photo; she then looks down and says: Don’t know. 
I: You do not know? 
L: No (says very quietly). 
I: That’s OK.  
You told me earlier that he looked like someone who is ‘not annoying’. 
Could you tell me why do you think so? 
L: He looks like he would agree with his friends. 
I: Does he? 
L: Yes. (Smiles broadly; quick answer). 
I: Aha, but why does he look ‘messy’ to you? 
L: Because … um … um … I don’t know (looks at the camera; 
No smile).  
I: I see. Anything else? 
L: He is … he is a bit mean. 
I: Is he? Why? 
L: Um … I don’t know (emphatically). 
 
Lisa’s description of the non European-Australian boys was different to how 
she responded to the other two photographs. She described the two Aboriginal,   281
Chinese and Kurdish boys as “mean”, and often selected other negative adjectives in 
relation to them. When she chose some positive ones, she was often not able to 
explain her reasons for such choices. When it came to the two European-Australians, 
she described them both as “nice and kind”, “clean” and “well organized”. Although 
she also stated that they were a bit “silly and naughty” and “a bit annoying”, she said 
that with a smile.  In relation to the other four boys, her body language and a 
frequent hesitation seemed to signal her apprehension. At the same time she did not 
seem to be willing to openly talk about it. I felt that it was due to her perception of 
what is, and what is not socially expected of her. Some researchers (see for example, 
Connolly, 1996) claim that young children of five years of age are quite aware of the 
power relations between adults and children and often alter what they do and say in 
front of an adult researcher, or another person in power in order to meet their 
expectations.  
 
Lisa’s teacher told me that a week before I conducted my interviews, the 
school celebrated a ‘multicultural week’, during which the children “saw beautiful 
costumes”, had cooked some “ethnic dishes” and talked about some “less fortunate 
children”. This school event seemed to be organized with the flavour of a “tourist 
approach” as Barnes (1996, p.178) calls it, where the “different” is visited for a short 
time and then everyone returns to the “usual”. During such events people 
representing cultures other than the dominant one are often portrayed in a 
stereotypical way, as those who are ‘exotic’ or ‘needing help’. Therefore, such 
‘cultural festivals’ may contribute to children’s understanding of what is officially 
expected of them to say in relation to the ‘racial’ Other, which often may contradict   282
other discourses that children are exposed to through the media or through different 
Microsystem settings such as family, playgrounds or neighborhoods.  
 
I had a feeling throughout the interviews with Lisa that she struggled 
sometimes while trying to reconcile different discourses and making sure that what 
she was saying was ‘politically correct’.  
 
Cleo (5 years 5 months girl) 
 
  Like Lisa, Cleo also seemed to be apprehensive about what in her perception 
was appropriate to say in front of adults. When we started the second interview, she 
said something that made me feel quite puzzled. When asked to describe a girl from 
European-Australian background, Cleo stated that she would be “fun to play” with 
and that she looked “friendly”. After that she looked at me and stated: “Cos you took 
them (meaning the photographs of children) and you know if they (these children) 
are friendly or not, don’t you?” I responded that I really did not know these children. 
I explained that I just took their photographs, but did not know what they were like. I 
then added that I would like her to tell me what she thought about these children. 
Cleo looked at me for a while and smiled. I had a feeling that she thought I was 
asking her questions to which I knew the answers. I noticed that throughout the 
interview Cleo used positive adjectives most of the time, but did so very quickly, 
sometimes even without looking at the photographs: 
 
 Cleo:  Looks at the photo of an Aboriginal girl with light skin; 
  before I managed to ask her any questions she says: Ugly. 
  Interviewer: Do you think that she looks ‘ugly’? Why? 
  C: No reason (covers her face with both hands).   283
  I: Anything else you could tell me about her? 
 C:  Looks around the room, plays with hair; ‘She is a good girl’. 
  I: Do you think so? Could you tell me why? 
  C: Not sure (looks at me, smiles). 
  I: What else, anything else you could tell me about her? 
 C:  Looks at the camera; She is tidy and she looks friendly. 
  (looks  around the room, not at the photograph). 
  I: Why does she look like that to you? 
 C:  Looks at the camera: No reason (quick answer). 
  I: Aha, anything else? 
  C:  Yes, she looks clever. 
  I: But you are not even looking at this photograph. 
 C:  Smiles; shakes her head and rolls her eyes and says: I left my  
  eyes at home. 
 
  Cleo’s sudden shift, after the quick initial negative response made me wonder 
whether she really meant what she was saying, or whether she was providing me 
with the ‘right’ answers. She made the first remark ‘ugly’ spontaneously before I 
even asked her any questions. Interestingly, this Aboriginal girl was the only girl 
whom Cleo described like that. After this statement her body language (covering her 
face with both hands) seemed to suggest that she really did not think it was the 
‘right’ thing to say. She then stopped looking at the photograph and answered all my 
questions very quickly. It almost felt as if she had already made up her mind about 
how to answer them and for that reason there was no need to look at the photograph 
any longer. Her cheeky remark about her eyes being left at home almost suggested 
that she was playing games with me. It is difficult to conclude why Cleo described 
this girl as ‘ugly’ looking. It is worth stating, however, that she was the only girl 
described like that by Cleo, and that she was also the only girl whom Cleo earlier 
rejected as a potential playmate. As I stated in my previous chapter, Cleo’s response 
in relation to the picture of this child during the first interview made me think that 
her rejection of her as a potential playmate was not related to ‘race’. However, her 
responses described above made me doubt my conclusion. It was obvious to me that   284
she was not willing to engage in any further conversation about this child with me 
and therefore I was left wondering about her reasons. 
 
  As I stated before, Cleo used positive adjectives in relation to the majority of 
children in the photographs. However, when it came to the photographs of the 
Aboriginal boy with dark skin and a Chinese boy, her way of ascribing value was 
quite different: 
  
  I: What could you tell me about this person (points to the Aboriginal  
  boy with dark skin)? Do you … 
 C:  Cleo looks at the photograph and before I finished my question and  says:  
  Mad (pulls mouth; no smile). 
 I:  Pardon? 
 C:  Looks at me and says again:  Mad. 
  I: ‘Mad’? What do you mean by that? 
  C: He looks angry. 
  I: Does he look angry to you? Why is that? 
  C: ‘Cos he looks like he has a funny face. 
  I: He looks like he has a ‘funny’ face? 
 C:  Nods and looks away. 
  I: Why is that? 
  C: I don’t know. 
  I: I see. Is there anything else you could tell me about him? 
  C: He looks nasty. 
  I: Why do you think so? 
  C: I am not sure. He just looks like that. His face …  
  (Looks ahead but not at the camera or me). 
  I: Aha!  Do you think he would be fun to play with?  
  C: No, he would be boring (looks away again). 
  I: Why do you think so? 
  C: He looks like that? 
  I: What else could you tell me about him? 
  C: He is good (Looks at Interviewer; smiles). 
  I: Is he? I see. And do you think he would be ‘friendly’? 
 C:  Mean. 
  I: Really. How could he be good and mean at the same time?  
  C: I am not sure … (picks up photo and puts it away; smiles at me). 
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  When describing this boy, Cleo predominantly used the words that she 
selected during the story reading session. However, the words “mad” and “nasty” did 
not belong to this selection. I was puzzled why she used these words and only later, I 
recalled that Cleo described this boy as having an “angry face” during the first 
interview. As she did not select this child earlier as looking like someone she knew, 
it seemed that this description as well as her further choice of predominantly 
negative adjectives was not a result of her direct experiences. It can be argued that 
like Lisa’s, Cleo’s negative image of the Aboriginal boy was linked to the broader 
racist discourses in the Australian society, in which the Other is often portrayed as a 
threat.  
 
  Another child, whose photograph Cleo described by choosing mainly 
negative terms was that of a Chinese boy: 
 
  Interviewer: Look at this photo Cleo. Do you think that he would be  
  a ‘nice’ child? 
 C:  No  (pulls mouth; shakes head). 
  I: Do you think this child would be fun to play with? 
  C: Mm … (looks away; no smile; moves back and forward in chair)…  
  Yes (during the first interview, she rejected him as a potential playmate). 
  I: Do you think he would be a friendly person? 
 C:  No  (shakes head; no smile). 
  I: Why is that? 
  C: Because he is silly (pulls mouth into a grimace). 
  I: Why is he ‘silly’? 
  C: ‘Cos he looks like a statue. 
  I: What do you mean he looks like a statue? 
  C: His face … just looks silly. 
  I: Is that so? 
 C:  Nods. 
  I: I can’t see that. And do you think he would be a ‘tidy’ person?  
  C: No. He is messy (looks away). 
  I: Messy? Why does he look ‘messy’ to you? 
  C: ‘Cos he looks like it. I used to be messy when I was little. When  
  I was eating by myself. I used to get food all over my face. And he looks  
  like he would eat like that. 
  I: Does he? But why?   286
  C: Because … he looks … little [???]. 
 
  Although Cleo used negative adjectives in relation to this boy quite often, she 
did not use direct references to ‘race’. Therefore it is difficult to conjecture about the 
reasons behind Cleo’s description of this photograph. However, it needs to be 
remembered that during the first interview, Cleo made a negative potential playmate 
choice in relation to him as well as the Aboriginal boy and described them as looking 
“angry” and “funny” respectively. The third boy, whom Cleo described as being 
“silly” during the first interview, and used this as a reason for rejecting him as a 
future playmate was an Indian boy. This is what she said about him this time: 
 
  Interviewer: Tell me about this child. Do you think he would be a  
 ‘nice’  person? 
 Cleo:  Glances at photo; no smile; Yes. Looks at interviewer; 
  I: What about playing with him? Do you think he would be ‘fun’? 
 C:  (Shakes her head):  Boring. 
  I: And do you think this person would be ‘kind’? 
 C:  Looks around the room; concentration on face; looks toward  
 Interviewer  and  says:  Do you give these reports to our Mums? 
  I: This is not a report. We are just playing a game and I am writing  
  down your answers. I could show it to your Mum if you wish.  
  But it is up to you. Would you like me to show it to her? 
 C:  Slides down in chair; looks around the room and then at the  
  photograph. She pauses for a while and then says: Okay. 
  I: So could you tell me please, would he be a ‘kind’ person? 
  C: Looks toward Interviewer; Kind. 
  I: Why do you think so? 
  C: I just do. 
  I: And would he be ‘clever’? 
 C:  Looks at photo with no smile and says: Clever.  
  Looks at me. 
  I: Clever, I see. Is there anything else you could tell me about this child? 
 
 
 C:  Looks at the brooch I am wearing, which is shaped like the letter L  
 and  says: That does not start with your name (meaning your name does  
  not start with this letter). 
  I: No, my name does not start with this letter. 
  C: But I do. I have this letter in my name.    287
  A short discussion between Cleo and me about different letters. 
  I: You know your letters well, don’t you? 
 C:  Smiles broadly and nods. Yeah. 
 
 I:  Points to the photo that was discussed before Cleo initiated the  
  conversation about letters; Could you tell me if this person is  
 ‘pretty’? 
 C:  Shakes her head. Ugly (picks up a photo and lifts her hand  
  holding it up, so it covers her face). 
  I: Could you put this photo down? I cannot see you. 
 C:  Puts photo down. 
  I: Why do you think this person is ‘ugly’? 
  C: I do not know. 
  I: Don’t you?  
  C: No reason. 
 
  It is worth to reflect on how Cleo answered questions in relation to this boy. 
Her responses appeared quite positive. She described him as “nice”, “clever” and 
“kind”. Although she also talked about him as being “boring” and “ugly”, this could 
have been related to same gender orientation. She described all boys as “ugly” and 
could have perceived him as “boring” due to different play styles which, as I 
discussed earlier, girls and boys demonstrate during preschool and middle childhood 
years. However, what puzzled me was her question about whether her Mum would 
see “the report”. After I asked her whether she would like me to show it to her Mum, 
she agreed, but thought about it for a while before answering my question. During 
the first interview she also asked me a similar question. I explained then, that it was 
not a test and that I was not writing a report. I also reassured her that there were no 
right and wrong answers to my questions. Although she appeared to accept my 
explanation, she was often intensely looking at me recording what she said during 
both of our interviews.  
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  There was also another part of this interview which is worth discussing. 
During our conversation Cleo suddenly changed its direction and started talking 
about letters. Once I complemented her on her competence in recognizing and 
naming them, her face lit up with pleasure. Her body language seemed to show that 
my approval made her happy. Once we went back to the description of the child, her 
smile disappeared and she covered her face with a photo after describing the boy 
who was in it as being “ugly”. To me she did not seem comfortable with her own 
statement. Looking at the transcript I noticed that every time Cleo used a negative 
description, her body language seemed to suggest her apprehension. For example, in 
relation to the Aboriginal boy, she predominantly used negative adjectives. When 
doing so she often looked away. However, when she described him as being “good” 
she looked at me directly and smiled. It almost felt that she was worried whether 
what she was saying would be approved by her Mum or me.  
 
Conclusion 
 
  The data presented in this chapter based on the second interview with Cleo, 
Lisa and Adam shows that when researching children’s racialised thinking and 
prejudice, we need to take into consideration a number of factors. Firstly, we need to 
contemplate not only what children state verbally, but also what their body language 
tells us. We also need to be mindful of the context in which these conversations 
happen, as well as of children’s awareness of adult-children power relations. Relying 
on the simple count of their positive or negative responses might be quite 
misleading. For example the way Cleo verbally responded to the photographs of 
children presented to her appeared to suggest that she was ascribing positive values   289
to the majority of them. As she rarely referred to the ‘racial’ characteristics it was 
even difficult to conclude whether the frequency of using negative adjectives in 
relation to the Chinese boy was indicative of her prejudice. However, when this 
information was combined with the analysis of her body language as well as with the 
whole context of the interview, it is possible to argue that prejudiced views are not 
always clearly articulated by children due to their awareness of what is, according to 
them, socially acceptable to say.  
 
  The data presented here also demonstrates that we must recognize children’s 
active role in making sense of different racialised discourses with which they often 
struggle in order to understand their social world. Adam’s as well as Lisa’s 
responses are good examples of such abilities. Children’s racialised thinking is quite 
complex, as they actively learn from experiences and information received from 
different Microsystems, which at times can be quite contradictory. Although the way 
they ascribe value to the racially different Other demonstrates their racial prejudice, 
as for example in Adam’s statements about “brown” people, such prejudice is often 
applied differently to different groups or even genders. Children’s prejudice is not 
simply ‘black’ and ‘white’. It seems to have a number of shades and tones, which 
have to be carefully unearthed and challenged by adults. 
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Chapter 8 
 
CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS 
 
Introduction 
 
The aim of my study was to explore the complexity of children’s racialised 
thought. As such thinking is context specific rather than fixed (Rizvi, 1993; 
Connolly, 1996, 1998b; van Ausdale & Feagin, 2001) I tried to move away from 
methods which rely on statistical counts and try to ‘measure’ how children think. In 
order to obtain in-depth information about the way children construct difference and 
ascribe value to it, I adopted a qualitative approach which allowed me to listen 
carefully to what children say and to observe what their body language told me. As I 
involved only a small number of children in my study, I do not aspire to developing 
any grand generalisations in relation to Australian children’s racialisation of 
difference between people and their social relations. Neither am I suggesting that my 
findings are representative of the whole community of young children in Australia.  
This is so not only due to my small sample, but also to the fact that, as my study 
demonstrated, salience of ‘race’ in children’s perception of difference may vary from 
one context to the next. Children play an active role in how they construct their 
understanding of difference and their prejudiced thinking may be applied differently 
to different social groups, depending on how children interpret their social 
experiences. For these reasons, I would like to state that while this thesis, similarly to 
some other qualitative research on children and ‘race’ (for example Connolly,   292
1998b) might offer some explanations in relation young children’s racialised 
thought, they should not be, applied directly to any child in any context. 
 
  However, I would also like to suggest that some of the themes and patterns 
identified in my study may not be that atypical for other young Australian children. 
After all, children’s racialised thinking develops in their Microsystems in the context 
of their everyday interactions and activities - which are influenced, if not determined 
- by broader social factors (Rizvi, 1993) such as, for example, educational policies at 
the Exosystem level, which reflect the value system of the Australian society at the 
Macrosystem level. 
 
What have I found? 
 
My study demonstrates that young children notice physical differences 
among people, including those that are commonly associated with ‘race’. All 
children who participated in my study used characteristics such as hair or skin colour 
as criteria for classifying people. This has been observed during the physical 
placement of photographs in relation to ‘same/different’ categories, as well as 
children’s verbal responses. It has been noticed that with age, children also used 
other attributes such as facial characteristics or group belonging to differentiate 
among people. These features were used along with others such as gender, or more 
fleeting characteristics, which included hair length and style, clothing or jewellery.  
 
  Some children demonstrated flexibility in using a range of characteristics 
during the categorisation tasks. Others heavily focused on attributes that are   293
commonly associated with ‘race’. Many participants of my study seemed to ignore 
individual differences among children from non-European backgrounds. They 
referred to them as having “black cheeks and neck”, having “black everything” or 
“being all the same … same dark skin”. This was especially true in relation to the 
three and some five year old children, who described in this way the photographs of 
Chinese, Indian or Aboriginal-Australian children, whose skin tones varied quite 
considerably. These children seemed to divide people into two categories only, those 
who had white skin and those who did not. The latter appeared to them as being all 
the same.  
 
  Like the younger ones, older children also placed emphasis on similarities 
among children whom they perceived as belonging to the same socially constructed 
group. However, unlike the younger children who drew the line between European 
(white) and non European Australians (black), the older participants often targeted 
specific groups, for example, Aboriginal children. They constructed them as being 
distinctly different from other children presented to them in the triads, regardless of 
the similarities in their skin, hair or eye colour. They also disregarded some 
significant individual differences in physical appearance among Aboriginal children. 
 
  Some children’s tendency to emphasise characteristics commonly associated 
with ‘race’ during the ‘same/different’ categorisation tasks was not necessarily a 
predictor of their potential playmate preferences, as only some of the participants 
perceived their future playmates in racialised terms. This was especially true for the 
younger children, although one of the three year olds demonstrated her strong 
preoccupation with ‘race’ during all the tasks.   294
  In relation to the older children who participated in this study, their strong 
focus on ‘race’ during the ‘same/different’ categorising tasks was often matched by 
their racialisation of potential playmates. This was evident in how they physically 
grouped the photographs and, in some cases, how they justified their choices. Some 
children consistently chose the photographs of European–Australians as their 
potential friends and rejected those of the non European–Australian origin. However, 
not all of them verbally referred to differences commonly associated with ‘race’ as 
the reasons for their choices. It seemed to me that some five- and seven-year-old 
children felt uncomfortable to discuss attributes such as skin colour or facial 
characteristics. All five- and seven-year-old girls also seemed reluctant to openly 
discuss their racialised potential playmate choices, although they were quite open in 
admitting their same gender preferences.  
 
  Some of the seven year old participants, who verbally rejected their potential 
playmates on the basis of ‘race’, demonstrated a tendency of ‘othering’ those whom 
they perceived as being not like ‘us’. They justified their negative playmate choices 
by using statements such as: “I would not like to play with them, because brown 
people do not sort of like playing with whitish people”; “she felt like us not playing 
with brownish people” or “I would not play with him” because “he might not be like 
us”. In addition, the ‘racial’ Other was sometimes perceived as a threat. For example, 
the seven years old girls referred to the photographs of the Aboriginal boys as 
looking “cross” and “tough” and expressed their concern in relation to these boys as 
being potentially “not nice to us” or “not speaking nice to us”. A seven year old boy 
stated in relation to the photographs of the Chinese children that they might “bully 
him” and made some general comments about “people with brown skin” who might   295
“hurt us with spears” because of our “white skin”. Not all children justified their 
verbal rejection of potential playmates in negative terms. For example, one of the 
seven year old boys described the Chinese boy as being “too smart for him” and for 
that reason potentially not willing “to play with him” and “do things” with him. 
 
  Some children’s playmate choices suggested their strong same gender 
orientation, as during their physical categorisation of photographs, they rejected all 
children who were of the opposite sex. However, closer analysis of their verbal 
responses revealed that some of them also perceived their potential playmates in 
racialised terms. They often dismissed their negative choices in relation to European-
Australians with a smile or a shrug, but in relation to the non European-Australians 
they often justified their choices by describing these children in negative terms, for 
example as being “funny”, “angry” or “silly”.  
 
  Positive playmate choices in relation to children whom the participants 
perceived as being different to them were often also made on the basis of gender. 
However, these choices were sometimes justified in a way that suggested other than 
gender reasons. For example, one of the seven years old girls explained that she 
would like to play with two girls whom she perceived as being different to her, 
because one of them “is Aboriginal and she might not have enough  food” and 
another because “she might come from a different country and […] might not know 
any language”. 
 
  The way children ascribed value to racialised difference, as well as the 
reasons for their potential playmate choices demonstrated some children’s ‘racial’   296
prejudice. However, their prejudiced views were not always coherent and varied in 
relation to different groups. This was especially true for older children. For example 
one of the seven year olds made negative comments in relation to “people with 
brown skin”, but at the same time made positive potential playmate choices in 
relation to boys from non European backgrounds. In a similar way, he described 
Aboriginal girls by using negative terms, but chose a Kurdish girl as his potential 
future mate and described her as being “pretty cool”. When challenged about his 
generally negative statements about “people with brown skin” and his contrary 
description of the Aboriginal boys and the Kurdish girl, he narrowed down his 
general negative opinion about “brown people” to “brown girls” only. He also 
explained that the Kurdish girl looked like someone he knew and hence he described 
her in a positive way. Similar competence of young children in their understanding 
of the dynamics of ‘race’ and their ability to comprehend and sometimes rework 
various racialised discourses to reconcile them with their own directed experiences 
was demonstrated by some other studies both oversees (Connolly, 1996, 1998b; van 
Ausdale & Feagin, 2001) and in Australia (Rizvi, 1993). 
 
What do my findings mean? 
 
  Given that I situated my research within the framework of Bronfenbrenner’s 
ecological theory of human development, my investigation was less complete than it 
might have been. To gain deeper insight into the ways in which young children who 
participated in this study construct their understanding of differences between people 
and their social relations, a more rounded ethnographic approach would have been 
beneficial. Such approach would certainly have allowed for a deeper exploration of   297
the development of children’s racialised images in the context of their various 
immediate social settings. Thus, while my findings illuminate certain aspects of the 
importance of children’s Microsystems in which they construct their ideas of ‘race’ 
and their link to the broader social structures, they are partial. 
 
  My findings demonstrate that young children who participated in my study 
were not ‘colour blind’. They noticed a number of physical characteristics, including 
those typically associated with ‘race’ and use them frequently as a basis for putting 
people into categories. Some of my study participants demonstrated flexibility in 
using a range of characteristics during the categorising process, while others heavily 
focused on ‘race’. Some children also had a tendency to ignore individual 
differences and perceive people, whom they classified as belonging to the same 
group, as being “all the same”. It appears that the process of racialisation can start at 
an early age, as even three-year-old participants of my study seemed to divide people 
into two broad categories, those who had “white” skin and those who had “black” 
skin. The latter was often perceived as being “all the same”. It can be argued that 
such a tendency can be explained within a developmental framework, as according 
to Piaget young, preoperational children experience difficulties in coordinating more 
than one characteristic of an object or a person at a time. They usually focus on a 
characteristic that is visually most obvious to them (Berk, 2000).  
 
  However, a similar tendency of ignoring quite significant individual 
differences and strongly emphasising similarities among children perceived as 
belonging to the same socially constructed group was also found in relation to the 
older participants of my study. Although these children, unlike the younger ones, did   298
not seem to divide people into two simple black-white categories, they targeted more 
specific groups, such as Aboriginal or Chinese and constructed them as being 
distinctly different from others, despite quite obvious common characteristics among 
individuals. Therefore, it can be argued that my study participants’ perception of 
difference was linked to environmental factors rather than to their level of cognitive 
maturity. It is possible to make a tentative claim that the tendency displayed by the 
older children may have been influenced by their exposure to different racialised 
discourses in their different Microsystems and through the media, in which different 
groups labelled as Aboriginal or Asian are being portrayed in a homogenous manner 
(Rizvi, 1993a). 
  
  For some children, physical characteristics such as skin or hair colour 
appeared not to go beyond the mere difference in pigmentation. For others, these 
features seemed to carry specific meanings. Although all children who participated 
in my study used these characteristics to divide people into separate categories, only 
some of them applied these features during their selection of potential playmates. 
This was true for the older participants, especially the seven-year-olds. However, a 
tendency to consistently emphasise skin colour characteristics during all the tasks 
displayed by one three-year-old girl and her spontaneously expressed dislike towards 
people with “black skin” seems to suggest that she become aware of the social 
meaning of such characteristics at a very early age and that her understanding of 
groups that share these characteristics become quite stereotyped. 
 
  Several seven-year-old children and some of the five-year-olds appeared to 
perceive their potential playmates in racialised terms. They tended to choose the   299
photographs of European-Australians as their potential friends and to reject the non 
European-Australians. Interestingly, however, some of them seemed reluctant to 
openly discuss their racialised playmate choices, although they were quite open 
about their same gender preferences. This was especially true for girls. There is not 
enough evidence in my study to draw definite conclusions about this phenomenon. 
However, one of the possible ways of explaining it is that these children’s behaviour 
was a result of what they perceived as being socially expected of them to do. 
Expressing same gender playmate preferences is socially acceptable and even 
encouraged in our society (Davis, 1989), openly talking about race related choices 
may be perceived as undesirable within the climate of multiculturalism. 
 
  Australia has a long racist tradition reflected in the ideologies and social 
policies at the Macro– and the Exosystem level. Examples of this tradition include 
the introduction of the policy of assimilation, which aimed at providing people from 
diverse cultural backgrounds with the ‘opportunity’ to adopt Anglo-Australian  
values and lifestyle; in other words, to learn how to be like ‘us’. Within this political 
climate, expressing racist views and prejudices was socially acceptable. Although, 
this policy was abolished in the 1970s, and replaced by the policy of 
multiculturalism, the attitudes prevalent in the assimilation era did not necessarily 
change (Jayasuriya, 1999). However, as they started being ‘politically incorrect’, 
their overt expression, especially in public, became less frequent (Brown, 1995). 
 
  As Bronfenbrenner (1979) maintains, values and attitudes at the 
Macrosystem level impact on all other layers of environmental influences. They 
filter through to different microsystem settings, in which children directly interact.   300
The most common children’s microsystems in the Australian context include 
schools, children services, family and neighbourhood settings or church groups. 
Interactions within these microsystems provide children with important messages 
about what is and what is not socially acceptable. It can be put forward therefore, 
that Australian children, who grow up in society where open expression of racialised 
views is deemed inappropriate, may quite early start experiencing feelings that such 
topics are socially undesirable. However, as children paly an active role in how they 
develop their understanding of their social worlds (Vygotsky, 1978; Connolly, 
1998b; van Ausdale & Feagin, 2001), their interpretation of such messages might not 
necessarily be consistent. This could have been the reason for some of my 
participants’ quite open expression of their ‘race’ related playmate preferences and 
others’ reluctance to admit it.  
 
  The older children’s verbal rejection of their potential playmates on the basis 
of ‘race’ was in some cases accompanied by the tendency to ‘other’ those who were 
perceived as different. The ‘racial’ Other was not only constructed as being “not like 
us”, but sometimes also as a potential threat, someone who looked “angry” or “mad”  
and who might “not be nice to us” or even “hurt us”. As none of these participants 
who expressed such views recalled any direct negative experiences which could 
contribute to the development of their images of the racial ‘Other’, it is possible to 
argue that these negative images were influenced by discourses to which children are 
exposed either directly or indirectly in their Microsystems or through the media. 
Newspapers and television reports often represent Aboriginal people and other 
minority groups as aliens whose presence may pose a threat to the majority 
community. For example, in my experience, Western Australian newspapers   301
repeatedly make references to juvenile ethnic gangs in certain suburbs in Perth, 
igniting fear about ‘ethnic crime’.   
 
  According to Jock (2002), debate about “ethnic crime […] has been highly 
racialised” in Australia: 
 
  there is an asymmetry in the response to, and reporting of, what is called 
   ethnic crime – that is, the crimes allegedly committed by immigrant  
  minorities in Australia, when compared to the response to, and reporting of, 
  crimes that involve so-called ‘non-ethnics’, that is the Anglo-Celtic majority 
  of the Australian population. p. 15 
 
  Evidence from a number of surveys demonstrates a general tendency within 
the Australian population to fear crime (for example Lupton, 1999, cited in Jock, 
2002). This evidence points to an interesting aspect of the process of racialisation in 
Australia. It shows that “people attach blame for their fear of safety” on some 
racialised Other, who is constructed as “the ‘unpredictable stranger’ … who poses a 
threat of crime to oneself [and] tends to act as a target and repository of generalised 
as well as more specific worries and anxieties” (Lupton, 1999, p.14, cited in Jock, 
2002, p.11). As Jock maintains, although not being solely responsible for such 
construction, Australian media play an important role in it.  
  
   Constructing the ‘racial’ Other as a threat fits very well within the discourse 
of new racism, which emphasises differences between the minority and majority 
groups to the point that they are viewed as incompatible. In this framework of 
differentiation (Jayasuriya, 1999), the ‘alien’ (minority) cultures are never going to 
be like ‘us’ (the dominant group) and their members are often viewed as a threat to   302
‘our’ safety and prosperity. Such ideology, being constructed through and 
reproduced by the media and in other private forums becomes a common sense 
category of ‘practical consciousnesses’. It is possible that the tendency of some of 
my participants to ‘other’ children whom they perceived as different and to fear the 
‘unpredictable stranger’, was influenced by such common sense new racism, to 
which they may have been exposed in their different Microsystems. Some statements 
made by my participants appear to support this claim. 
 
  Not all children who participated in my study perceived the ‘racial’ Other in 
negative terms. Nevertheless, some of them still rejected them as potential 
playmates. It can be argued that a statement such as “he is too smart for me” (made 
in relation to the photo of a Chinese boy by one seven-year-old participant) is quite 
positive. When read in conjunction with the rest of the remark “he would not like to 
play with me” and “he would not want to do things with me”, however, the comment 
may be interpreted in a different way. As I discussed in Chapter 6, such seemingly 
positive statements in relation to different racialised groups may be considered as a 
form of racism due to their underlying negative assumptions (Cole, 1998). In such a 
process of racialisation, students associated with certain cultural groups may become 
positively stereotyped, for example as being ‘smart’ and ‘academically able’. 
However, a common negative assumption attached to such stereotype often is, that 
these students ‘stick together’ and do not integrate with their other school mates. My 
participant’s comments in relation to the Chinese boy may be interpreted as an 
example of such a taken for granted stereotype, which in my experience, is not 
uncommon in some Australian schools. 
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  Some children, who made positive playmate choices in relation to the 
racialised Other, sometimes expressed their concerns for these children and a 
willingness to help them. For example, one seven-year-old girl made some 
comments in relation to a photograph of an Aboriginal girl as not having enough 
food and possibly being shy and not having many friends. She also stated that 
another girl, whom she perceived as “coming from a different country” might need 
her help as she “might not know any language”. Although these comments appear 
genuinely positive, it is difficult to refrain from a conclusion that they also seem to 
reflect the images created in the broader community “of Aboriginal Australians and 
of other minority groups that portray these groups as objects of paternalistic 
concerns” (Rizvi, 1993, p.126). As I stated in Chapter 7, this child’s perception of 
the members of different minority groups as requiring help and support could have 
been influenced by the ‘multicultural week’ which was organised at school just a few 
days before I conducted my interviews. According to the anecdotal data provided by 
one of the teachers at this school, during the multicultural week the students had the 
opportunity to “see beautiful costumes”, to “cook some ethnic dishes” and to “talk 
about some less fortunate children”.  
 
  This child’s positive comments were accompanied by her further negative 
statements about the Kurdish boy and two Aboriginal boys, whom she considered as 
a potential threat. It seemed that her racialisation of difference was not very coherent 
as she struggled to reconcile different messages in relation to the ‘racial’ Other. On 
the one hand, she appeared to be influenced by the images of ‘them’ needing help 
and support from ‘us’, on the other hand, she seemed to be affected by images of 
some ‘radical’ Others perceived as a threat to ‘us’.    304
 
  Similar lack of coherence was identified in relation to some other children. 
The way they ascribed value to racialised difference as well as the way they justified 
their potential playmate choices demonstrated on occasions their prejudice towards 
the ‘racial’ Other. Their views, however, were often contradictory and varied in 
relation to different groups. This was observed especially in relation to the older 
children who took part in my study. The way my study participants drew lines 
between ‘them’ and ‘us’ appeared was varied. Younger children prejudice views 
seemed to be directed at the different Other understood in global terms, as 
demonstrated by statements of my three year old participant Ella, who appeared to 
draw distinct line differentiating between ‘whites’ and ‘blacks’. However, my older 
participants’ racialised ideas seemed more contextualised and directed differently to 
different cultural or even gender groups.  In comparison to the younger children who 
participated in my study, the older participants seemed to be more active in making 
sense of their experiences, both direct and indirect, and more critical towards 
messages which they could have received in their different Microsystems. Some of 
them, for example Adam or Lisa appeared to struggle with contradictions that may 
have resulted from their direct and observed interactions with children from various 
backgrounds and possibly from the discourses to which they were exposed at school, 
home, and neighbourhood or through the media. When challenged about their own 
contradictions, they sometimes were able to rework different discourses in order to 
make sense of their social worlds. Similar findings in relation to children’s agency 
and social competence as well as to the context specific and sometimes contradictory 
nature of children’s racialised thinking have been reported by some researchers 
overseas (Connolly, 1996, 1998b) as well as  in Australia (Rizvi, 1993).   305
Implications of my study 
 
  Reflections on the research process  
 
  As I stated in my methodology chapter, my research process was very much 
discovery orientated. I started with a more traditional approach to racialised thinking, 
which I conceptualised within a framework of attitudes. As a result of this 
understanding, I designed my second interview, which aimed at exploring children’s 
ways of ascribing value to racialised differences between people and their social 
relations, utilising some ideas from George Kelly’s Theory of Personal Constructs 
(1955). It was not until I started collecting my data and later analysed it, that I 
realised Kelly’s framework was less useful than I expected, as children rarely 
described individual photographs in entirely positive or negative ways. Instead, their 
perception was not static and sometimes characterised by contradictions. This, along 
with my analysis of the first interview, made me change my approach to children’s 
racialised thinking. I adopted the perspective of some other researchers like Connolly 
(1996, 198b) or Rizvi (1993a), who argue, that similarly to the context specific 
nature of racist ideologies (Hall, 1980, 1986; Miles, 1993), children’s racist 
assumptions may also vary from one context to the next.  
 
  This has important methodological implications for research into children 
and ‘race’. One of them being the necessity to move away from methods that try to 
‘measure’ children’s racialised thought, as the latter is not necessarily consistent and 
clear cut. Studies on children’s understanding of racialised difference that attempt to 
rely on more statistical methods can be quite misleading, as they do not allow for   306
unearthing the multiplicity of factors that may affect children’s development and 
expression of racist assumptions. 
 
  In order to contribute to a better understanding of children’s racialised 
thinking, it is important to adopt a more naturalistic qualitative approach and employ 
methodologies that allow children to freely follow their train of thought. This is not 
an easy task, especially in relation to studies involving very young children. 
However, my study demonstrated that informal conversations provide far richer and 
meaningful data than rigidly structured interviews. This is not to say that some 
careful initial planning and a certain degree of structure are without benefits. In the 
case of my study, I started with a presentation of photographs and categorisation 
tasks that each child was asked to complete. This part of the interview allowed 
children to become involved in the physical manipulation of the photographs, a 
process that was easy and similar to many other classifying tasks in which children 
are involved in their everyday games and other activities at school, home or 
neighbourhood.  Once children completed this task I followed it up by asking 
questions about their choices, which started our less structured conversations. 
Although the value of using photographs in research on children and race has been 
questioned by some researchers (Connolly, 1996), I believe that they can be 
successfully used, as long as they are viewed as an introduction to more open 
interviews rather than as the only means of collecting data. While totally 
unstructured interviews play an important role in allowing children to take a leading 
role in conversations, they are sometimes difficult to conduct in studies that are not 
purely ethnographic.  
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  My informal conversations with children that followed the initial structured 
tasks, demonstrated that even at the age of five years children can be quite competent 
in verbalising their thoughts and feelings in relation to ‘race’. They also 
demonstrated to me that some children are not just passive recipients of different 
messages they receive. They are not simply “imitators” of adults’ language (van 
Ausdale & Feagin, 2001, p.2). They are quite active in reworking and sometimes 
even resisting various racist discourses to which they are exposed in the settings of 
their Microsystems such as families, schools or neighbourhoods. Nevertheless, their 
racialised thoughts reflect many racist assumptions that are present in Australian 
society. Some of these assumptions echo the legacy of colonial times; others are part 
of more recent discourses of the new or cultural racism or even an example of a 
positive racism (Cole, 1998).  
 
  In order to unearth the complexity of children’s assumptions, we need to 
listen carefully to children. Individual face-to-face interviews can be a good source 
of data; however, when listening to children, we have to be mindful about their 
awareness of adult-child power relations. This should not be ignored, as despite a 
common belief in children’s naivety and social incompetence, children demonstrate 
such awareness quite early in their lives (Connolly, 1996, 1998b; van Ausdale & 
Feagin, 2001; Rizvi, 1993a). This awareness can result in children saying and doing 
things which they perceive as socially desirable. My interviews with some of the 
participants, for example Natalie, Cleo or Lisa seem to illustrate this tendency. 
Keeping that in mind, I strove to be reflective when analysing my data and took into 
consideration not only what children stated, but also what I felt their body language 
was telling me and what they sometimes tried to avoid saying. I found the use of   308
videotapes, which allowed me to listen and view the interviews over and over again, 
invaluable in unearthing some contradictions in children’s responses as well as in 
discovering their perception of what is and what is not socially acceptable.  
 
  While analysing my data from the second interview I realised how little 
meaning this data would have had if I relied only on counting how many times 
children described the photographs in either positive or negative way. It was the 
follow-up discussion that allowed me to discover how complex their thinking was 
and where some of their assumptions might have been coming from. However, 
although I gathered some important data form this interview, I realised that its design 
had a number of limitations.  
 
  One of them related to its time frame. Having children describe the 
photographs by the set of adjectives was quite a lengthy process. By the time it was 
completed, some children started showing signs of fatigue and, in some cases, were 
not engaging in follow-up conversations. However, those who did, demonstrated a 
significant degree of sophistication in how they responded to my questions, which at 
times challenged their assumptions. Nevertheless, these interviews did not provide 
me with as much data as I expected.  
 
  If I were to design my second interview again, I would refrain from the 
description of the photographs, which at times became quite mechanical and 
monotonous. Instead, I would conduct it in a more open manner and ask some focus 
questions related to their classroom friends as a starting point for further discussion. 
I would also have small groups of two or three rather than individual children   309
involved in each of the interviews. Research conducted by Connolly (1996, 1998b) 
demonstrated that such small group interviews can be very successful, as they allow 
children to feel supported by their peers and to get stimulated by each other’s 
statements. 
 
  Pedagogical implications of my findings 
 
  Although my study offers an insight into an understanding of some ways 
children come to racialise their social worlds, similarly to other qualitative studies 
(Connolly, 1998b; van Ausdale & Feagin, 2001) it does not intend to draw any grand 
generalisations. It is important to acknowledge that although certain patterns and 
themes of children’s racialised thought have been identified, they apply to the 
children who participated in my study. Parents, childcare workers, teachers and 
practitioners need to determine themselves whether and to what extent my findings 
can be applied to the children with whom they live or work. Nevertheless, as my 
study demonstrates that some young children develop biased views about the ‘racial’ 
Other at quite an early age, it appears important to reflect on the messages children 
receive in their social settings and on the ways these assumptions can be challenged.  
 
  It seems that in order to address children’s racialised views and prejudices, it 
is imperative to revisit the principles of multicultural education which underlie 
curricula at schools and children’s services in Australia and to critically evaluate 
strategies that are currently employed to combat racism in children. As I argued in 
Chapter 3, the policy of multiculturalism in Australia is placed within the framework 
of ‘diversity’. Such a soft approach to multiculturalism, sometimes identified as a   310
“life style” approach (Bell, 1997, p.41), promotes tolerance and understanding of 
cultural differences and “equality of opportunity” as the ultimate goals for society. 
However, at the same time, it assumes that minority cultures should identify with the 
Anglo-Australian core culture and neglects “deeper structural issues … such access 
to political power and the distribution of social resources” (p.41). Education framed 
within such a soft approach to multiculturalism faces some important issues. 
 
  Firstly such multicultural education often contributes to the development of 
stereotypes as it portrays cultural traditions as homogenous and static and ignores the 
dynamic nature of identities of individuals and groups. Secondly, it conceptualises 
racism as a product of ignorance and assumes that it can be dealt with by providing 
students with knowledge about different cultures, which will result in positive 
changes to their misconceptions and attitudes. 
     
  Based on this study, I argue that more radical educational responses are 
required to address children’s racist assumptions. As my study demonstrates, these 
assumptions may start developing quite early in children’s lives and seem to be 
influenced by various discourses present in Australian society at present. These 
assumptions range from reflecting crude racist beliefs as constructed within a 
discourse of colonialism, to more subtle forms of racialisation which refer to cultural 
differences between ‘them’ and ‘us’ or even to examples of ‘positive’ racism. To 
challenge these assumptions of young children, children’s services and school 
curricula need a stronger anti-racist focus than current multicultural education allows 
for. Within these programs, frequent opportunities to critically look at the issues of 
racisms, their different forms of expression, and their consequences are needed. This,   311
however, cannot be done without examining the broader social structures and social 
relations within which children experience the world, as these relations are 
characterised not only by racism but also by other socially constructed distinctions 
such as class and gender. Children also need to have opportunities to imagine better, 
just communities in which all their members are equally valued and treated with 
respect (Rizvi, 1993a). This can start with building more socially just communities 
within their Microsystems settings such as child care centres or schools.    
 
  As Bronfenbrenner (1979) argues, changes at the Microsystem level are not 
possible without important shifts at the broader systems. Therefore, in order to fulfil 
its role in combating racism in children, critical educational approaches that do not 
stereotype cultures or construct racism as simply a product of ignorance need to be 
accompanied by changes at the higher levels of environmental influences. These 
should include factors such as employment policies and practices at the Exosystem 
level, to ensure that all social groups are equally represented in the teaching and 
caregiving professions at various levels of responsibility, as well as “radically re-
orientated” (Cole, 1998, p.7) education programs for caregivers and teachers, which 
include opportunities to challenge their own stereotypes and to recognise and 
challenge all forms of racism, including the subtle ones.  
 
  As I stated in my introduction, it seems unrealistic to expect curricula and 
educational institutions to have the power of directly changing existing racist 
discourses and structures in society. However, they can contribute to the 
development of a culture within some Microsystems, where society’s racist views   312
become unmasked and challenged by children now and possibly carried into their 
future roles in the broader social structures. 
 
Suggestions for further research 
 
My study demonstrated that my participants engaged in the process of 
racialising difference from an early age.  It also showed that the ways they perceived 
the ‘racial’ Other were dynamic and seemed to be influenced by a variety of 
common racist discourses that are constructed and reproduced through the media and 
in various Microsystem settings. Although my study was based on a small sample, it 
might be that my evidence sheds light on a broader social problem, which requires 
action.  
 
To establish the need and scope for social action, further qualitative research 
explaining ways young Australian children’s view the ‘racial’ Other is required, as 
available other Australian data related to this topic is limited to a few studies 
(Palmer, 1990; Rizvi, 1993a; MacNaughton & Davis, 2001). There is also a need to 
study how the issues of inequalities related to ‘race’, gender and class are addressed 
in early childhood programs. Action research related to curricula with a strong anti-
racist focus could provide important data to address the future desired shape of 
programs for young children in our multicultural Australian society. Similar research 
needs have been identified by other Australian researchers (for example, 
MacNaughton & Davis, 2001). 
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GUIDE TO INTERVIEW 1  
 
DATE:                                                                        TIME: 
NAME:                                                                        DOB: 
 
 
TASK 1 
 
PRESENT PHOTOGRAPHS ONE BY ONE 
 
DO YOU KNOW ANYBODY WHO LOOKS LIKE THAT? 
 
YES (PLAIN CIRCLE): 
 
NO (CIRCLE WITH A FLOWER): 
 
 
TASK 2 
 
PRESENT EIGHT PHOTOS IN SETS OF THREE IN SIX RANDOMLY 
SELECTED TRIALS  
 
WHICH TWO OF THESE PHOTOGRAPHS GO TOGETHER? 
 
NUMBERS                                          
SET 1:       
 
 
SET 2: 
 
 
SET 3: 
 
 
SET 4: 
 
 
SET 5: 
 
 
SET 6: 
 
ADDITIONAL SET: 
 
ADDITIONAL SET: 
 
 
 
   315
COULD YOU TELL ME MORE ABOUT YOUR CHOICES? 
WHY DO THESE PHOTOGRAPHS GO TOGETHER? 
 
WHY IS THIS PHOTOGRAPH DIFFERENT? 
 
 
TASK 3 
 
PRESENT TWELVE PHOTOGRAPHS - SPREAD THEM ON THE TABLE 
 
CHOOSE CHILDREN WHO LOOK LIKE YOU – PLACE THEM ON THE 
PLAIN CIRCLE 
 
WHY ARE THEY LIKE YOU? 
 
 
 
 
CHOOSE CHILDREN WHO DO NOT LOOK LIKE YOU – PLACE THE 
PHOTOS ON THE CIRCLE  WITH A FLOWER 
 
WHY ARE THEY NOT LIKE YOU? 
 
 
 
TASK 4 
 
PLACE TWELVE PHOTOS ON THE TABLE   
 
IF YOU WOULD LIKE TO PLAY, WHICH OF THESE CHILDREN WOULD 
YOU CHOOSE? 
PLACE THE PHOTOGRAPHS ON THE PLAIN CIRCLE 
 
 
COULD YOU TELL ME WHY YOU WOULD CHOOSE THESE 
CHILDREN? 
 
 
WHICH OF THESE CHILDREN YOU WOULD NOT LIKE TO PLAY WITH? 
PLACE THEM ON THE CIRCLE WITH A FLOWER 
 
 
COULD YOU TELL ME WHY YOU WOULD NOT CHOOSE THESE 
CHILDREN? 
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GUIDE TO INTERVIEW 2 
 
 
DATE:                                                                                                  TIME:     
 
NAME:                                                                                                AGE: 
 
 
VOCABULARY USED: 
 
ADJECTIVES                                                                                            
ANTONYMS 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
 
Photograph 1 
Description: 
 
 
 
Why does this child look like that to you? 
 
 
 
 
 
Photograph 2 
Description: 
 
 
Why does this child look like that to you? 
 
 
 
 
Photograph 3 
Description: 
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CONSENT FORM 
 
 
Project title: Development of ‘racial’ attitudes in young children-an Australian 
study 
 
 
 
 
I   ______________________    have been informed about all aspects of the above 
research project and any questions I have asked have been answered to my 
satisfaction.  
 
I understand that my child will not be forced to participate in any activity and will be 
always given a freedom to choose whether to interact with the researcher or not. 
 
I further understand that I may withdraw my child from this study at any time 
without prejudice. 
 
I understand that this research is not designed to provide any judgment about my 
child’s views and attitudes, but aims to increase knowledge about children’s 
awareness of racial differences and their evaluation and preferences in general.  
 
I agree that the research data gathered for this study may be published provided my 
child is not identifiable. 
 
 
 
 
I give my consent to my child _____________________to participate in this study 
under the conditions above: 
 
 
Signed: _____________________  Parent/guardian               Date: ______________ 
 
 
 
Investigator: _________________________                           Date: ______________ 
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DECLARATION OF CONFIDENTIALITY 
 
PROJECT TITLE: Development of ‘racial’ attitudes of young children – an 
Australian study 
 
 
I ________________________________ the above research project team member, 
declare that I will abide the University guidelines on good research practice. I am 
aware and will adhere to ethical principles of justice and veracity and of respect for 
people and their privacy and avoidance to harm them. I will therefore not discuss any 
aspects of this study outside the research team or give any information to any 
persons that might identify the participants or the families involved in this project.   
 
 
 
Signed: 
 
 
 
____________________        Name of research team member (Research      
                                                Assistant/transcriber) 
 
 
____________________         Signature 
 
 
 
____________________          Signature of Principal Investigator 
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PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM 
7 YEAR OLD CHILDREN 
 
PROJECT TITLE: Development of ‘racial’ attitudes of young children - an 
Australian study 
 
 
 
I _____________________ agree to play a game with Anna and look at and put into 
different groups the photographs of children she will show me. I also agree to answer 
questions asked by Anna in relation to these photos and explain my choices. I also 
agree to listen to a story and talk about it when I meet with Anna next time. 
I understand that this game is not a test and that different children give different 
answers to the questions of this game and all of them are OK. 
I know that when we play this game there will be another person who will record it. I 
will be able to see this video when we finish. 
I understand that I can stop this game at any time or ask Anna any questions if I need 
to. 
 
 
Signed: 
 
 
____________________         Name of the participant 
 
 
 
____________________          Signature 
 
 
 
____________________           Signature of the Principal Investigator 
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INFORMATION FOR THE YOUNGEST PARTICIPANTS OF THE STUDY 
 
PROJECT TITLE: Development of ‘racial’ attitudes of young children - an 
Australian study 
 
Session one. 
 
I would like you to play a game with me. I will show you some photographs of 
different children and we will talk about them. I will later ask you to put these 
photographs into different piles and to tell me why you put them there. There will be 
another person with a camera when we play this game, so when we finish we will be 
able to see ourselves on the video. If you get tired or if you feel like not playing 
anymore, let me know and we will stop. 
 
Session two. 
 
I would like you to play another game with me today. I will read you a story and we 
will talk about it. I will ask you to describe for me some of the characters in this 
story. We will also look at the photos that you saw last time and I will ask you to 
describe them with the same words you have used for the story characters. My friend 
is with us here again. She will film us and when we finish we will be able to see 
ourselves on the video. Remember that you can stop this game at any time and ask 
me any questions if you need to. 
 
Are you happy to do that? 
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